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Human Diversity:

Vernon Bogdanor • Mark D.W. Edington • Hermann Giliomee
John A. Hall • Chris Hann • Martin Kramer • Charles Lindholm
Mark Mazower • Amartya Sen • Edward A. Tiryakian

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

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Preface to the Issue "Human Diversity"

THE TERM "DIVERSITY" HAS BECOME increasingly popular of late and is much used by those who preach tolerance and understanding of races, nations, individuals, and communities presumed to be different, separated in significant ways by their belief and experience from those others thought to belong to whatever is taken to be the majority. Yet, the whole concept of majority and minority is constantly changing, and the attributes conventionally awarded to each show how ephemeral are many of yesterday's attributions. At a time when nationalism, ethnicity, race, and religion are all thought to be defining elements in the lives of individuals, it is easy to believe that America's preoccupation today with race, gender, ethnicity, and sexual orientation, for example, are also the world's preoccupations, that Americans are in some very fundamental sense setting the intellectual agenda for others. This may, in fact, be one of the many fictions that now exist. At a time when the world is thought to be more than ever a "global village," when nation-states are said to be declining in importance beside the growth of multinational agencies, public and private, when the "market" is thought to be all-powerful, and

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when it is recognized to be international in quite novel ways, creating wholly new patterns of investment, trade, and influence, it is difficult to assert that we may be going too far in discounting difference, that in our very yearning to find order in a world that remains highly differentiated we are exaggerating common features, ignoring distinctive traits.

This issue of *Dædalus* suggests both implicitly and explicitly that this may be the case. It starts with the proposition that the world is incontestably changing, dramatically so, but that the changes are not following a scenario that individuals as recently as a decade ago imagined possible. That the events of the last decade, whether in the Soviet Union, the other so-called people's democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, South Africa, or the Middle East, to take only several vast areas, have come as surprises, that we are still largely confounded as to how the unanticipated "revolutions" of those worlds will eventually turn out is only a very small part of the problem. The equally compelling question is how the supposedly more stable democracies of the world, the "old nations," are faring, in Europe, North and South America, in those states that can claim origins that go back in a few instances to the eighteenth century or earlier, that are all able to claim birth dates that precede the events of World War II. What is distinctive about each? Are they in fact becoming increasingly like each other, and are the resistances of certain of these societies to this so-called homogenization process a forlorn venture, certain to lead nowhere?

Our journals and newspapers are filled with accounts of how the United States, for example, is changing, but it is difficult to know whether many of these accounts are not fundamentally ephemeral, whether they do not ignore the interpretative works of another era, indeed of our own century, which sought to account for the character of American society. In our present preoccupation with "political correctness," are we giving sufficient attention to all those studies of American conformity, beginning with Alexis de Tocqueville, who understood so well the power of public opinion and the influence of majorities? Are we too cavalier in forgetting the remarkable interpretations produced in this country in the years immediately after World War II? Are they now all antiquated, describing an America that no longer exists? Or would we

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do well to consult them again, to see whether their fundamental findings about the character of American society do not still have merit, why they may indeed help to explain what we now imagine to be happening? One thinks, for example, of American society as described in *The Lonely Crowd,* first published in 1950, written by David Riesman, Nathan Glazer, and Reuel Denney. Are the distinctions between "tradition directed," "inner directed," and "other directed" no longer valid, or is it important to see that each still exists, though not necessarily expressed in forms described in a work written immediately after World War II? If suburban America is no longer what it was in those first years of postwar prosperity, as urban America is also fundamentally transformed—drugs do not figure at all in *The Lonely Crowd*—such major changes do not by themselves invalidate a work that is seeking to explain why Americans act as they do, why so many are so concerned to be like the others.

In our journalistic age, when large theories about the United States are discounted, it is easy to ignore another work of the immediate postwar period that once enjoyed great influence: Erik Erikson's *Childhood and Society,* with its memorable chapter on the American "mom." Has the disappearance of this character from American life, like the disappearance of an earlier patriarchal father, fundamentally transformed the society, making such analyses useful as histories, revealing as documents reflecting the state of the social sciences in the United States in the decades after World War II, but no longer descriptive of a society that today views race, class, ethnicity, and gender in quite new ways? Indeed, is the whole idea of the American nation a very different one from what those who wrote for a very early issue of *Dædalus,* in the spring of 1958, believed "the American national style" to be? What would today's generation of social scientists say about the conclusions Clyde Kluckhohn reached as a result of the researches he described in that *Dædalus* issue? Are American values so different today from what they were when Clyde Kluckhohn wrote the essay entitled "The Evolution of Contemporary American Values," as to make his observations significant only as history?

To ask these questions is to ask a more fundamental question. Are we witnessing such rapid changes in almost every part of the world that the theoretical analyses and empirical findings of yes-

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terday are largely outmoded, or are we confronted with a much more difficult issue that we ignore at our peril, which requires us to understand a world increasingly diverse and disparate whose differences we refuse to acknowledge? This last proposition will not be readily accepted by those who imagine that we are witnessing the triumph of democracy and the market almost everywhere, that the "global village" is today a reality, made uniform by the silken ties of competitive trade and commerce, where money circulates and goods travel as neither ever did before. If, in a very recent period—the Cold War is, after all, "only yesterday"—American politicians were able to divide the world into that which was Communist and the other which was "free," largely ignoring the fundamental differences between the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, China, North Korea, Poland, and Albania, showing not much greater discrimination in contrasting Canada and Mexico, the United States and the United Kingdom, there is no reason to believe that the present distinctions, which emphasize other kinds of uniformities, are any less crude. When a newly appointed secretary of state divides the world into four categories—developed states, developing states, rogue states, and failed states—and these are imagined to be real entities, one can only conclude that the world is not seen in the same perspective from Washington, D.C., as it is from New Delhi or from Paris.

To argue this is to assert a very simple proposition. While some would like to find uniformities and discover them in common political and economic institutions, or in a common religion—imagining Islam, for example, to be the defining element of very disparate societies—there is too little effort made to discriminate between such large entities, to acknowledge that the differences, the diversity, may be as significant as the beliefs held in common. When Amartya Sen, in the opening essay in this issue of *Dædalus,* reminds us that India is commonly seen as a "mainly Hindu" country, he is not disputing the fact that the greatest number of those who profess a religion in that society are Hindu, but only that the country also boasts almost 110 million Muslims, making it the third largest Muslim country in the world. What is one to say of this minority? Can its condition be compared with that of the many millions who live across the border in Pakistan, or across the water in Saudi Arabia or Egypt, where they are not in a

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minority? Why, given India's reputation for spirituality, does it boast, in Sen's words, "perhaps the largest atheistic and materialist literature of all the ancient civilizations?" Are these latter facts much considered by those who write about Indian politics and economic development? Are they significant for either? In arguing in this way, Sen's concern is not to "distance" India from the rest of the world, least of all from the West; he has little sympathy for those who do that. Instead, his concern is to show how those who argue about India's "specialness" fail to understand the unique features of Indian culture, making it seem somehow committed to the "irrational" when so much of the rest of the world inclines its head before the "rational." Only when the full panoply of India's cultural contributions are considered, when attention is given to how much Indians see themselves in a frame largely provided by others, principally in the West, do we begin to understand why the society is so little known, caricatured even when it is purportedly honored. Yet to know this society, to understand its peoples, so diverse in so many ways, is to engage in an exploration that few outside India are prepared to undertake. It is much too arduous.

If this is true of India, a society acknowledged to be complex, whose potential as an economic and military power is much debated in the West today, what possibility is there of understanding certain of the smaller societies of our vastly differentiated globe, which have been greatly changed in recent decades? Chris Hann, in considering Poland and Turkey, reflecting on how their national identity is integrally related to their religious belief, understands that it is not enough to say that Catholicism is powerful in Poland, that Islam appears to be gaining new influence in Turkey. Though both are increasingly "homogenized" national societies, having lost many of their minority populations in this century, both remain fragmented, made so in great part by external and domestic events too rarely reported by the mass media. Looking beyond the capital cities, the so-called cosmopolitan world that preoccupies many who pretend to know these countries or presume to speak of them, Hann gives the political and economic "revolutions" of recent decades a quite new meaning. If communism is dead in Poland, Kemalism continues to live in Turkey, but it is not the Kemalism of yesterday. In the opening of large numbers of Islamic schools, in the growing antipathy to certain kinds of West-

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ernization, there is a new Turkey in the making. Too few have reflected on how the disintegration of the Soviet Union has affected both countries, not least in creating weak successor states that have been very hospitable to "petty trading," creating new economic opportunities for Turks and Poles, but at the same time challenging any number of their traditional moral and religious beliefs. It is not at all obvious that toleration has become the hallmark of these rapidly changing societies, buffeted by forces they scarcely know how to contend with.

Mark Mazower tells the story of how Thessaloniki, a polyglot city of 150,000 a century ago, whose population under the Ottoman Empire included many tens of thousands of Jews but also Turks, Greeks, Armenians, Bulgarians, Vlachs, Circassians, and Albanians, was transformed in much less than a hundred years into a city of one million Greeks, almost no Turks, and fewer than two thousand Jews. The Nazi extermination of the Jews, following the earlier expulsion of the Turks both before and after World War I, is a tale well known, but few have thought to probe deeply into how and why all the cosmic tragedies of the interwar and war years were allowed to happen. Indeed, what the League of Nations sought to do (and what it failed to do) to protect "minorities" in the interwar years is a story familiar to a handful of scholars but largely ignored by those concerned principally with the more contemporary examples of genocide. According to Mazower, the United Nations was never able to develop a strong policy on minority rights, and its record, in comparison with that of the League of Nations, is a dismal one. The issue of Europe's minorities in this century, following on the breakup of the great multinational empires, is one that does scant credit to those who seek to demonstrate their credentials as civilized and humane beings.

Because the problem of minorities remains so important today, not only in the former Soviet Union, but also in so many other parts of Europe, Asia, and Africa, Vernon Bogdanor considers what the experience of those who have succeeded in finding a way to accommodate both majority and minority communities has been. In his view, some form of "power-sharing" has characterized all who have been successful in this endeavor, entailing some sort of departure from the principle of strict obedience to the will of the majority. Whether the power-sharing is achieved territori-

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ally through a federal system, often involving some sort of regional autonomy, or is guaranteed by specific electoral practices instituted to protect minority opinion, including the common practice of proportional representation, or whether there is a specific commitment of certain powers to the executive, which can take many different forms—all are conceived as giving protection to those who are numerically disadvantaged. Achieving such equity has never been easy, and the world is scarcely interested in what either the Belgian or the Swiss experiments in this regard have been. Yet it is the role of scholars to remind us that such experiments are in fact going on, that they need to be considered. Bogdanor, aware of how difficult the minority issues are, reminds us that the Hapsburg Empire never succeeded in resolving its nationality problems, that it is no less serious a problem in many contemporary states, not least those created out of the now-extinct Soviet Union. He gives particular attention to what Estonia is seeking to do but knows that there is no one method by which the participation of minorities can be secured. If the concept of sovereignty is made less paramount, and if new efforts are made to transcend nationalism, there may be some hope for the new governments of Central and Eastern Europe. For Bogdanor, both the Leninist and the Wilsonian legacies need to be overcome—a view that will commend itself to many.

Martin Kramer, writing about another region, the Middle East, tells of those who have dreamed of a "new society" in that region, characterized by peace, prosperity, and cooperation, in which Arab, Jew, Turk, and Persian would all participate. The dream, however utopian, is obliged to seek its fortunes at the end of the twentieth century in a world where dictatorship, xenophobia, and fundamentalism are all too common. In the Middle East, where there is such an acute "competition of identities," Western experts have found solace in elections, economic reforms, peace negotiations, and the like; but Kramer knows that the region, composed of four major parts not likely to make the same choices or to agree on all matters of substance, needs to be seen as something other than a single entity, moving towards some sort of unity. For him, Israel, the Arab lands, Turkey, and Iran are the principal players. Each starts with its own quite specific memories; each is engaged in a national project that bears little resemblance to what the

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others aspire to do. They are not likely to see the future in the same ways; their debates do not always dwell on the same subjects. For Israel, the crucial fact is that there are today two Zionisms, one secular, the other religious, and the contradictions between the aspirations of each cannot be easily compromised. How both see the new Palestine, what each is prepared to give in the way of concessions, how indeed Israel identifies itself as a culture and as a society are all matters that are today being heatedly debated. The economic and military strengths of the country are incontestable, and this leads to a certain self-confidence, but the greatest trials of the Israeli democracy, in Kramer's view, almost certainly lie ahead.

In the Arab world, the problems are very different. While the old slogans (Arab unity, Arab socialism, and Arab steadfastness against Israel) enjoyed a very long run, they never achieved their intended objectives, and the Arab world paid dearly for cleaving to those beliefs. Today, with populations growing dramatically and gross domestic production showing significant declines, there is new concern with economic adversity. While some in the region wish to put ideology behind them, concentrating wholly on economic growth, Islamism—Islamic fundamentalism—has by no means folded its tents, stealing away into the desert. If cooperation with Europe appears to be a possible panacea for the Arab elites and middle classes who live on the shores of the Mediterranean, those whom Kramer calls "the leaders-for-life" are not simply passing from the scene. They retain their power, and the states of the Arab world are strong, dispensing patronage and guaranteeing order. The focus of loyalty of their citizens and subjects, they are today the only power that can be depended on to be pragmatic, avoiding the populism of yesterday, though it is by no means certain that this will in fact be their choice.

When one moves to Turkey, the third of the four principal players, one encounters a society recently resolutely secular, determined to become part of Europe, that has now come under increasing pressure from Islamic elements. In the process, what once passed for a Turkish consensus has all but eroded. Turkey is by no means Islamist, Kramer says, but by sharing power it has significantly altered the character of Turkish politics. Meanwhile, in Iran, the last of the powers in the region, the earlier Islamic fundamentalist thrust seems to be waning somewhat, but it is

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difficult to know whether the project, pressed by Khomeini, to make Iran the ideal Islamic state remains a compelling vision for very many. Islamization certainly remains the state's policy in respect to public morality and foreign policy, but whether it extends much beyond those areas is increasingly in doubt.

Do these several developments suggest that there is a "new Middle East" in the making? Kramer provides no definitive answer to that conundrum, but he does explain why the area cannot be taken today to be what it was in the period of the Cold War. Whether it will in fact "take off," becoming more secular in its policies if not in its religious beliefs, is only one of many uncertainties that relates to how the area modernizes, whether in fact it is able to be modern and at the same time preserve certain traditions.

If there is any surprise in the last years comparable to the collapse of the Soviet empire, it is certainly the end of Afrikaner rule in South Africa, achieved peacefully, in circumstances that few who thought themselves expert on the subject would have imagined possible only a few decades ago. How this happened, how an all-powerful minority of only 8 percent of the population, which enjoyed a safe majority in a parliament from which blacks were excluded, came voluntarily to abandon its domination is the subject of Hermann Giliomee's essay. While the Afrikaner state was challenged in many ways, both domestically and internationally, there were no reasons to believe that its extinction was imminent. Though Nelson Mandela called the transformation a "small miracle," it was the *Financial Times* that understood the full import of the change, saying that "the people have defied the logic of their past and broken all the rules of social theory." There have been many explanations for the peaceful revolution, and Giliomee's principal concern is to explain why the apartheid idea collapsed and why there was no alternative ideology to replace it. In his view, the Afrikaner minority, confronting serious economic and political problems, knew that it had to make certain changes. Not the least of de Klerk's achievements was to keep the whole process of constitutional change fairly ambiguous so that the full extent of his "gamble" was not immediately recognized. The expected resistance to change never materialized in the white community; in the end, the author concludes, much of the credit must go to de Klerk, but a good deal is also owing to what he sees as the

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pragmatism, fatalism, and resilience of the Afrikaner people. Why these qualities were not perceived earlier—why indeed the Afrikaner was thought to be irrevocably tied to the ideology of apartheid, someone who would fight rather than compromise—remains something of a mystery. In this instance, as in so many others, the character of a minority was rendered in certain conventional ways, and when these no longer adequately described how that minority acted, too little notice was taken of the real options that existed for that hard-pressed minority. Giliomee, recognizing the role of contingency, knows that a prolonged stalemate might have occurred, that what finally happened was not inevitable at that moment. His is not a tale that makes any individual the all-knowing and all-powerful person who anticipated and prepared a blueprint for the future. It is only by recounting the details of what happened in the last years before the "miracle" that the author is able to explain how the peaceful change that so confounded the world occurred.

It is precisely the elements of surprise in these last decades that makes Edward Tiryakian write of "the wild cards of modernity." Those who once imagined that they could predict the future, who equated gross national product with modernity and identity, have been compelled in recent years to reconsider their utopian visions, to make room for what some once conceived to be the receding forces of the contemporary world, including race, ethnicity, religion, and nationalism. In Tiryakian's view, these are not the antiquated beliefs of another age that may be safely stored away in a historical archive labeled tradition; they are the elemental forces creating modernity, giving it many of its more distinctive features. Understanding how much contemporary scholars have contributed to our understanding of phenomena like nationalism and ethnicity—how very different is the debate now taking place about both and what their consequences for modern societies have been—Tiryakian knows that this is not simply the nineteenth-century discussion brought up to date. In considering the theories of individuals as different as Hobsbawm and Gellner, Wallerstein and Balibar, Shils, Schnapper, and Kristeva, to name only a few, the author is seeking to explain why an earlier conventional view of the forces operating in supposedly "backward" and "advanced" societies is being revised, why what he calls the "paradigm of

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progress," of both the liberal and the socialist variety, is no longer universally believed in or accepted. At a time when "collective identities" are being redefined or in some instances rediscovered, the "culture of distrust," spoken of by Piotr Sztompka and thought to be particularly applicable to the postcommunist societies of Central and Eastern Europe, has a much larger relevance in many parts of the world than is commonly admitted. The theme of social cohesion has taken on new importance precisely because men and women who perceive themselves to be different, in some instances insisting on that difference, need somehow to be absorbed into communities that they can identify with. In our "brave new world," the task of analysis becomes all the more imperative, and all the more difficult.

Charles Lindholm and John Hall, gazing at the United States, ask questions about the fate of what was once conceived to be a common American cultural value system. Has it in fact atrophied in the ways that Robert Bellah and Robert Putnam, in their quite different ways, suggest? The authors begin by identifying some of the characteristic features of American life that have long historic antecedents: the egalitarianism and social mobility that Alexis de Tocqueville, more than a century and a half ago, dwelled on; the refusal to accept a state religion and the absolute insistence on religious toleration; the very limited support that has existed for socialism in any form, and indeed the docile acceptance of substantial economic inequality. It is the "relentless quest for wealth" that the authors, following Tocqueville, find to be "a central preoccupation for Americans." The "shared fantasy of achieving and displaying material wealth" is said to be incarnate in the mall culture that has become so characteristically American. In this society, then, has there been no conflict? Have religious and class differences, not to speak of those that divide ethnic groups, had relatively little impact in the country? Lindholm and Hall know that the country has known all these divisions, that they have sometimes erupted in violence, but they argue that by comparison with most other societies the United States has been a pacific society, able to absorb its immigrant populations relatively easily. Indeed, the easy assimilation and incorporation of new arrivals has made for a fluid social world where capitalist enterprise is valued, and where social hostilities are largely defused. If this is the condi-

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tion of the country, how is one to explain the malaise that so many express? Why, for example, is there such universal disappointment with today's political leaders? Why is there a growing tendency to idealize "us" and to demonize "them"? How is one to explain the continued force of antiblack racism in the country? The authors seek to explain each of these and other like phenomena, but they are unwilling to see the society as riven in the way so many others are.

As they explain, "Whether black or white, gay or straight, female or male, the vast majority of Americans continue to believe in the possibilities of economic success and to act as if the world was made up of nice, nonjudgmental individuals, who build familiar communities through mutual and voluntary cooperation." They know that this is an "idealized belief," but they see no evidence that it is being seriously challenged today. Still, this does not blind them to the large conformities in the society, to the penalties that are paid by those who seriously deviate from what are thought to be the prevailing and acceptable norms. Just as the great nineteenth-century theorists of democracy, Alexis de Tocqueville and John Stuart Mill, worried about how minorities would fare, that problem remains a very serious one today, too rarely discussed or acknowledged. It is obvious that the pieties of the American world that Sinclair Lewis mocked are no longer vital in the way they once were; others, however, have replaced them, and in an age that values investigative reporting but disapproves of irony, there is little open criticism of the new orthodoxies. The United States, if it is indeed as Lindholm and Hall describe it, is not only a "little dull," enjoying "the comforts of a measure of conformity," but also blissfully ignorant of much of the outside world, which may be no less interested in riches and comfort, in "making it," but retains some memory of other goods as well.

It is this aspect of the American scene that makes Mark Edington's essay so very compelling. Who can doubt, for example, that a great deal of social science in the last fifty years has been American, either in inspiration or in its actual implementation? In any number of disciplines, concepts that originated in the United States traveled abroad and were in varying degrees accepted. So, to take only the example principally cited by Edington, the concept of "deterrence" became very popular, influencing both scholars and

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practitioners seeking to make sense of the external world. While the need to deter an adversary—which usually meant the Soviet Union—legitimated the very complex arms control proposals and national security studies that made it possible to interpret what a new system of weaponry had done to change both strategic and tactical military issues, deterrence theory was never satisfied to remain in so restricted a security frame. As Edington explains, resource scarcity, trade relationships, environmental degradation, alliance-building, ethnic identity, and even religious nationalism were all subjected to analysis with one version or another of deterrence theory. It was not only Raymond Aron in *Dædalus* and in other publications who questioned what the new theorizing of Americans was doing to distort analysis of the world's problems, not least those of modern industrial society; but the more compelling issue today may be whether these methods of interpretation do not do great violence to our understanding of such fundamental modern phenomena as nationalism and ethnicity.

Nationalism, in Edington's view, is not made more comprehensible by the introduction of deterrence theory, "with its assumptions of unitary, value-maximizing, rational actors, pursuing connected and transitive preferences in logically consistent fashion." One understands neither Bosnia nor Croatia by using such analytic tools, and the annual presidential statements on national security, which now bear the somewhat grandiloquent and hyperbolic title *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement,* do little to explain how the United States is to comport itself in a world where most states do not resemble the American one and are not likely soon to do so. This, then, is the problem of the moment. American military power is incontestably superior to that of any other single state or group of states, but it does not in itself, wedded to theories of deterrence, provide a way of compelling others to act in the way we would have them do. To the extent that Americans, including many in high places, refuse to see the world as highly differentiated, and to the extent that they ignore the evidence of what may indeed be growing diversity, they remain provincials, isolated in their own hyperbolic hubris. If there is indeed a *pax democratia,* as so many insist, whether it will survive well into the next century, with the consequences that are often attributed to it, is a very open question. Human loyalties are more

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complex than those who wish only to dwell on the growing success of the democracies committed to market economies are prepared to acknowledge.

This, then, is the burden of this issue of *Dædalus*. How, in a world like ours, can one hope to master the human diversity that now exists? How, indeed, ought one to seek to study it? Can it be done by each of us becoming expert in a geographic area, a nation-state, a single religion, a limited chronological period? Is this the way for the world to be viewed, and will it yield the understanding that is needed for those who are purportedly responsible for understanding India and Poland, Russia and Israel, Turkey and the United States? This century has spawned expertness; it has also been sympathetic to theory. The question is whether our present scholarly procedures do indeed generate the kinds of understanding necessary for discerning identities and differences in the contemporary world, and whether they make this one of their principal purposes.

These were not problems that seemed preoccupying to scholars in the United States even a few decades ago. When one considers, for example, that the American Historical Association as early as 1909 claimed some 2,700 members, and that no other country in the world could muster a cohort of that size, it is obvious that this country has for a very long time considered historical study to be a profession of no small importance. Still, it must be remembered that the greatest number of these historians were Americanists, doing research and teaching on matters that related principally or exclusively to the United States. This is still true today. As late as the 1920s, the *American Historical Review* gave as much space to American history as to the whole of Europe. Medieval history became a subject of some importance early in this century, but the interest related principally to English medieval law and institutions. Indeed, England in all periods—medieval, Tudor and Stuart, eighteenth century, and modern—was for many years the staple foreign subject, presumed to have special importance for students who wished to understand the history of the United States. Latin America figured in certain parts of the country, particularly in the Southwest, with classical philological and biblical studies also avidly pursued, particularly in many of the church-related institutions. Interest in Russia developed principally after 1917; Asia and

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Africa were very marginal fields of study in American universities until well after World War II.

To dwell on these facts is not to suggest that the United States was particularly parochial in its investigation of the external world. Indeed, an argument can be made that very substantial steps were taken in the period after World War II to give support to studies of those regions of the world—including the Soviet Union—thought to be of particular importance to the security of the United States. In time, Asia figured much more conspicuously in American academic curricula, reflecting the new commercial and political interests of the society. Africa, by comparison, ran a relatively poor second. Still, the country was obviously moving away from its earlier preoccupation with itself, first and foremost, and only secondarily with that small western cape of Europe. Today, the challenge is to know which areas of the world merit particular study and whether the national frameworks, so useful in the past, still retain some validity. Does it make sense, in the late twentieth century, to make the nation-state a principal subject of inquiry? If not, what should the subject be, particularly when the concern is not only to describe the present but to explain how the present came to be? What attention must be given to the kinds of identifying characteristics that have figured in the study that produced this issue of *Dædalus?* Do we not make a fundamental mistake if we neglect vast and complex subjects like religion, so intimately tied to politics and social behavior? When so many in the world believe in Islam, can we continue to teach as if the powers that matter in the world are all still overwhelmingly and meaningfully Christian? Has international collaboration in many historical and social scientific fields not become a necessity, as it has proved to be in so many of the natural sciences? Why, then, is it still so little pursued?

To ask these questions is to ask another, of even greater import. If the broad outlines of American development are being substantially revised today—largely as a consequence of new inquiries by American scholars, which have given new importance to the role of women, race, and specific ethnic groups—is the larger story also being fundamentally altered, and with what consequences? In our concern to tell the story of previously neglected groups, are other tales being scanted, not least those that relate to the evolution of

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specific American institutions but also to the fundamental changes in the American economy and polity? Finally, are not American studies still predominantly an intellectual preserve of American scholars? However important the foundation of American studies curricula abroad has been, particularly in certain parts of Europe, are the findings of foreign scholars substantially influencing the field of American studies? If not, will this remain the situation well into the twenty-first century, or must we anticipate that the American "monopoly" on the serious study of its own society will soon be broken, with very great consequences for the kinds of questions that will be asked, the sorts of comparisons that will be made? The theme of human diversity waits to be developed.

If this is true of the United States, if a much greater effort must be made to discern the character of the society as a whole, but also of its several parts, if it becomes important to distinguish between Minnesota and Texas, to see that neither California nor New York define the American experience, this is true, preeminently so, also of Europe. Because so many of the states of the European Union resemble each other superficially, with Germany being much more like France than it seemed to be in the days before 1914, it is easy to ignore the large differences that still exist between these societies, for example, and the others that belong to the European Union. Analysis that dwells only on the particular, that ignores universal features, will always be partial and can sometimes take on the quality of quaintness. Yet, analysis that sees only homogeneity will miss much that is significant in the life of a specific society. In the last years, when it has become necessary to know more about Serbia and Croatia, Bosnia and Albania, Ukraine and Latvia, the large generalizations that once served to describe Europe as a whole were seen to be fundamentally flawed. There may be reason to believe that no less serious an error is made in failing to see what is distinctive about the Netherlands as distinguished from Belgium, and why Norway and Sweden, despite their superficial similarities, remain in many ways so distinct.

In a world where nation-states are so numerous, it is impossible to imagine that all will be seen as different, and will be studied individually. Yet, the hazard of the moment is not that we will go too far in studying each society but that we will never initiate serious scholarly investigation of very many, including a number

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whose history and traditions are very different from those familiar to the West. At a time when international trade and travel have assumed such universal proportions, it may seem perverse to speak of a growing provincialism, but such parochialism may in fact exist, vying for supremacy with those who wish to see themselves as cosmopolitan. There have never been greater opportunities to investigate fundamentally different societies, to develop theories about human diversity, and indeed to describe and explain what are incontestably complex and different polities and economies, but there are powerful forces hostile to such free-ranging inquiry. It is much easier to pretend that there are certain prevailing intellectual and cultural currents, that we are all in fact swimming in the same sea, headed for the same shore. This may just possibly be the major error of our time.

It is well to remember that opinion on even very fundamental questions can change rapidly, and that these changes will often reflect new scholarly preoccupations. When one considers, for example, how many thought nationalism to be yesterday's problem, with many predicting the imminent demise of the nation-state, likely to be rendered obsolescent by the growing integration of vast regions—on the model of what seemed to be happening in Western Europe—one can only say that such sanguine opinion has not had a very long run, and not only because of all that has taken place in the world since 1989. So, also, with religion, thought by many scholars of the contemporary world to be antiquated, a throwback to an earlier time. Those who confidently prophesied the triumph of secularism everywhere, again taking Western Europe to be the model of future industrial society, wholly ignoring the American situation, and giving too little attention to the less-developed world, have not enjoyed great renown as prophets in recent decades. It is difficult to know, looking at the universe in 1997, what importance may attach to race and ethnicity in the twenty-first century, what fissures they are likely to create in individual societies, or what role, if any, they will play in the international system. Today, when all such issues engage individuals and groups passionately attached to one theory or other, it becomes all the more necessary for nonpartisan bodies, who have less reason for advocacy and special pleading, to be engaged in serious scholarly research on what are incontestably some of the

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explosive political and social issues of our day, likely to have even greater importance in the future.

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S.R.G.

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Amartya Sen

Indian Traditions and the Western Imagination

INTRODUCTION

THIS ESSAY IS CONCERNED WITH WESTERN IMAGES of Indian intellectual traditions and the interactions between those representations and a contemporary "internal" understanding of Indian culture.[1] I focus particularly on the elementary diversities that characterize Indian society and its intellectual traditions, as well as on the biases that result from paying inadequate attention to them. In an obvious way, this applies to seeing India as a "mainly Hindu" country (as Western newspapers often describe India, as do the newly powerful Hindu political parties within India); this "mainly Hindu" country is also the third-largest Muslim country in the world (with nearly 110 million Muslims).

Less conspicuously, the contrast applies also to Indian intellectual traditions. This home of endless spirituality has perhaps the largest atheistic and materialist literature of all the ancient civilizations. To be sure, this accounting of the *amount* of unorthodox writing may be a little misleading, since Indian traditions are characterized by some prolixity. For example, the Sanskrit epic *Mahabharata,* which is often compared with the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey,* is in fact seven times as long as the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* put together. One of the more striking Bengali verses I remember from my childhood is a lamentation about the tragedy of death in

Amartya Sen is Lamont University Professor and Professor of Economics and Philosophy at Harvard University.

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a nineteenth-century poem: "Just consider how terrible the day of your death will be. / Others will go on speaking, and you will not be able to respond." But even this extreme fondness for speech is associated with an enormous heterogeneity of programs and preoccupations. Irreducible diversity is perhaps the most important feature of Indian intellectual traditions.

The self-images (or "internal identities") of Indians have been extremely affected by colonialism over the past centuries and are much influenced—both collaterally and dialectically—by the impact of outside imagery (what we may call "external identity"). However, the direction of the influence of Western images on internal Indian identities is not altogether straightforward. In recent years, separatist resistance to Western cultural hegemony has led to the creation of significant intellectual movements in many postcolonial societies—not least in India. This has particularly drawn attention to the important fact that the self-identity of postcolonial societies is deeply affected by the power of the colonial cultures and their forms of thought and classification. Those who prefer to pursue a more "indigenous" approach often opt for a characterization of Indian culture and society that is rather self-consciously "distant" from Western traditions. There is much interest in "recovering" a distinctly Indian focus in Indian culture.

I would argue that this stance does not take adequate note of the dialectical aspects of the relationship between India and the West and, in particular, tends to disregard the fact that the external images of India in the West have often tended to *emphasize* (rather than downplay) the differences—real or imagined—between India and the West. Indeed, I propose that there are reasons why there has been a considerable Western inclination in the direction of "distancing" Indian culture from the mainstream of Western traditions. The contemporary reinterpretations of India (including the specifically "Hindu" renditions), which emphasize Indian particularism, join forces in this respect with the "external" imaging of India (in accentuating the distinctiveness of Indian culture). Indeed, it can be argued that there is much in common between James Mill's imperialist history of India and the Hindu nationalist picturing of India's past, even though the former image is that of a grotesquely primitive culture whereas the latter representation is dazzlingly glorious.

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The special characteristics of the Western approaches to India have encouraged a disposition to focus particularly on the religious and spiritual elements in Indian culture. There has also been a tendency to emphasize the contrast between what is taken to be "Western rationality" and the cultivation of what "Westerners" would see as "irrational" in Indian intellectual traditions. While Western critics may find "anti-rationalism" to be defective and crude, and Indian cultural separatists may find it cogent and penetrating (and perhaps even "rational" in some deeper sense), they nevertheless agree on the existence of a simple and sharp contrast between the two heritages. The issue that has to be scrutinized is whether such a bipolar contrast is at all present in that form.

I will discuss these questions and argue that focusing on India's "specialness" misses, in important ways, crucial aspects of Indian culture and traditions. The deep-seated heterogeneity of Indian traditions is neglected in these homogenized interpretations (even though the interpretations themselves are of different kinds). My focus will be particularly on images of Indian *intellectual* traditions, rather than on its creative arts and other features of social life. After distinguishing between three of the dominant approaches in Western interpretations of Indian intellectual traditions, I will consider what may appear to be the overall consequence of these approaches in Western images of India and its impact on both external and internal identities.

WESTERN APPROACHES TO INDIA: THREE CATEGORIES

A dissimilarity of perceptions has been an important characteristic of Western interpretations of India, and several different and competing conceptions of that large and complex culture have been influential in the West. The diverse interpretations of India in the West have tended to work to a considerable extent in the same direction (that of accentuating India's spirituality) and have reinforced each other in their effects on internal identities of Indians. But this is not because the distinct approaches to India are not fundamentally different; they certainly are very disparate. The similarity lies more in their *impact*—given the special circumstances and the dialectical processes—than in their content.

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The analysis to be pursued here would undoubtedly invite comparison and contrast with Edward Said's justly famous analysis of "Orientalism." Said analyzes the construction of the "Orient" in Western imagination. As he puts it, "The Orient is an idea that has a history and a tradition of thought, imagery, and vocabulary that have given it reality and presence *in and for the West.*"[2] This essay has a much narrower focus than Said's, viz. India, but there is clearly an overlap of subject matter since India is a part of the "Orient." The main difference is at the thematic level. Said focuses on uniformity and consistency in a particularly influential Western characterization of the Orient, whereas I shall be dealing with several contrasting and conflicting Western approaches to understanding India.

Said explains that his work "deals principally not with a correspondence between Orientalism and Orient, but with the internal consistency of Orientalism and its ideas about the Orient."[3] I would argue that unless one chooses to focus on the evolution of a specific conceptual tradition (as Said, in effect, does), "internal consistency" is precisely the thing that is terribly hard to find in the variety of Western conceptions of India. There are several fundamentally contrary ideas and images of India, and they have quite distinct roles in the Western understanding of the country and also in influencing self-perceptions of Indians.

Attempts from outside India to understand and interpret the country's traditions can be, I would argue, put into at least three distinct categories, which I shall call *exoticist* approaches, *magisterial* approaches, and *curatorial* approaches.[4] The first (*exoticist*) category concentrates on the wondrous aspects of India. The focus here is on what is different, what is strange in the country that, as Hegel put it, "has existed for millennia in the imagination of the Europeans."

The second (*magisterial*) category strongly relates to the exercise of imperial power and sees India as a subject territory from the point of view of its British governors. This outlook assimilates a sense of superiority and guardianhood needed to deal with a country that James Mill defined as "that great scene of British action." While a great many British observers did not fall into this category (and some non-British ones did), it is hard to dissociate this category from the task of governing the Raj.

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The third (*curatorial*) category is the most catholic of the three and includes various attempts at noting, classifying, and exhibiting diverse aspects of Indian culture. Unlike the exoticist approaches, a curatorial approach does not look *only* for the strange (even though the "different" must have more "exhibit value"), and unlike the magisterial approaches, it is not weighed down by the impact of the ruler's priorities (even though the magisterial connection would be hard to avoid *altogether* when the author is also a member of the ruling imperial elite, as they sometimes were). For these reasons, there is more freedom from preconceptions in this third category. On the other hand, the curatorial approaches have perspectives of their own, with a general interest in seeing the object—in this case, India—as very special and extraordinarily interesting.

Other categories can be proposed that are not covered by any of the three. Also, the established approaches can be reclassified according to some *other* organizing principle. I am not claiming any grand definitive status of this way of seeing the more prominent Western approaches to India. However, for the purpose of this essay, I believe this threefold categorization is useful.

Curiosity, Power, and Curatorial Approaches

I shall begin by considering the curatorial approaches. But first I must deal with a methodological issue, in particular, the prevalent doubts in contemporary social theory about the status of intellectual curiosity as a motivation for knowledge. In particular, there is much skepticism about the possibility of any approach to learning that is innocent of power. That skepticism is justified to some extent since the motivational issues underlying any investigation may well relate to power relations, even when that connection is not immediately visible.

Yet people seek knowledge for many different reasons, and curiosity about unfamiliar things is certainly among the possible reasons. It need not be seen as a figment of the deluded scientist's imagination, nor as a tactical excuse for some other, ulterior preoccupation. Nor does the pervasive relevance of different types of motivation have the effect of making all the different observational findings *equally* arbitrary. There are real lines to be drawn between inferences dominated by rigid preconceptions (for ex-

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ample, in the "magisterial" approaches, to be discussed presently) and those that are not so dominated.

There is an interesting methodological history here. The fact that knowledge is often associated with power is a recognition that had often received far too little attention in traditional social theories of knowledge. But in recent social studies, the remedying of that methodological neglect has been so comprehensive that we are now in some danger of ignoring other motivations altogether that may not link directly with the seeking of power. While it is true that any useful knowledge gives its possessor some power in one form or another, this may not be the most remarkable aspect of that knowledge, nor the primary reason for which this knowledge is sought. Indeed, the process of learning can accommodate considerable motivational variations without becoming a functionalist enterprise of some grosser kind. An epistemic methodology that sees the pursuit of knowledge as entirely congruent with the search for power is a great deal more cunning than wise. It can needlessly undermine the value of knowledge in satisfying curiosity and interest; it significantly weakens one of the profound characteristics of human beings.

The curatorial approach relates to systematic curiosity. People are interested in other cultures and different lands, and investigations of a country and its traditions have been vigorously pursued throughout human history. Indeed, the development of civilization would have been very different had this not been the case. The exact motivation for these investigations can vary, but the inquiries need not be hopelessly bound by some overarching motivational constraint (such as those associated with the exoticist or magisterial approaches). Rather, the pursuit may be driven primarily by intellectual interests and concerns. This is not to deny that the *effects* of these investigative pursuits may go well beyond the motivating interests and concerns, nor that there could be *mixed motivations* of various kinds, in which power relations play a collateral role. But to deny the role of curiosity and interest as powerful motivational features in their own right would be to miss something rather important. For the curatorial approaches, that connection is quite central.

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Curatorial Approaches in Early Arabic and European Studies

A fine example of a curatorial approach to understanding India can be found in Alberuni's *Ta'rikh al-hind* (The History of India), written in Arabic in the early eleventh century.[5] Alberuni, who was born in Central Asia in A.D. 973, first came to India accompanying the marauding troops of Mahmud of Ghazni. He became very involved with India and mastered Sanskrit; studied Indian texts on mathematics, natural sciences, literature, philosophy, and religion; conversed with as many experts as he could find; and investigated social conventions and practices. His book on India presents a remarkable account of the intellectual traditions and social customs of early eleventh-century India.

Even though Alberuni's was almost certainly the most impressive of these investigations, there are a great many examples of serious Arabic studies of Indian intellectual traditions around that time.[6] Brahmagupta's pioneering Sanskrit treatise on astronomy had first been translated into Arabic in the eighth century (Alberuni retranslated it three centuries later), and several works on medicine, science, and philosophy had an Arabic rendering by the ninth century. It was through the Arabs that the Indian decimal system and numerals reached Europe, as did Indian writings in mathematics, science, and literature.

In the concluding chapter of his book on India, Alberuni describes the motivation behind his work thus: "We think now that what we have related in this book will be sufficient for any one who wants to converse with [the Indians], and to discuss with them questions of religion, science, or literature, on the very basis of their own civilization."[7] He is particularly aware of the difficulties of achieving an understanding of a foreign land and people, and specifically warns the reader about it:

> . . .in all manners and usages, [the Indians] differ from us to such a degree as to frighten their children with us, with our dress, and our ways and customs, and as to declare us to be devil's breed, and our doings as the very opposite of all that is good and proper. By the bye, we must confess, in order to be just, that a similar depreciation of foreigners not only prevails among us and [the Indians], but is common to all nations towards each other.[8]

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While Arab scholarship on India provides plentiful examples of curatorial approaches in the external depiction of India, they are not, of course, unique in this respect. Chinese travelers Fa Hsien and Hsuan Tsang, who spent many years in India in the fifth and seventh centuries A.D. respectively, provided extensive accounts of what they saw. While they had gone to India for Buddhist studies, their reports cover a variety of Indian subjects, described with much care and interest.

Quite a few of the early European studies of India must also be put in this general category. A good example is the Italian Jesuit Roberto Nobili, who went to south India in the early seventeenth century, and whose remarkable scholarship in Sanskrit and Tamil permitted him to produce quite authoritative books on Indian intellectual discussions, in Latin as well as in Tamil. Another Jesuit, Father Pons from France, produced a grammar of Sanskrit in Latin in the early eighteenth century and also sent a collection of original manuscripts to Europe (happily for him, the Bombay customs authorities were not yet in existence then).

However, the real eruption of European interest in India took place a bit later, in direct response to British—rather than Italian or French—scholarship on India. A towering figure in this intellectual transmission is the redoubtable William Jones, the legal scholar and officer of the East India Company, who went to India in 1783 and by the following year had established the Asiatic Society of Bengal with the active patronage of Warren Hastings. In collaboration with scholars such as Charles Wilkins and Thomas Colebrooke, Jones and the Asiatic Society did a remarkable job in translating a number of Indian classics—religious documents (such as the *Gita*) as well as legal treatises (particularly, *Manusmriti*) and literary works (such as Kalidasa's *Śakuntala*).

Jones was quite obsessed with India and declared his ambition "to know India better than any other European ever knew it." His description of his selected fields of study included the following modest list:

> . . .the Laws of the Hindus and the Mohamedans, Modern Politics and Geography of Hindustan, Best Mode of Governing Bengal, Arithmetic and Geometry, and Mixed Sciences of the Asiaticks, Medicine, Chemistry, Surgery, and Anatomy of the Indians, Natural

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Productions of India, Poetry, Rhetoric, and Morality of Asia, Music of the Eastern Nations, Trade, Manufacture, Agriculture, and Commerce of India.[9]

One can find many other examples of dedicated scholarship among British officers in the East India Company, and there can be little doubt that the Western perceptions of India were profoundly influenced by these investigations. Not surprisingly, the focus here is quite often on those things that are distinctive in India. The specialists on India pointed to the uncommon aspects of Indian culture and its intellectual traditions, which were obviously more interesting given the perspective and motivation of the observers.[10] As a result, the curatorial approaches could not escape being somewhat slanted in their focus. I shall come back to this issue later.

The Magisterial Burden

I turn now to the second category, the magisterial approaches. The task of ruling a foreign country is not an easy one when its subjects are seen as equals. In this context, it is quite remarkable that the early British administrators in India, even the controversial Warren Hastings, were as respectful of the Indian traditions as they clearly were. The empire was still in its infancy and was being gradually acquired, rather tentatively (if not in a fit of absentmindedness).

A good example of a magisterial approach to India is the classic book on India written by James Mill, published in 1817, on the strength of which he was appointed as an official of the East India Company. Mill's *History of British India* played a major role in introducing the British governors of India to a particular characterization of the country. Mill disputed and dismissed practically every claim ever made on behalf of Indian culture and its intellectual traditions, concluding that it was totally primitive and rude. This diagnosis fit well with Mill's general attitude, which supported the idea of bringing a rather barbaric nation under the benign and reformist administration of the British Empire. Consistent with his beliefs, Mill was an expansionist in dealing with the remaining independent states in the subcontinent. The obvious policy to pursue, he explained, was "to make war on those states and subdue them."[11]

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Mill chastised early British administrators (like William Jones) for having taken "Hindus to be a people of high civilization, while they have in reality made but a few of the earliest steps in the progress to civilization."[12] At the end of a comprehensive attack on all fronts, he came to the conclusion that the Indian civilization was on a par with other inferior ones known to Mill—"very nearly the same with that of the Chinese, the Persians, and the Arabians"; he also put in this category, for good measure, "subordinate nations, the Japanese, Cochin-chinese, Siamese, Burmans, and even Malays and Tibetans."[13]

How well informed was Mill in dealing with his subject matter? Mill wrote his book without ever having visited India. He knew no Sanskrit, nor any Persian or Arabic, had practically no knowledge of any of the modern Indian languages, and thus his reading of Indian material was of necessity most limited. There is another feature of Mill that clearly influenced his investigations, to wit, his inclination to distrust anything stated by native scholars, since they appeared to him to be liars. "Our ancestors," says Mill, "though rough, were sincere; but under the glossing exterior of the Hindu, lies a general disposition to deceit and perfidy."[14]

Perhaps some examples of Mill's treatment of particular claims of achievement may be useful to illustrate the nature of his extremely influential approach. The invention of the decimal system with place values and the placed use of zero, now used everywhere, as well as the so-called Arabic numerals are generally known to be Indian developments. In fact, Alberuni had already mentioned this in his eleventh-century book on India,[15] and many European as well as Arab scholars had written on this subject.[16] Mill dismisses the claim altogether on the grounds that "the invention of numerical characters must have been very ancient" and "whether the signs used by the Hindus are so peculiar as to render it probable that they invented them, or whether it is still more probable that they borrowed them, are questions which, for the purpose of ascertaining their progress in civilization, are not worth resolving."

Mill proceeds then to explain that the Arabic numerals "are really hieroglyphics" and that the claim on behalf of the Indians and the Arabs reflects the confounding of "the origin of cyphers or numerical characters" with "that of hieroglyphic writing."[17] At

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one level Mill's rather elementary error lies in not knowing what a decimal or a place-value system is, but his ignorant smugness cannot be understood except in terms of his implicit unwillingness to believe that a very sophisticated invention could have been managed by such primitive people.

Another interesting example concerns Mill's reaction to Indian astronomy and specifically the argument for a rotating earth and a model of gravitational attraction (proposed by Aryabhata, who was born in A.D. 476, and investigated by, among others, Varahamihira and Brahmagupta in the sixth and seventh centuries). These works were well known in the Arab world; as was mentioned earlier, Brahmagupta's book was translated into Arabic in the eighth century and retranslated by Alberuni in the eleventh. William Jones had been told about these works in India, and he in turn reported that statement. Mill expresses total astonishment at Jones's gullibility.[18] After ridiculing the absurdity of this attribution and commenting on the "pretensions and interests" of Jones's Indian informants, Mill concludes that it was "extremely natural that Sir William Jones, whose pundits had become acquainted with the ideas of European philosophers respecting the system of the universe, should hear from them that those ideas were contained in their own books."[19]

For purposes of comparison it is useful to examine Alberuni's discussion of the same issue nearly eight hundred years earlier, concerning the postulation of a rotating earth and gravitational attraction in the still-earlier writings of Aryabhata and Brahmagupta:

> Brahmagupta says in another place of the same book: "The followers of Aryabhata maintain that the earth is moving and heaven resting. People have tried to refute them by saying that, if such were the case, stones and trees would fall from the earth." But Brahmagupta does not agree with them, and says that that would not necessarily follow from their theory, apparently because he thought that all heavy things are attracted towards the center of the earth.[20]

Alberuni himself proceeded to dispute this model, raised a technical question about one of Brahmagupta's mathematical calculations, referred to a different book of his own arguing against the proposed view, and pointed out that the relative character of movements makes this issue less central than one might first think:

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"The rotation of the earth does in no way impair the value of astronomy, as all appearances of an astronomic character can quite as well be explained according to this theory as to the other."[21] Here, as elsewhere, while arguing against an opponent's views, Alberuni tries to present such views with great involvement and care. The contrast between Alberuni's curatorial approach and James Mill's magisterial pronouncements could not be sharper.

There are plenty of other examples of "magisterial" readings of India in Mill's history. This is of some practical importance, since the book was extremely influential in the British administration and widely praised. It was described by Macaulay as "on the whole the greatest historical work which has appeared in our language since that of Gibbon."[22] Macaulay's own approach and inclinations echoed James Mill's:

> I have no knowledge of either Sanskrit or Arabic. . . . I am quite ready to take the Oriental learning at the valuation of the Orientalists themselves. I have never found one among them who could deny that a single shelf of a good European library was worth the whole native literature of India and Arabia.[23]

This view of the poverty of Indian intellectual traditions played a major part in educational reform in British India, as is readily seen from the 1835 "Minute on Indian Education," written by Macaulay himself (the quoted remark is actually taken from that document). The priorities in Indian education were determined, henceforth, by a different emphasis—by the need, as Macaulay argued, for a class of English-educated Indians who could "be interpreters between us and the millions whom we govern."[24]

The impact of the magisterial views of India was not confined only to Britain and India. Modern documents in the same tradition have been influential elsewhere, including in the United States. In a series of long conversations on India and China conducted by Harold Isaacs in 1958 with 181 Americans—academics, professionals in mass media, government officials, missionaries and church officials, and officials of foundations, voluntary social-service groups, and political organizations—Isaacs found that the two most widely read literary sources on India were Rudyard Kipling and Katherine Mayo, the author of the extremely derogatory *Mother India*.[25] Of these, Kipling's writings would be more readily recognized as

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having something of the "magisterial" approach to them. Lloyd Rudolph describes Mayo's *Mother India* thus:

> First published in 1927, *Mother India* was written in the context of official and unofficial British efforts to generate support in America for British rule in India. It added contemporary and lurid detail to the image of Hindu India as irredeemably and hopelessly impoverished, degraded, depraved, and corrupt. Mayo's *Mother India* echoed not only the views of men like Alexander Duff, Charles Grant, and John Stuart Mill but also those of Theodore Roosevelt, who glorified in bearing the white man's burden in Asia and celebrated the accomplishments of imperialism.[26]

Mahatma Gandhi, while describing Mayo's book as "a drain inspector's report," had added that every Indian should read it and seemed to imply, as Ashis Nandy notes, that it is possible "to put her criticism to internal use" (as an overstern drain inspector's report certainly can be).[27] Gandhi himself was severely attacked in the book, but given his campaign against caste and untouchability, he might have actually welcomed even her exaggerations because of its usefully lurid portrayal of caste inequities. But while Gandhi may have been right to value external criticism as a way of inducing people to be self-critical, the impact of the "magisterial approach" certainly gives American perceptions of India a very clear slant.[28]

Exoticist Readings of India

I turn now to the "exoticist" approaches to India. Interest in India has often been stimulated by the observation of exotic ideas and views there. Arrian's and Strabo's accounts of Alexander the Great's spirited conversations with various sages of northwest India may or may not be authentic, but ancient Greek literature is full of uncommon happenings and thoughts attributed to India.

Megasthenes's *Indika,* describing India in the early third century B.C., can claim to be the first outsider's book on India; it created much Greek interest, as can be seen from the plentiful references to it, for example, in the writings of Diodorus, Strabo, and Arrian. Megasthenes had ample opportunity to observe India since, as the envoy of Seleucus Nicator to the court of Chandragupta Maurya, he spent nearly a decade (between 302 and 291 B.C.) in Pataliputra

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(the site of modern Patna), the capital city of the Mauryan empire. But his superlatively admiring book is also so full of accounts of fantastic objects and achievements in India that it is hard to be sure what is imagined and what is really being observed.

There are various other accounts of exotic Indian travels by ancient Greeks. The biography of Apollonius of Tiyana by Flavius Philostratus in the third century A.D. is a good example. In his search for what was out of the ordinary, Apollonius was, we are assured, richly rewarded in India: "I have seen men living upon the earth and not upon it; defended without walls, having nothing, and yet possessing all things."[29] How such contradictory things can be seen by the same person from the same observational position may not be obvious, but the bewitching charm of all this for the seeker of the exotic can hardly be doubted.

Exotic interests in India can be seen again and again, from its early history to the present day. From Alexander listening to the gymnosophists' lectures to contemporary devotees hearing the sermons of Maharishi Mahesh Yogi and Shri Rajneesh, there is a crowded lineage. Perhaps the most important example of intellectual exoticism related to India can be seen in the European philosophical discussions in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century, among the Romantics in particular.

Important figures in the Romantic movement, including the Schlegel brothers, Schelling, and others, were profoundly influenced by rather magnified readings of Indian culture. From Herder, the German philosopher and a critic of the rationalism of the European Enlightenment, we get the magnificent news that "the Hindus are the gentlest branch of humanity" and that "moderation and calm, a soft feeling and a silent depth of the soul characterize their work and their pleasure, their morals and mythology, their arts."[30] Frederich Schlegel not only pioneered studies of Indo-European linguistics (later pursued particularly by Max Muller) but also brought India fully into his critique of the contemporary West. While in the West "man himself has almost become a machine" and "cannot sink any deeper," Schlegel recommended learning from the Orient, especially India. He also guaranteed that "the Persian and German languages and cultures, as well as the Greek and the old Roman, may all be traced back to the Indian."[31] To this list, Schopenhauer added the New Testament, informing

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us that, in contrast with the Old, the New Testament "must somehow be of Indian origin: this is attested by its completely Indian ethics, which transforms morals into asceticism, its pessimism, and its *avatar* (i.e., the person of Christ)."[32]

Not surprisingly, many of the early enthusiasts were soon disappointed in not finding in Indian thought what they had themselves put there, and many of them went into a phase of withdrawal and criticism. Some of the stalwarts, Schlegel in particular, recanted vigorously. Others, including Hegel, outlined fairly negative views of Indian traditions and presented loud denials of the claim of preeminence of Indian culture—a claim that was of distinctly European origin. When Samuel Coleridge asked: "What are / These potentates of inmost Ind?"[33] he was really asking a question about Europe, rather than about India.[34]

In addition to veridical weakness, the exoticist approach to India has an inescapable fragility and transience that can be seen again and again. A wonderful thing is imagined about India and sent into a high orbit, and then it is brought crashing down. All this need not be such a tragedy when the act of launching is done by (or with the active cooperation of) the putative star. Not many would weep, for example, for Maharishi Mahesh Yogi when the Beatles stopped lionizing him and left suddenly; in answer to the Maharishi's question of why were they leaving, John Lennon said, "You are the cosmic one; you ought to know."[35]

But it is a different matter altogether when both the boom and the bust are thrust upon the victim. One of the most discouraging episodes in literary reception occurred early in this century, when Ezra Pound, W. B. Yeats, and others led a chorus of adoration at the lyrical spirituality of Rabindranath Tagore's poetry but followed it soon afterwards with a thorough disregard and firm denunciation. Tagore was a Bengali poet of tremendous creativity and range (even though his poetry does not translate easily—not even the spiritual ones that were so applauded) and also a great storyteller, novelist, and essayist; he remains a dominant literary figure in Bangladesh and India. The versatile and innovative writer that the Bengalis know well is not the sermonizing spiritual guru put together in London; nor did he fit any better the caricature of "Stupendranath Begorr" to be found in Bernard Shaw's "A Glimpse of the Domesticity of Franklyn Barnabas."

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INTERACTIONS AND REINFORCEMENTS

These different approaches have had very diverse impacts on the understanding of Indian intellectual traditions in the West. The exoticist and magisterial approaches have bemused and befuddled that understanding even as they have drawn attention to India in the West. The curatorial approaches have been less guilty of this, and indeed historically have played a major part in bringing out and drawing attention to the different aspects of Indian culture, including its nonmystical and nonexotic features. Nevertheless, given the nature of the curatorial enterprise, the focus inevitably leans towards that which is different in India, rather than what is similar to the West. In emphasizing the distinctiveness of India, even the curatorial approaches have sometimes contributed to the accentuation of contrasts rather than commonalities with Western traditions, though not in the rather extreme form found in the exoticist and magisterial approaches.

The magisterial approaches played quite a vigorous role in the running of the British Empire. Even though the Raj is dead and gone, the impact of the associated images survives, not least in the United States (as discussed earlier). To some extent, the magisterial authors also reacted against the admiration of India that can be seen in the writings of curatorial observers of India. For example, both Mill and Macaulay were vigorously critical of the writings of authors such as William Jones, and there are some important dialectics here. The respectful curatorial approaches painted a picture of Indian intellectual traditions that was much too favorable for the imperial culture of the nineteenth century, and contributed to the vehemence of the magisterial denunciations of those traditions. By the time Mill and Macaulay were writing, the British Indian empire was well established as a lasting and extensive enterprise, and the "irresponsibility" of admiring the native intellectual traditions—permissible in the previous century for early servants of the East India Company—was hard to sustain as the favored reading of India in the consolidated empire.

Turning to the exoticist approaches, the outbursts of fascinated wonder bring India into Western awareness in big tides of bewildering attention. But then they ebb, leaving only a trickle of hardened exoticists holding forth. There may well be, after a

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while, another tide. In describing the rise and decline of Rabindranath Tagore in London's literary circles, E. M. Forster remarked that London was a city of "boom and bust," but that description applies more generally (that is, not confined only to literary circles in London) to the Western appreciation of exotic aspects of Eastern cultures.

The tides, while they last, can be hard work though. I remember feeling quite sad for a dejected racist whom I saw, some years ago, near the Aldwych station in London, viewing with disgust a thousand posters pasted everywhere carrying pictures of the obese—and holy—physique of Guru Maharajji (then a great rage in London). Our dedicated racist was busy writing "fat wog" diligently under each of the pictures. In a short while that particular wog would be gone, but I do not doubt that the "disgusted of Aldwych" would scribble "lean wog" or "medium-sized wog" under other posters now.

It might be thought that since the exoticist approaches *give* credit where it may not be due and the magisterial approaches *withhold* credit where it may well be due, the two might neutralize each other nicely. But they work in very asymmetrical ways. Magisterial critiques tend to blast the rationalist and humanist aspects of India with the greatest force (this is as true of James Mill as of Katharine Mayo), whereas exoticist admirations tend to build up the mystical and extrarational aspects with particular care (this has been so from Apollonius of Tyana down to the Hare Krishna activists of today). The result of the two taken together is to wrest the understanding of Indian culture forcefully away from its rationalist aspects. Indian traditions in mathematics, logic, science, medicine, linguistics, or epistemology may be well known to the Western specialist, but they play little part in the general Western understanding of India.[36] Mysticism and exoticism, in contrast, have a more hallowed position in that understanding.

THE DIALECTICS OF INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL IDENTITY

Western perceptions and characterizations of India have had considerable influence on the self-perceptions of Indians themselves. This is clearly connected to India's colonial past and continued deference to what is valued in the West.[37] However, the relation-

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ship need not take the form of simple acceptance—it sometimes includes strategic responses to the variety of Western perceptions of India that suit the interests of internal imaging. We have to distinguish between some distinct aspects of the influence that Western images have had on Indian internal identities.

First, the European exoticists' interpretations and praise found in India a veritable army of appreciative listeners, who were particularly welcoming given the badly damaged self-confidence resulting from colonial domination. The admiring statements were quoted again and again, and the negative remarks by the same authors (Herder, Schlegel, Goethe, and others) were systematically overlooked.

In his *Discovery of India,* Jawaharlal Nehru comments on this phenomenon:

> There is a tendency on the part of Indian writers, to which I have also partly succumbed, to give selected extracts and quotations from the writings of European scholars in praise of old Indian literature and philosophy. It would be equally easy, indeed much easier, to give other extracts giving an exactly opposite viewpoint.[38]

In the process of accepting the exoticist praise, the Indian interpretation of the past has extensively focused on the *objects* of exoticist praise, concentrating more on the mystical and the antirationalist, for which many in the West have such admiration.[39]

Second, the process fit into the politics of elitist nationalism in colonial India and fed the craving for a strong intellectual ground to stand on to confront the imperial rulers. Partha Chatterjee discusses the emergence of this attitude very well:

> . . .anticolonial nationalism creates its own domain of sovereignty within colonial society well before its political battle with the imperial power. It does this by dividing the world of social institutions and practices into two domains—the material and the spiritual. The material is the domain of the "outside," of the economy and of statecraft, of science and technology, a domain where the West had proved its superiority and the East had succumbed. In this domain, then, Western superiority had to be acknowledged and its accomplishments carefully studied and replicated. The spiritual, on the other hand, is an "inner" domain bearing the "essential" marks of cultural identity. The greater one's success in imitating Western

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> skills in the material domain, therefore, the greater the need to preserve the distinctiveness of one's spiritual culture. This formula is, I think, a fundamental feature of anticolonial nationalisms in Asia and Africa.[40]

There was indeed such an attempt to present what was perceived to be the "strong aspects" of Indian culture, distinguished from the domain, as Chatterjee puts it, "where the West had proved its superiority and the East had succumbed."

Chatterjee's analysis can be supplemented by taking further note of the dialectics of the relationship between Indian internal identity and its external images. The diagnosis of strength in that nonmaterialist domain was as much helped by the exoticist admiration for Indian spirituality as the acceptance of India's weakness in the domain of science, technology, and mathematics was reinforced by the magisterial dismissals of India's materialist and rationalist traditions. The emphases on internal identity that emerged in colonial India bear powerful marks of dialectical encounters with Western perceptions.

Third, as the focus has shifted in recent decades from elitist colonial history to the role of the nonelite, the concentration on the intellectual traditions of the elite has weakened. Here we run into one of the most exciting developments in historiography in India. There has been a significant shift of attention from the elite to the underdogs in the writing of colonial history, focusing more on the rural masses and the exploited plebeians—a broad group often identified by the capacious term "subalterns."[41] The move is entirely appropriate in its context (in fact, much overdue), and in understanding colonial history, this is a very important corrective.

While this shift in focus rejects the emphasis on elitist intellectual traditions in general (*both* of the materialist and the nonmaterialist kind), it is in many ways easier to relate the religious and spiritual traditions of the elite to the practices and beliefs of the nonelite. The cutting edge of science and mathematics is inevitably related to formal education and preparation. In this context, the immense backwardness of India in mass education (an inheritance from the British period but not much remedied yet) compounds the dissociation of elite science and mathematics from the lives of the nonelite. Acceptance of the achieve-

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ments of Indian spirituality tends to look less "alienated" from the masses than the achievements in fields that demand more exacting formal education. Thus, the exoticists' praise of India is more easily accepted by those who are particularly careful not to see India in elitist terms.

The fact remains, however, that illiteracy is a deprivation. The issue of interclass justice cannot be a matter only of recognizing the real role of the subalterns *in history* (for example, in anticolonial national movements), important though it is. It is also a matter of remedying the immense inequalities in educational and other opportunities that severely limit, even today, the *actual* lives of the subalterns.

Interestingly enough, even by the eleventh century, the seriousness of this loss was noted by Alberuni himself (one of the major curatorial authors whose work was referred to earlier). Alberuni spoke of the real deprivation of "those castes who are not allowed to occupy themselves with science."[42] This substantive deprivation remains largely unremedied even today (except in particular regions such as Kerala), with half of the adult population of India (and nearly two-thirds of the adult women) still remaining illiterate.[43] In understanding the nature of Indian cultures and traditions, focusing mainly on the achievements—rather than deprivations—of the Indian subaltern can yield a deceptive contrast.

This shift in emphasis has also, to some extent, pushed the interpretation of India's past away from those achievements that require considerable formal training. While this move makes sense in some contexts, a comparison of a self-consciously nonelitist history of India with the typically classical understanding of the intellectual heritage of the West produces a false contrast between the respective intellectual traditions. In comparing Western thoughts and creations with those in India, the appropriate counterpoints of Aristotelian or Stoic or Euclidian analyses are not the traditional beliefs of the Indian rural masses or of the local wise men but the comparably analytical writings of, say, Kautilya or Nagarjuna or Aryabhata. "Socrates meets the Indian peasant" is not a good way to contrast the respective intellectual traditions.

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CONCLUDING REMARKS

The internal identities of Indians draw on different parts of India's diverse traditions. The observational leanings of Western approaches have had quite a major impact—positively and negatively—on what contributes to the Indian self-image that emerged in the colonial period and survives today. The relationship has several dialectical aspects, connected to the sensitivity towards selective admirations and dismissals from the cosmopolitan West as well as to the mechanics of colonial confrontations.

The differences between the curatorial, magisterial, and exoticist approaches to Western understanding of Indian intellectual traditions lie, to a great extent, in the varying observational positions from which India has been examined and its overall images drawn. The dependence on perspective is not a special characteristic of the imaging of India alone. It is, in fact, a pervasive general feature in description and identification.[44] "What is India really like?" is a good question for a foreign tourist's handbook precisely because the description there may sensibly be presented from the particular position of being a foreign tourist in India. But there are other positions, other contexts, other concerns.

The three approaches investigated here have produced quite distinct views of Indian intellectual history, but their overall impact has been to exaggerate the nonmaterial and arcane aspects of Indian traditions compared to its more rationalistic and analytical elements. While the curatorial approaches have been less guilty of this, their focus on what is really different in India has, to some extent, also contributed to it. But the bulk of the contribution has come from the *exoticist admiration* of India (particularly of its spiritual wonders) and the *magisterial dismissals* (particularly of its claims in mathematics, science, and analytical pursuits).

The nature of these slanted emphases has tended to undermine an adequately pluralist understanding of Indian intellectual traditions. While India has inherited a vast religious literature, a large wealth of mystical poetry, grand speculation on transcendental issues, and so on, there is also a huge—and often pioneering—literature, stretching over two and a half millennia, on mathematics, logic, epistemology, astronomy, physiology, linguistics, pho-

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netics, economics, political science, and psychology, among other subjects concerned with the here and now.[45]

Even on religious subjects, the only world religion that is firmly agnostic (Buddhism) is of Indian origin, and, furthermore, the atheistic schools of Carvaka and Lokayata have generated extensive arguments that have been seriously studied by Indian religious scholars themselves.[46] Heterodoxy runs throughout the early documents, and even the ancient epic *Ramayana,* which is often cited by contemporary Hindu activists as the holy book of the divine Rama's life, contains dissenting characters. For example, Rama is lectured to by a worldly pundit called Javali on the folly of his religious beliefs: "O Rama, be wise, there exists no world but this, that is certain! Enjoy that which is present and cast behind thee that which is unpleasant."[47]

What is in dispute here is not the recognition of mysticism and religious initiatives in India, which are certainly plentiful, but the overlooking of all the other intellectual activities that are also abundantly present. In fact, despite the grave sobriety of Indian religious preoccupations, it would not be erroneous to say that India is a country of fun and games in which chess was probably invented, badminton originated, polo emerged, and the ancient *Kamasutra* told people how to have joy in sex. Indeed, Georges Ifrah quotes a medieval Arab poet from Baghdad called al-Sabhadi, who said that there were "three things on which the Indian nation prided itself: its method of reckoning, the game of chess, and the book titled *Kalila wa Dimna* [a collection of legends and fables]."[48] This is not altogether a different list from Voltaire's catalog of the important things to come from India: "our numbers, our backgammon, our chess, our first principles of geometry, and the fables which have become our own."[49] These selections would not fit the cultivated Western images of Indian historical traditions, which are typically taken to be pontifically serious and uncompromisingly spiritual.

Nor would it fit the way many Indians perceive themselves and their intellectual past, especially those who take a "separatist" position on the nature of Indian culture. I have tried to discuss how that disparity has come about and how it is sustained. I have also tried to speculate about how the selective alienation of India from a very substantial part of its past has been nourished by the

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asymmetrical relationship between India and the West. It is, oddly enough, the rationalist part of India's tradition that has been affected most by this alienation. The impact of the West on internal identities in India has to be seen in fundamentally dialectical terms.

ENDNOTES

[1]This essay draws on an earlier article entitled "India and the West," *The New Republic* (7 June 1993). For helpful discussions, I am grateful to Akeel Bilgrami, Sugata Bose, Barun De, Jean Drèze, Ayesha Jalal, Dharma Kumar, V. K. Ramachandran, Tapan Raychaudhuri, Emma Rothschild, Lloyd Rudolph, Suzanne Rudolph, Ashutosh Varshney, Myron Weiner, and Nur Yalman.

[2]Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Random House, 1978; Vintage Books, 1979), 5; italics added.

[3]Ibid., 5.

[4]In the earlier article "India and the West" on which this essay draws, the third category was called "investigative" rather than "curatorial"; the latter is more specific and I believe somewhat more appropriate.

[5]See *Alberuni's India,* trans. E. C. Sachau, ed. A. T. Embree (New York: Norton, 1971).

[6]See Wilhelm Halbfass, *India and Europe: An Essay in Understanding* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1988), chap. 2.

[7]*Alberuni's India,* pt. II, chap. LXXX, 246. The same Arabic word was commonly used for "Hindu" and "Indian" in Alberuni's time. While the English translator had chosen to use "Hindus" here, I have replaced it with "Indians" in view of the context (to wit, Alberuni's observations on the inhabitants of India). This is an issue of some interest in the context of the main theme of this essay, since the language used here in the English translation to refer to the inhabitants of India implicitly involves a circumscribed ascription.

[8]*Alberuni's India,* pt. I, chap. I, 20.

[9]William Jones, "Objects of Enquiry During My Residence in Asia." Included in *The Collected Works of Sir William Jones,* 13 vols. (London: J. Stockdale, 1807; republished, New York: New York University Press, 1993).

[10]I have discussed the "positional" nature of objectivity, depending on the placing of the observer and analyst vis-à-vis the objects being studied, in "Positional Objectivity," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* (1993), and "On Interpreting India's Past," in Sugata Bose and Ayesha Jalal, eds., *Nationalism, Democracy and Development: State and Politics in India* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997).

[11]Quoted in Eric Stokes, *The English Utilitarians and India* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959), 250.

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[12]James Mill, *The History of British India* (London, 1817; republished, Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1975), 225–226.

[13]Ibid., 248.

[14]Ibid., 247.

[15]*Alberuni's India,* pt. I, chap. XVI, 174–175.

[16]For a modern account of the complex history of this mathematical development, see George Ifrah, *From One to Zero* (New York: Viking, 1985).

[17]Mill, *The History of British India,* 219–220.

[18]Mill found in Jones's beliefs about early Indian mathematics and astronomy "evidence of the fond credulity with which the state of society among the Hindus was for a time regarded," and he was particularly amused that Jones had made these attributions "with an air of belief." Mill, *The History of British India,* 223–224. On the substantive side, Mill amalgamates the distinct claims regarding *1)* the principle of attraction, *2)* the daily rotation of the earth, and *3)* the movement of the earth around the sun. Aryabhata's and Brahmagupta's concern were mainly with the first two, on which specific assertions were made, unlike on the third.

[19]Mill, *The History of British India,* 223–224.

[20]*Alberuni's India,* pt. I, chap. XXVI, 276–277.

[21]Ibid., 277.

[22]Quoted in John Clive's introduction to James Mill, *The History of British India* (republished, Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1975), viii.

[23]T. B. Macaulay, "Indian Education: Minute of the 2nd February, 1835"; reproduced in G. M. Young, ed., *Macaulay: Prose and Poetry* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952), 722.

[24]Ibid., 729.

[25]See Harold Isaacs, *Scratches on Our Minds* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1958); republished as *Images of Asia: American Views of India and China* (New York: Capricorn Books, 1958). See also the discussion of this issue in the "Introduction" in Sulochana Glazer and Nathan Glazer, eds., *Conflicting Images: India and the United States* (Glen Dale, Md.: Riverdale, 1990).

[26]Lloyd I. Rudolph, "Gandhi in the Mind of America," in Glazer and Glazer, eds., *Conflicting Images,* 166.

[27]Ashis Nandy, *Traditions, Tyranny, and Utopias: Essays in the Politics of Awareness* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1987), 8.

[28]On this, see Glazer and Glazer, eds., *Conflicting Images.* The influence of magisterial readings on American imaging of India has been somewhat countered in recent years by the political interest in Gandhi's life and ideas, a variety of sensitive writings on India (from Erik Erikson to John Kenneth Galbraith), and the Western success of several Indian novelists in English.

[29]Quoted in John Drew, *India and the Romantic Imagination* (Delhi and New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 95.

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[30]J. G. Herder, *Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte: Samtliche Werke*; translated by Halbfass, *India and Europe,* 70.

[31]Translations by Halbfass, *India and Europe,* 74–75. Halbfass provides an extensive study of these European interpretations of Indian thought and the reactions and counterreactions to them.

[32]A. Schopenhauer, *Parerga und Paralipomena*; translated by Halbfass, *India and Europe,* 112.

[33]See John H. Muirhead, *Coleridge as a Philosopher* (London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1930), 283–284, and Drew, *India and the Romantic Imagination,* chap. 6.

[34]The nature of exoticist reading has typically had a strongly "Hindu" character. This was, in some ways, present even in William Jones's curatorial investigations (though he was himself a scholar in Arabic and Persian as well), but he was to some extent redressing the relative neglect of Sanskrit classics in the previous periods (even though the version of the *Upanishads* that Jones first read was the Persian translation prepared by the Moghul prince Dara Shikoh, Emperor Akbar's great-grandson). The European Romantics, on the other hand, tended to identify India with variants of Hindu religious thought.

[35]William Davis, *The Rich* (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1982), 99.

[36]On this issue, see Bimal Matilal, *Perceptions* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986). See also Ronald Inden, *Imagining India* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990).

[37]On this issue in general, and on the hold of "a predominantly third-person perspective" in self-perception, see Akeel Bilgrami, "What Is a Muslim? Fundamental Commitment and Cultural Identity," *Critical Inquiry* 18 (4) (1992).

[38]Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Discovery of India* (Calcutta: Signet Press, 1946; centenary edition, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989), 158.

[39]While the constitution of independent India has been self-consciously secular, the tendency to see India as a land of the Hindus remains quite strong. The confrontation between "secularists" and "communitarians" has been an important feature of contemporary India, and the identification of Indian culture in mainly Hindu terms plays a part in this. While it is certainly possible to be both secular and communitarian (as Rajeev Bhargava has noted in "Giving Secularism Its Due," *Economic and Political Weekly,* 9 July 1994), the contemporary divisions in India tend to make the religious and communal identities largely work against India's secular commitments (as Bhargava also notes). I have tried to scrutinize these issues in my paper "Secularism and Its Discontents," in Kaushik Basu and Sanjay Subrahmanyam, eds., *Unravelling the Nation: Sectarian Conflict and India's Secular Identity* (Delhi: Penguin, 1996). See also the other papers in that collection, and the essays included in Bose and Jalal, eds., *Nationalism, Democracy and Development: State and Politics in India.*

[40]Partha Chatterjee, *The Nation and Its Fragments* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), 6.

[41]The most effective move in that direction came under the leadership of Ranajit Guha; see his introductory essay in *Subaltern Studies I: Writings on South Asian History and Society,* ed. Ranajit Guha (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1982). See also the collection of "subaltern" essays edited by Ranajit Guha and Gayatri

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Chakravorty Spivak, *Selected Subaltern Studies* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988).

[42]*Alberuni's India,* chap. II, 32.

[43]Indeed, in conceptualizing "the good life" even from the perspective of the deprived underdog, it would be a mistake to ignore altogether the intellectual achievements of the elite, since part of the deprivation of the exploited lies precisely in being denied participation in these achievements. While Marx might have exaggerated a little in his eloquence about "the idiocy of the village life," there is nevertheless a substantial point here in identifying the nature of social deprivation. There is, in fact, no basic contradiction in choosing the subaltern perspective of history and taking systematic note of the scholarly accomplishments of the elite.

[44]I have tried to discuss this general issue in "Description as Choice," *Oxford Economic Papers* 32 (1980) (reprinted in *Choice, Welfare and Measurement* [Oxford: Blackwell; Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1982]), and in "Positional Objectivity," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* (1993).

[45]This contrast is discussed in my joint paper with Martha Nussbaum, "Internal Criticism and Indian Rationalist Traditions," in Michael Krausz, ed., *Relativism: Interpretation and Confrontation* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1989).

[46]For example, the fourteenth-century book *Sarvadarsanasamgraha* ("Collection of All Philosophies") by Madhava Acarya (himself a good Vaishnavite Hindu) devotes the first chapter of the book to a serious presentation of the arguments of the atheistic schools.

[47]English translation from H. P. Shastri, *The Ramayana of Valmiki* (London: Shanti Sadan, 1959), 389.

[48]Ifrah, *From One to Zero,* 434.

[49]Voltaire, *Les ouevres completes,* vol. 124; translated by Halbfass, *India and Europe,* 59.

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Chris Hann

The Nation-State, Religion, and Uncivil Society: Two Perspectives from the Periphery

INTRODUCTION

THE ROLE OF RELIGION in the formation and persistence of modern nation-states is extremely variable. For every instance of a strong, integral link between religion and an ethnic or national identity, it is easy to think of counterexamples where no such link exists, and other factors must be invoked to explain the rise of the latter. The implication is that religion should become just one more item on a shopping list of cultural traits, important for the demarcation of group boundaries in some cases but not in others.[1]

However, some scholars have pursued alternative, generalizing approaches. Anthony D. Smith has shown the importance of the salvation religions and their literate specialists in his studies of the "ethnic origins of nations."[2] Priests were often a key group in the conversion of narrow movements of "national awakeners" into mass movements. Often, however, they then promptly handed over that leading role to a secular intelligentsia. Conor Cruise O'Brien has also attempted to synthesize and impose patterns on the relationships between religion and nationalism, but his book received a devastating critique from Ernest Gellner.[3] One central issue in this field is the extent to which nationalism itself can be

Chris Hann is Professor of Social Anthropology and Dean of Social Sciences at the University of Kent at Canterbury, England.

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seen as a form of "secular religion." This idea was elaborated many years ago by Carleton Hayes.[4] More recently it has been rejected by Benedict Anderson, who nonetheless acknowledges that some of the functions performed in the past by religion are now, in the conditions of large-scale, industrial societies, performed by nationalism.[5] Nationalist ideology provides not just the sense of belonging to a community but the nearest that modern citizens have to a principle of transcendence: the values of the nation are ultimately sacred. However, rather than see nationalism as a substitute for religion, it is more instructive to follow Hayes and investigate the extent to which new ideologies of nationalism build upon older cosmologies, and how the two can interact. Bruce Kapferer's work on Sri Lanka, showing how an ancient, hierarchical Buddhist world view has influenced both the doctrines and the practical expressions of contemporary Sinhalese nationalism, is a suggestive example.[6]

In this essay I shall explore some connections between religion and nationalism in two countries that have become, in the course of the twentieth century, close approximations of the ideal-type of the "nation-state." By this I mean a society conceived as a homogeneous entity, the political boundaries of which coincide with cultural boundaries. In fact, neither country is as close to the ideal as its ideologists and school history books would like its people to believe, but the model has nonetheless been a powerful one, internalized by a large majority of citizens. Even though these nation-states are officially secular, in both cases I find the role of religion to be of great importance in the dissemination of this national identity.

After introducing each country in turn, the issues I go on to address concern ideas about "civil society." This concept has been substantially reinvented in recent years, thanks in large part to developments in Eastern Europe, where civil society has been represented as locked into a "zero-sum" battle against a totalitarian state. Hegel has been turned on his head once again, since in the recent debates it is civil society, rather than the state, that has carried the positive, "ethical" connotation. The flurry of interest in civil society has revolved around opposition to the state. Little attention has been paid to the relationship that exists between civil society and the *nation,* or to that between civil society and reli-

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gion. The formulation of these linkages poses major theoretical challenges that I cannot hope to broach here.[7] I limit myself to exploring some of the practical problems that have arisen in two locations where I have recently engaged in fieldwork projects. To understand these problems I outline some pertinent contemporary political and economic developments in the two cases. My general argument is that the "egoism" of civil society, which is corroding the frontiers of states and contributing to "globalization," can at the same time unleash forces that exaggerate and strengthen national and confessional barriers.

POLAND

The case of Poland is one of the clearest in Europe to exhibit a very high degree of overlap between national and religious identity. Since it was also one of the states in which the concept of civil society was most effectively deployed in the late communist period, it is a highly appropriate place to consider the tangled course of the nation/state/religion/civil society relationships in recent years.

Poles date both their sovereign statehood and their Catholicism from the tenth century, and the two have been symbolically linked ever since.[8] One long-standing element in the national self-image (or mythology) is that of the Antemurale: the country is a bulwark of the West, an outpost of European civilization, that has often suffered (on behalf of the rest of Europe) from the depredations of invaders from the East. Religious imagery has played a large part in popular ideas of Poland as "the Christ of nations." Such ideas are mostly the product of a nineteenth-century nationalist movement, which relied heavily on the religious element in an age when no Polish state existed. It would, of course, be quite wrong to imagine that the Polish–Roman Catholic identity was always widely disseminated. The high culture of the medieval Polish state was not a *national* culture at all in the modern sense. That state certainly had a great many subjects who were neither speakers of a language or dialect that could be called Polish nor Roman Catholics.

Some significant steps away from this cultural diversity were taken in the early modern period in the age of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Polish kings, partly under the pressure of the

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Counter-Reformation, began to implement the principle of *cuius regio, eius religio* by converting their Eastern Slav subjects from Orthodoxy to Catholicism. However, these church unions, the most significant of which was the Union of Brest in 1596, did not require any change in the practical observances of the Eastern Slavs: their "Greek Catholicism" was a sort of hybrid, no longer fully "Eastern," but obviously entirely different from the Roman Catholicism that dominated among the Western Slavs.[9]

Poland was partitioned in the final decades of the eighteenth century between three powerful neighbors: Prussia, Russia, and Austria. Nineteenth-century nationalist rhetoric about "awakening" a dormant nation may be considered a little closer to the mark in this case than in the case of certain other East European nations with no previous history of statehood. However, even in the Polish case it is clear that the phoenix that arose in the wake of World War I was quite a different bird from the Poland that had been wiped out more than a century before. A great deal changed in the course of the nineteenth century, the age in which modern nationalism became generalized throughout the region.

The shape and composition of the new Polish Republic were not determined solely by the ideals of self-determination imperfectly implemented by statesmen at Versailles. Soldier-politicians played a decisive role in quashing attempts to establish an independent Ukraine; they then agreed to a border with Soviet Russia that left many millions of Eastern Slavs within the boundaries of the new Polish state. Roughly one third of the population in the interwar decades was not, ethnically speaking, Polish. These minorities were strongly pressured by power holders in Warsaw. Politicians such as Roman Dmowski upheld an extreme ethnic nationalism, while Józef Piłsudski, the dominant figure until his death in 1935, preferred a "federal" model that, in practice, never came close to providing equal rights and opportunities for non-Poles. During this period the links between church and state were extremely close. Propaganda was directed towards Greek Catholics, in an effort to persuade them that they, too—or at least some of them—were members of the Polish nation and should not be seduced by the blandishments of Ukrainian nationalism.

The cultural diversity that characterizes what Ernest Gellner terms the Agrarian Age was definitively shattered in this region by

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the genocides and deportations of the 1940s.[10] The population of the new People's Republic of Poland found itself within radically altered borders. Ethnically it was much more homogeneous than the prewar state: according to one official source, the minorities amounted to only 1.3 percent of the total population.[11] The Roman Catholic church once again came to the fore in the life of the nation, thanks to a political context in which nominal sovereignty was widely seen as a thin mask for domination by the superpower to the east. In this situation, levels of church attendance and other religious observances seemed to fly in the face of secularization trends almost everywhere else in Europe. The efforts of communist power holders to project themselves as legitimate rulers of a sovereign people were continuously undermined by the messages conveyed by the church (for example, through the opportunity provided by the millennium celebrations in 1966).

The fusion of Polishness and Roman Catholicism came to a giddy climax in the 1980s in the context of "Solidarity," a social movement that has been aptly described as "the swan song of Polish Romanticism."[12] The period was ushered in by the election of Karol Wojtyła as pope in 1978, which evoked extraordinary national pride among most Poles. From the first strikes in Baltic shipyards in 1980, Solidarity was closely identified with the church: the image of "Mary, Queen of Poland," the famous icon of Czestochowa, always adorned Lech Wałesa's lapel. The moral capital earned by leaders of the caliber of Stefan Wyszyński in the Stalinist years enabled the church to command the respect of almost all members of society. As an institution, it was extremely successful in extending its network of parishes and its reach into citizens' everyday lives. The eventual victory of Solidarity, as evidenced by the first multiparty elections in the communist bloc—which inaugurated the momentous transformation of the rest of Eastern Europe later in 1989—was also a victory for the church.

This apotheosis of Polish Catholicism was not, however, uniformly celebrated in every corner of the country. While doing fieldwork on the southeast edges of the state I discovered that, even after large-scale deportations in 1947, there lived in the valleys of the Carpathians some people whose dialects were closer to Ukrainian than to Polish, and whose religious practices, whether Greek Catholic or Orthodox, marked them as different from the

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Polish majority that now surrounded them.[13] These people did not welcome the rise of Solidarity. Also in this region, a few miles from the state border, the small city of Premyśl, a center of ecclesiastical and secular power for the better part of a thousand years, had almost totally lost its large Jewish population. But it still had a small Ukrainian, Greek Catholic minority, which remained proud of its contribution to the city's multicultural heritage. This was visible in its architecture, above all in the tower and massive bells of the Greek Catholic cathedral church, confiscated by the state in 1946 and handed over to the Roman Catholic Carmelites. I shall return to the circumstances of this city later.

TURKEY

The Turkish case bears more similarities to the Polish than may be apparent at first sight. Like the Polish nation-state, Turkey has come to constitute a highly homogenized, "block" society only in the course of the twentieth century.[14] It emerged as a nation-state at the same time, in the wake of World War I. The roots of the new nationalist ideology lay deep in Ottoman society, but in this case the element of modernist invention was necessarily great: there was no medieval high culture that could be identified with a Turkish state. Mustafa Kemal therefore imposed a radical reinterpretation of the past that glorified Central Asian origins. He also imported German town planning, the French administrative system, and the Swiss legal code. He abolished the Arabic script, decreeing that a language purged of many of its Arabic and Persian loanwords would henceforth be written in the Latin alphabet. Also abolished was the Caliphate, the centuries-old link that had tied the Ottoman sultans to the world religion of Islam.

Atatürk's secular state did not recognize national minorities. The territory within its borders contained a more homogenous population as a result of what were euphemistically termed "population exchanges" with Greece after the War of Independence. But Turkey's Anatolian population remained much more diverse than the ideology acknowledged. By far the largest minority group was the Kurdish population, concentrated in the southeast and sometimes referred to as "mountain Turks." Power holders viewed any attempt to assert minority rights as a threat to the integrity of the

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state. This ideology has been implemented in the brutal suppression of Kurdish resistance movements over many years. But the situation is complicated. There is little doubt that many Kurdish speakers do have a strong sense of belonging to a different people and would vote for some form of regional autonomy if they could (evidence from the most recent elections suggests that the authorities continue to take great trouble to prevent these voices from being heard).[15] But it is also the case that many Kurds have become assimilated into the national "block" society. There are probably more of them working in the labor markets of Istanbul and the other cities of the west than living in the villages and small towns of the homeland.

Religion was the key strand in Ottoman civil society, and it has retained its role under the secular Republic. But religion does not unite all Turks and cannot provide as strong a potential basis for unity as the Turkish language: a very sizable Alevi minority sees itself as quite different from the Sunni majority. The accommodation reached between secular power holders and the Sunni hierarchy was never felt by Alevis to include them, any more than Greek Catholics in Poland could feel included when the state sat down to negotiate with that country's Roman Catholic hierarchy. Alevis can also be found among Kurds, so the religious and ethnic affiliations are cross-cutting. This contrasts with the greater congruence of ethnic and religious ties in contemporary Poland (though other combinations can be found here as well: there are still significant communities of Protestant and Orthodox Poles).

In contrast to Poland, the midcentury change of gear on the Turkish political scene led to multiparty elections and a much greater degree of freedom in the media and in public life generally. The years after 1950 were marked by cycles of instability in which Islamic parties often played a minor role, but which always ended in a reaffirmation of Kemalist secular principles.[16] They were also marked by the rapid expansion of private enterprise. When the American-trained economist and committed neo-liberal Turgut Özal won a clear victory in the elections of 1983, after the army had returned to barracks for the third time in twenty years, it seemed to many that the prospects for civil society in Turkey were reasonably bright, in at least two senses. First, the country was again able to boast a rich range of mediating institutions, extend-

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ing far beyond the political parties. Second, the prospects for civil society as an economic realm of unconstrained free enterprise were greatly enhanced through Özal's policies of privatization, deregulation, and the general weakening of state controls.

However, perhaps the most interesting field of Turkish civil society in its most recent phase of development has been religion. Behind the facade of secularism, strictly maintained in the national education system and in the state-controlled media, it is clear that Islam never lost its hold on the great majority of the population. Within or parallel to the Sunni orthodox tradition, *tarikat* brotherhoods attracted many adherents.[17] Just as many young intellectuals in Poland were attracted by the social and ethical principles of Catholicism, so Turkey produced a new generation of Islamic intellectuals.[18] To some extent at least, they defined themselves against the West, against the commercial excesses of capitalist civilization, just as their Polish equivalents drew their moral strength from the struggle against an Eastern oppressor and rather different forms of corruption.

There is little doubt, then, that religion continues to evoke extremely powerful responses among most of the Turkish population, both the masses and the intellectual elites. Şerif Mardin explains this in terms of the need to restore vital elements of identity that were ripped out of the social fabric by Atatürk and threatened with obliteration in the course of his aggressive westernizing campaigns. (Many Poles might use the same metaphor to describe their feelings about communism.) As Mardin put it recently:

> The most important single fact concerning value-conflicts in Turkey is that Turkey now lives in a shuffling of two cultures: the West, its own dream or *telos,* and the Ottoman Islamic culture with its own latent directional trusts which has not been allowed to develop since the 19th century and which is now a thing of bits and pieces.
>
> The current jumble of Turkish values (Western-Islamic-consumerist-econo-puritanical) makes part of a population already displaced geographically by the great influx to the cities of the last fifty years yearn for a return to such an imagined seamless Islamic society.[19]

Other commentators, however, take a somewhat different view. Instead of viewing Islam as a threat to the institutions of the

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secular Republic, they emphasize the mutual accommodations that have been reached. The so-called Turkish-Islamic synthesis expresses the idea that to be Muslim is itself a vital feature of Turkish national identity. It defines them against the neighbors to the west with whom they maintain their closest contacts, and, as we shall see, it also defines them against some neighbors to the east as well. This synthesis comes through very strongly in everyday life, where it has been noted by a number of anthropologists. Richard and Nancy Tapper have gone so far as to see the cult of Atatürk as closely modeled on the cult of the Prophet.[20]

My fieldwork has been based on the Black Sea coast, close to Turkey's border with Georgia,[21] a transition zone between Anatolia and the Caucasus. Its economic profile was and remains quite different from that of the rest of Turkey; the ethnic profile is also quite different. The Black Sea coast was a cosmopolitan zone for millennia (until the 1920s). One major group along what is now Turkey's northern shore was the Pontic Greeks. Even after their evacuations, in the northeastern corner other Caucasian languages have survived. The Lazi population have a compact homeland here, but it was arbitrarily divided by the new state frontier. The number of Lazuri speakers was small, a few hundred thousand at most. In Ottoman times they had migrated in large numbers to the cities of the Russian Empire as well as to Istanbul. They shared with other Caucasian people a reputation for military valor, but they had also developed other specializations—in building, catering, and so on. Those who remained in the homeland became prosperous during the 1950s, following the state's promotion of tea as a cash crop to replace the old subsistence economy. Against this background it is perhaps unsurprising that, among the Lazi, virtually no one questions the tenets of Turkish nationalism. Their language is not written and has no recognition, and Turkish historians deny their very existence as a different people. None of this seems to matter to the Lazi. Unlike the Kurds, they and other small groups of non-Turkish background in this region seem quite content to see their future as part of the "indissoluble unity" of Atatürk's nation-state. Parents in the emerging middle classes do not encourage their children to speak Lazuri at home since "it has no use."[22]

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In terms of religion, however, this corner of Turkey has been unified since the expulsion of the Greeks and the disappearance or assimilation of smaller Armenian and Georgian Christian communities. The ethnic groups that remain, Hemsinli and Mingrelian-Georgian as well as Lazi, all identify with the Sunni orthodox tradition that predominates in the nation. When the German scholar Rosen asked the Lazi people in 1843, "What religion did you have before you adopted Islam?" they answered, "We have been Turks for a long time"; they had no knowledge of what they had been before.[23] This is still the case today: the Lazi know that they have a language and other traditions that mark them as different from the mass of Anatolian Turks, but this is not thought to weaken their basic adherence to the Turkish nation-state. The "Turkish-Islamic synthesis" is as applicable here at the periphery as it is in the Anatolian heartlands. During fieldwork my wife and I would sometimes be challenged by villagers: Why is it that you are speaking Turkish when you are not Muslim?

NEW DIRECTIONS

I now want to pursue the comparison between Poland and Turkey in more detail, focusing on the consequences of recent government economic policies in the regions that I have introduced above. Both countries have seen significant shifts in the relation between the state and the dominant religion. In Poland this has been extremely obvious, thanks to the election of Solidarity-inspired governments and of Wałesa himself as president. During the first postcommunist years the church had a substantial impact on policy, notably in the drastic curtailing of abortion entitlements. There is some evidence to indicate that the church in Poland lost support as a result of this perceived meddling in secular spheres.[24] But with religious instruction now firmly entrenched in the school curriculum and the history books rewritten to emphasize the symbiosis of church and nation, a decline in church attendance and occasional recurrences of an old tradition of anticlericalism pose no serious threat to the privileged position enjoyed by the Roman Catholic church.

Yet, as noted, the strength of the Roman Catholic church was not everywhere uniformly welcomed. Events in Premyśl revealed

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disturbing signs.[25] Shortly before his visit to the city in 1991, the pope indicated that the Carmelites should hand their church back to the Greek Catholics, now officially recognized again after almost half a century of semiclandestine existence. However, small groups of Polish nationalists protested vehemently against the decision of their own Roman Catholic hierarchy. They set up barricades around the church and eventually succeeded in having the pope's decision overturned (the Greek Catholics were instead obliged to make do with another building, a rather less impressive one lower down the hill, which had never belonged to them in the past). It became quite clear during this dispute over ecclesiastical property that the religious boundary was also an ethnic-national boundary: the Polish nationalists who did the most to stir up the conflict made it plain that they saw the Greek Catholic church as the unwelcome face of Ukrainian nationalism in their city.

In Turkey there was undoubtedly a significant relaxation of the strict Kemalist line toward Islam after Özal came to power in 1983. Here, too, the new direction was most obviously signaled in the education system. Large numbers of Islamic schools were opened throughout the country, and the stream of officially sanctioned Islamic publications became an uncontrollable flood. The attractions of Islam seemed at least in part to be a reaction *against* other aspects of the Özal government's policies. For example, a lifting of the government's monopoly on the air waves led to the rapid proliferation of private television channels by the early 1990s. Several of these regularly broadcast Western programs that probably would have fallen foul of the censors in countries such as Britain or the United States. The rejuvenated political party of Necmettin Erbakan, the Welfare Party, led the criticism of these new, highly visible forms of Westernization from the perspective of Islam.

Economic liberalism meant, in both countries, the scaling down of state activity in the economy. Again, the process that took place in Turkey was less dramatic than Poland's decision to apply the "shock therapy" strategy of Harvard economist Jeffrey Sachs; but the main thrust of state policy was very similar. For example, Turkish authorities ended the state's monopoly over tea, the mainstay of the Lazi region, opening up the sector to private competition in 1986. Perhaps the most important similarity—and certainly

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one of the most visible, affecting very large numbers of people—was the decision to relax border controls to allow almost unlimited opportunities for petty commerce. In the case of the Lazi community, this decision was linked to the president's more general commitment to Black Sea economic cooperation. For both Turkey and Poland, the disintegration of the Soviet Union by the end of 1990 and the emergence of a string of new and relatively weak successor states created a climate that was extremely conducive to petty trading.

To appreciate the impact of the sudden influx of traders from the former USSR on the people of the Lazi country and of the Premyśl region, a number of factors need to be borne in mind. First, I would emphasize the sheer novelty of such unregulated petty commerce.[26] People had never known anything like it before. Swarms of people would spread out their bric-a-brac wherever they liked, and no agents of the state interfered. It took some time before new elements of order emerged. In both regions, local sports clubs spotted an opportunity to raise funds for their teams: by controlling stalls (sometimes inside their stadiums and sometimes elsewhere) and charging minuscule entrance fees to vendors and their customers, they emerged as a substitute market authority. Visiting these markets was fun for local people. Their inability to communicate with the traders was not a problem: the latter usually had a rudimentary grasp of the numbers in the local language, and haggling over the price of a trinket was itself a popular new form of entertainment.

The markets also helped to meet real economic needs. For example, many of the products of old socialist factories brought into the Lazi country were much cheaper than the equivalent items in local shops; during the years when real incomes from tea were in steady decline, the availability of this merchandise was very important to many families. In Premyśl, similarly, the expanding Ukrainian bazaar was particularly appreciated by those whose budgets were most limited, perhaps as a consequence of unemployment. Increasingly, in both countries, the visitors began to spend some of the money they earned on goods that they would then take back with them to resell in the former USSR. Although most traders in the Lazi country and in Premyśl were Georgians and Ukrainians respectively, these ports of trade attracted enter-

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prising individuals from all parts of the old Soviet Union. In Turkey, their generic name was "the Russians"—"*Ruslar.*" Thus the closure of socialist factories, and the withdrawal of state supports from key industries in Turkey, were partially mitigated by the emergence of these new opportunities in the bazaar sector.

However, the petty trading had other, less positive consequences. These were most visible in the Islamic setting, where a flourishing prostitution business developed rapidly in all the urban centers along the coast.[27] This was a part of Turkey famed for the strictness of the honor codes, and suddenly every town had a new *gazino* in which painted blonde women were available, subject to haggling, to local men. Secular officials were fairly relaxed about this activity and law enforcement was distinctly ineffective (when the women were deported, they soon came back again, possibly using a different passport). The media were always quick to give intensive coverage to particular scandals; and there were plenty of incidents, including violent quarrels between local men, domestic violence in their families, and the murder of prostitutes. The sordid character of the prostitution business inevitably spilled over to the market traders generally. It led to frequent crude stereotyping on both sides: local people saw the traders as uniformly "dirty," while traders saw local men as "without culture." In these cultural exchanges, there was little evidence that the local Lazi felt much understanding or sympathy for the visitors, even though some of them were, in an ethnic sense, their close relatives. On the contrary, most Lazi seemed to draw from these marketplace contacts only a heightened sense of their superiority as members of a more economically developed and politically stable Turkish nation-state.

Within a short period the Russian markets provoked a moral backlash. Local women petitioned provincial governors and other leading officials to put an end to practices that, they claimed, were undermining family life. Their cause was taken up energetically by the Welfare Party, which linked the side effects of these markets to the general insidious advance of Western capitalism in Turkey. The fact that these petty traders were arriving from the east, and were the victims of a collapsed socialist system rather than the agents of Western capitalism, did not seem to make the rhetoric of the Welfare Party any less persuasive. While the other major political parties were silent on the issue, or issued only cursory and

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unconvincing criticisms of the new sex trade, the Welfare Party was able to bring hundreds of people onto the streets of the smaller towns in a series of meetings to protest against the moral degradation of their society. Rallies that I witnessed were attended by as many women as men. Many of them were clad from head to foot in the black *çarşaf,* previously unknown in this region but now the international uniform of women with a strong Islamic commitment. Some carried placards protesting against the government's attempts to defend the influx of traders as contributing to tourist development: "This is not tourism, it is a Scandal (*Rezalet*)!" and "OTEL, MOTEL, AIDS!" In many parts of the eastern Black Sea coast the Welfare Party has recently emerged as the strongest party in local and national elections, helping Erbakan in 1996 to become Turkey's first Islamist prime minister. However, the new government has made no move to abolish the Russian markets and continues to stress the importance of international cooperation. Media coverage of the sexual dimension has declined as the novelty has worn off, although some local women are still angry about the continued impact of prostitution on family life, and there is still great fear of AIDS.

Prostitution is less visible in Premyśl, though informants say that it does play a part in a thriving underworld linked to the new bazaar sector. What seems plain, here as in the Lazi country, is that frequent interaction in the marketplace, which might include regular contacts with the same individuals and the formation of stable trading partnerships, does not at all preclude the expression of the most derogatory stereotypes of the other group. Ukrainians have been among the most stigmatized groups throughout the history of modern Poland.[28] Socialist power holders helped to foment this antagonism, for example, in their official representations of the violence of the 1940s. After the collapse of socialism, members of the country's Ukrainian minority, including about two thousand people in Premyśl, thought that this might be an opportunity for them to make their voices heard for the first time. But they were soon drowned out by the voices of Polish nationalist groupings, which, though lacking any electoral mandate, have poisoned interethnic relations in the city.

A series of incidents, provoked by the government's decision in 1995 to hold Poland's biennial Festival of Ukrainian Culture in

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Premyśl rather than at the usual location on the Baltic coast, shows the complexity of the new relationships between the state and local communities. The town council of Premyśl had no Ukrainian minority representation, and its mayor did his best to obstruct the plans formulated by the Ministry of Cultural Affairs. But the center did not bow to pressure: for a number of macropolitical and strategic reasons, Warsaw needs to cultivate a close relationship with the new Ukrainian Republic.[29] The festival went ahead, but posters were defaced with anti-Ukrainian propaganda, and the town's Ukrainian Club was the object of a potentially life-threatening arson attack. In short, the effect of this well-intentioned gesture by the state, to relocate its Ukrainian festival to an area with real historical links to Ukraine, was like pouring petrol onto the simmering fires of Premyśl. In 1996 a group of nationalists campaigned against the celebration of "Polish cultural days" in L'viv, a few hours away on the bus or train. Until World War II this city was a notable center of Polish culture, but it has since been rendered as fully Ukrainian as Premyśl has become Polish. The nationalists in Premyśl prefer not to acknowledge a multicultural past in either city. I suspect that Poland's Ukrainian festival will in the future return to its former location at Sopot on the Baltic coast, an area with no heritage whatsoever of Ukrainian culture.

Some of the most controversial recent events in Premyśl have again highlighted the dimension of religion. In 1994 the Polish nationalists in the city campaigned successfully to have the county's conservation officer (an ethnic Pole) removed from his post after he had tried to obstruct their attempts to demolish the distinctive Orthodox-style cupola of the Carmelites' church (it was finally pulled down and replaced with a tower more pleasing to Western sensibilities in 1996). It was alleged that this conservation officer had allocated a high proportion of his budget, funded from the Polish public purse, to the conservation of Ukrainian church buildings in the county.[30] In 1995 the local Polish media carried stories of Greek Catholic clergy who were actively supporting the campaigns of former Ukrainian terrorists to erect monuments to their comrades who died in the 1940s, and to have them reburied in consecrated ground. For Polish nationalists it is a sacrilege to allow such monuments or reburials to take place on Polish soil; but for the Ukrainians, this is a legitimate commemoration of their

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"freedom fighters." It seems that some clergy on both sides line up with their respective extremists: Greek Catholic priests have committed themselves to the Ukrainian cause, while Roman Catholic clergy have been active in the nationalist agitation on the Polish side.

CONCLUSIONS

Both Poland and Turkey have developed into highly homogenous nation-states in the course of this century. Summoned into existence following the collapse of empires in 1918, each has been aided in its promotion of cultural uniformity by large-scale population transfers (Greeks being expelled from Anatolia in the 1920s; Ukrainians, Germans, and others finding themselves excluded from Poland's new borders in the 1940s). A major unifying factor in each of these societies has been religion: Roman Catholicism in Poland and Islam in Turkey. The capacity of religion to unify and represent an entire national community was strongest in periods when radical modernizing states pursued policies ostensibly antagonistic to religion. The Kemalists and the communists had much in common in this respect.

Although communism in Eastern Europe has a clear end date in 1989 whereas Kemalism has yet to be officially overturned in Turkey, the two countries have followed quite similar paths since their political emergencies of the early 1980s. In both there has been a rapprochement with religion, which now has a much more complex relation to state power. The two countries have also pursued similar economic policies, moving away from statist models and embracing neoliberal models of privatization and free markets. In the peripheral regions with which I have been concerned, the most conspicuous consequence of these policies has been an upsurge in petty marketing across national frontiers that have suddenly become porous.

These policies have had dramatic implications for the populations in these border zones, where significant pockets of cultural diversity have been preserved. Postmodern social theorists might expect the new marketplace interaction to act as an effective solvent of the artificial barriers erected by strong, "Hegelian" states, leading to the dissolution of collective subjects and the

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multiple fracturing of identities. It is possible that for some people something like this may indeed be happening, but the overall situation on the ground in Premyśl and in the Lazi country is not quite so exhilarating. The imaginary community of the strong nation-state has become rather tattered at its edges, but the pursuit of egoism in the marketplace does not seem to be leading to greater trust between neighbors, or to greater tolerance of ethnic and religious differences. On the contrary, with ethnicized models of religion being utilized to revive old stereotypes and hatreds (and contributing to new ones as well), the situation in the two locations examined is precarious. Among the results of economic liberalization and a relaxation of state border controls are decidedly uncivil forms of society and new *imaginaires* that offer even less scope for freedom and tolerance than those of the subverted states.

ENDNOTES

[1]This was the case in the approaches of Soviet ethnographers, who usually took the view that "religion of itself can neither establish nor preserve ethnic community, but can only contribute to it." V. Kozlov, "On the Concept of Ethnic Community," in Yulian Bromley, ed., *Soviet Ethnology and Anthropology Today* (The Hague: Mouton, 1974), 73–87; quote is from 86.

[2]Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986).

[3]Conor Cruise O'Brien, *GodLand: Reflections on Religion and Nationalism* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988); Ernest Gellner, "The Sacred and the National," in Ernest Gellner, *Encounters with Nationalism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 59–73.

[4]Carleton Hayes, *Nationalism: A Religion* (New York: Macmillan, 1960).

[5]Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983).

[6]Bruce Kapferer, *Legends of People, Myths of State* (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1988). Also of interest is Kapferer's comparative exploration in this book of Australian nationalism, including some apparently mundane, even banal forms of everyday nationalism. Cf. Michael Billig, *Banal Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1995).

[7]Debates about the usefulness of the concept of civil society have been taking place across a number of disciplines. For an introduction see John A. Hall, ed., *Civil Society: Theory, History, Comparison* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995). For anthropological perspectives see Chris Hann and Elizabeth Dunn, eds., *Civil Society: Challenging Western Models* (London: Routledge, 1996).

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[8]See Norman Davies, *God's Playground; A History of Poland,* 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981). See also B. Szajkowski, *Next to God, Poland: Politics and Religion and Contemporary Poland* (London: Pinter, 1983).

[9]C. M. Hann, "Religion and Nationality in Central Europe: The Case of the Uniates," *Ethnic Studies* 10 (1993): 201–213.

[10]Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983).

[11]Jerzy J. Wiatr, "Polish Society," in *Poland: A Handbook* (Warsaw: Interpress, 1977), 137.

[12]Włodzimierz Wesolowski, "The Nature of Social Ties and the Future of Post-Communist Society; Poland after Solidarity," in Hall, ed., *Civil Society: Theory, History, Comparison,* 114.

[13]C. M. Hann, *A Village Without Solidarity; Polish Peasants in Years of Crisis* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1985); also, "Who Are the Lemko-Ukrainians?" in L. Kürti and J. Feldman, eds., *Remaking East European Identities in the 1990s* (Oxford: Westview Press, forthcoming).

[14]The concept of the "block" is borrowed from S. Mardin, *Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey: The Case of Bediüzzaman Said Nursi* (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1989). For a more general historical discussion see Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London: Oxford University Press, 1963).

[15]See observations by Lord Hilton (House of Lords, Westminster, London), "Free and Fair? The Turkish General Election of December 24th 1995," *MS* (1996).

[16]Ernest Gellner, "The New Circle of Equity," in C. M. Hann, ed., *When History Accelerates: Essays on Rapid Social Change, Complexity and Creativity* (London: Athlone, 1994), 229–237.

[17]Mardin, *Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey.*

[18]Michael E. Meeker, "The New Muslim Intellectuals in the Republic of Turkey," in Richard Tapper, ed., *Islam in Modern Turkey* (Oxford: I. B. Tauris, 1991), 189–222.

[19]Şerif Mardin, "Some Notes on Normative Conflicts in Turkey," in Peter Berger, ed., *The Limits of Social Cohesion: Conflict and Mediation in Plural Societies* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, forthcoming).

[20]Richard Tapper and Nancy Tapper, "The Birth of the Prophet: Ritual and Gender in Turkish Islam," *Man* 22 (1) (1987): 67–92.

[21]For a fuller account of the early phases of this project see C. M. Hann, *Tea and the Domestication of the Turkish State* (SOAS Occasional Papers in Modern Turkish Studies, No. 1) (Huntingdon: Eothen, 1990). Fieldwork in 1992–1993 was supported by a grant from the Economic and Social Research Council (R 000233208: "Culture and Economy among the Lazi").

[22]For further detail see C. M. Hann, "Ethnicity, Language, and Politics in Northeast Turkey," in C. Govers and H. Vermeulen, eds., *The Politics of Ethnic Consciousness* (London: Macmillan, 1997), 121–156.

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[23]G. Rosen, "Über die Sprache der Lazen," *Abhandlung der Königlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin aus dem Jahre 1843* (Berlin: n.p., 1845), 2.

[24]According to one poll in 1994, 54 percent of Poles disapproved of the extension of the activities of the Polish church. See the discussion in P. Sztompka, "Trust and Emerging Democracy," *International Sociology* 11 (1) (1996): 52.

[25]I have described recent developments in this city in more detail in C. M. Hann, "Ethnic Cleansing in Eastern Europe: Poles and Ukrainians Beside the Curzon Line," *Nations and Nationalism* 2 (3) (1996): 389–406. Fieldwork in Premyśl in 1995–1997 has been supported by a grant from the Economic and Social Research Council (R 000236071: "The Politics of Religious Identity: The Greek Catholics of Central Europe").

[26]For a further discussion of these markets in Turkey, see Chris and Ildikó Hann, "Samovars and Sex on Turkey's Russian Markets," *Anthropology Today* 8 (4) (1992): 3–6; also Chris Hann and Ildikó Bellér-Hann, "Markets, Muslims and Morality in Northeast Turkey," in T. Wilson and H. Donnan, eds., *Border Identities: Nation and State at International Frontiers* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).

[27]See Ildikó Bellér-Hann, "Prostitution and Its Effects in Northeast Turkey," *The European Journal of Women's Studies* 2 (2) (1995): 219–235.

[28]It is curious that the political pressures of the socialist period, which prevented any expression of traditional anti-Russian sentiment among Poles, did not curtail the intensified stigmatizing of Ukrainians. For discussion of how prejudice was spread in the socialist media, see various contributions to Peter J. Potichnyj, ed., *Poland and Ukraine: Past and Present* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1980).

[29]See I. J. Brzezinski, "Polish-Ukrainian Relations: Europe's Neglected Strategic Axis," *Survival* 35 (3) (1993): 26–37.

[30]Some of the Greek Catholic churches are architectural gems, made entirely of wood from the local Carpathian forests and formerly housing the artifacts of a unique iconic tradition. Most of the churches and many of the icons were destroyed or simply lost after the deportations of the 1940s, and the cultural vandalism against all traces of a Ukrainian past has continued to the present day. See O. Iwanusiw, *Church in Ruins: The Demise of Ukrainian Churches in the Eparchy of Premysl* (St. Catharine's, Ontario: St. Sophia Religious Association of Ukrainian Catholics in Canada, 1987).

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The total, astonishing, and almost completely unforeseen collapse of the Soviet Union leaves us all with a practical as well as a theoretical problem. It is both difficult and dangerous, and we would much rather be without it. It is a kind of personal and emotional problem, a sense of acute embarrassment. If one had become accustomed to seeing a large number of people, and indeed an entire social system, live out and seemingly adhere to a certain set of ideas and principles, if one had internalized the obligation to treat those principles and values with a certain respect (as one generally does with regard to the religion of others, a recognized obligation violated only by boors), and then suddenly, overnight, they disavow it all, abuse it with an abandon which one would never have dared to indulge in oneself—from sheer respect for the deep convictions of others, or for their social pieties—well, one feels ill at ease.

I always knew that those beliefs were rubbish, but I did not like saying so, in so many words, to people who either chose or were obliged to organize their lives as if they believed it all. If they too knew it was rubbish, why did they not say so sooner? The polarization of the debate concerning the social order between liberalism and socialism had engendered certain conventions and expectations, and we had become habituated to them. The total collapse of one participant in the Great Debate or the Great Contest, or of its institutional incarnation, has transformed the intellectual-political landscape. It has been deeply disorienting. It is as if one had become so used to a certain constant and powerful wind that one unthinkingly leaned into it, and it suddenly disappeared. Old expectations persist; one still leans in a certain direction, but the counterwind is no longer there. One stumbles if indeed one does not fall over altogether.

Ernest Gellner

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Mark Mazower

Minorities and the League of Nations in Interwar Europe

THIS YEAR THE NORTHERN GREEK CITY of Thessaloniki is the Cultural Capital of Europe. A century ago, it was known as Selanik, one of the most fascinating cities in the Ottoman Empire. Roughly half its 150,000 inhabitants then were Jews, as many as lived in the whole of France. In addition to Turks and Greeks, there were also Armenians, Bulgarians, Vlachs, Circassians, Albanians, and the secretive Dönmeh—the crypto-Jews who had followed Sabbatai Zevi, their false Messiah, into Islam in the late seventeenth century. Foreign visitors were astonished to find bootblacks and porters on the docks who spoke six or seven languages.

How did polyglot Selanik turn, in the span of a few generations, into a modern metropolis of the Greek nation-state, with a population of more than one million Greeks, virtually no Turks, and fewer than two thousand Jews? Its "liberation" by the Greek army in 1912 is only the beginning of the story. In fact, the city's designation as the Cultural Capital is perhaps more fitting than the Eurocrats realized: the hellenization of Thessaloniki encapsulates the history of minorities in Europe in the first half of this century.

In 1943, while the young *Wehrmacht* lieutenant Kurt Waldheim was posted to the city, its large Jewish community was deported and exterminated within a few months at Auschwitz-Birkenau. But even before that point, Thessaloniki had turned into a predominantly Greek city. Nazi genocide was but the most extreme variant of the international experimentation in policy towards ethnic minorities that had begun with the disintegration of the

Mark Mazower is Reader in History at the University of Sussex.

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Ottoman, Habsburg, and Romanov empires in the maelstrom of World War I.

Nothing contributed more to turning Selanik into Thessaloniki than the population exchanges that took place in the Balkans as the Ottoman Empire broke up. In 1919, under the Treaty of Neuilly, the Bulgarian inhabitants of the city and the surrounding region were "exchanged" with Greeks from Bulgaria. This was a striking innovation in terms of international policy, but the tens of thousands caught up in this supposedly voluntary transfer were small fry compared with the millions involved in the compulsory exchange of populations that took place between Greece and Turkey when fighting between them stopped a few years later. According to the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, Muslim residents in Greece had to leave their homes and "return" to Turkey, while Orthodox Christians from Asia Minor were moved in the opposite direction. Hundreds of thousands of the latter settled in and around Thessaloniki, thus helping to "hellenize" Greek Macedonia.

Today, in the aftermath of the war in Bosnia with its ethnic cleansing and its massive enforced movements of population, the 1923 Greco-Turkish agreement has acquired new relevance. Its seeming tidiness appealed to some European policymakers then, and apparently still does today. But how successful was it? At the level of individual lives, it wrought—or acquiesced in—the destruction of centuries-old homes and communities; it transformed identities according to the logic of nationalism, turning Orthodox villagers from Anatolia, many of whom could not speak Greek, into Greeks, and Muslims from Crete, many of whom were the descendants of Islamized Christians, into Turks. It created a massive problem regarding the property these refugees left behind, which poisoned Greco-Turkish relations for several years. It also burdened governments in Athens and Ankara with the expense of resettling hundreds of thousands of refugees.

On the other hand, both the Greeks and the Turks saw the exchange as a means of bolstering their new nation-states and "homogenizing" the ethnic mix of their populations. More to the point, as far as international policymakers are concerned, relations between the two countries did improve over the next twenty years, before the Cyprus dispute poisoned them once more. Today, relations are perhaps as bad as they have ever been. Thus the jury

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remains out on whether such transfers of population actually ease international tensions in the long run.

In the interwar years, however, the international community proved strikingly reluctant to draw on the Greco-Turkish population exchange as a precedent. It was not emulated until Munich and the start of Hitler's own policy of repatriating the ethnic Germans from the South Tyrol, the Baltic states, and Bessarabia. Before that, in the heyday of Wilsonian liberalism, the minorities policy with which the League of Nations came to be associated, and which seems to me to remain an experiment of abiding interest, involved keeping minorities where they were and offering them the protection of international law, rather than uprooting and resettling them elsewhere.

The idea of protecting minorities by law emerged rather belatedly during World War I. The sudden collapse of the great empires of Central and Eastern Europe caught most policymakers by surprise. History seemed to have vindicated the dreamers of a "New Europe"—whether it was Wilson himself with his dangerously vague principle of national self-determination, crusaders for oppressed nationalities like Robert Seton-Watson and Arnold Toynbee, or national leaders such as Masaryk and Paderewski. But some liberals were also well aware that nationalism as a policy could open up a Pandora's box of conflicts and tensions. Years before, Lord Acton had warned that "by making the State and the nation commensurate with each other in theory, [nationality] reduces practically to a subject condition all other nationalities that may be within the boundary." "I do not myself believe," noted Robert Cecil, in the British Foreign Office in 1917, "that a European peace founded only on nationality and without any other provisions is likely to be desirable or even in all respects beneficial."[1]

Similar doubts were forcefully expressed by Jewish lobbying groups in both Washington and London. Ever since the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913, they had tried to alert the Great Powers to the dangers that "half-crazed nationalists" posed to ethnic minorities and international stability in southeastern Europe. During World War I, two national movements proved their point. The first was the Turkish attempt to wipe out the Armenians, which unfolded in all its horror in 1915 and led to the murder of between eight hundred thousand and 1.3 million people. This was perhaps

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the first example of the "war of extermination" that the British scholar Arnold Toynbee saw as the result of the extension of the principle of nationalism to the multi-confessional tapestry of the Ottoman Empire.[2]

On the heels of the Armenian genocide came the struggle for Poland in 1918–1920. At Versailles, proponents of an ethnically pure Poland clashed with those who advocated a multiethnic commonwealth under Polish leadership. The problem for the former was that Poles lived alongside Germans, Jews, Lithuanians, and Ukrainians in the claimed territory; the problem for the latter was that multiethnic harmony was a rather ambitious goal for anyone in postwar Eastern Europe. By the end of 1918, Polish troops were battling for supremacy with the Ukrainians. They also carried out a series of pogroms that forced Jews to form self-defense units. Balfour worried that an independent Poland, "so far from promoting the cause of European peace, would be a perpetual occasion of European strife." By mid-1919 Poland was only two-thirds Polish from an ethnic point of view. In the disputed city of L'viv someone pointed out the war damage to an American visitor: "You see those little holes? We call them here 'Wilson's Points.' They have been made with machine guns; the big gaps have been made with hand grenades. We are now engaged in self-determination, and God knows what and when the end will be."[3]

At the Paris Peace Conference, the struggle over the form of an independent Poland eventually brought into being an ambitious new international policy on minority rights. Behind the scenes, the influential New States Committee recognized the need for some such policy if ethnic civil war was not to spread through Eastern Europe and destabilize an area already under the shadow of Bolshevism. Despite bitter protests, the new Polish government was obliged to guarantee certain rights to its minorities as a condition of recognition: they included equality of treatment under the law and religious freedoms as well as rights to certain forms of collective organization in the educational and cultural spheres. The Polish Minorities Treaty was guaranteed by the League of Nations, which apparently meant that complaints could be brought to Geneva (though not directly by the minority concerned). In certain circumstances, the League's Council could take action.

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The Polish Treaty took international law into uncharted waters. During the previous century, the Great Powers had often recognized new states dependent on a commitment to religious freedom and toleration; such had been the case, for example, in Belgium in 1830 and Romania in 1878. What was new in 1919 was the concern for "national" rather than exclusively religious rights, for collective rights rather than individual liberties, and the provision for international deliberation.

Poland provided the model for a whole series of minority rights treaties that the peacemakers in Paris drew up for Eastern Europe. Similar obligations were imposed on other newly-created states as well as on former belligerents like Hungary and older states like Romania and Greece, which acquired territory as a result of the war. The League of Nations came to stand for a system that, on the one hand, accepted the nation-state as the norm in international relations and, on the other, made a considered effort to tackle the minority issues that were thus created. It accepted (perhaps thereby sometimes encouraging the creation of) minorities as collective entities; their political weight and profile were increased through the annual meetings of the European Congress of Nationalities, which publicized their plight.

But the role of the League itself in this system was ambiguous. It was difficult to bring cases to the League's attention, and even more difficult to push them through the Geneva machine and have them taken up by the Council. Although the League had the power to refer cases to the Permanent Court of Justice in The Hague, it rarely acted on it. On the other hand, it jealously guarded this power and blocked proposals to allow minorities to appeal to the Court directly. The League Secretariat did not see itself as a "champion of minorities" but more modestly as an interlocutor helping governments carry out their own obligations. The League also had few sanctions against egregious offenders. Thus the notoriously repressive behavior of Yugoslav gendarmes in Macedonia went unchecked, as did the Polish government's bloody "pacification campaign" against the Ukrainians in 1930.

Polish or Serbian intolerance did not much bother the French, who were more concerned about the stability of their Eastern European allies than about minorities. Nor, increasingly, did it bother the British, who believed the minorities treaties were hin-

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dering the process of assimilation. "More harm would in the end be done by unnecessary interference than, even at the risk of a little local suffering, to allow these minorities to settle down under their present masters," wrote a Foreign Office official in London in 1922. "So long as these people imagine that their grievances can be aired before the League of Nations they will refuse to settle down and the present effervescence will continue indefinitely."[4]

Yet despite such indifference from the League's main sponsors, some groups pushed for more of an activist stance. Under the diplomacy of Gustav Stresemann, Weimar Germany entered the League and began to assume the role of the "defender of minorities" with an eye to the millions of ethnic Germans scattered across Eastern Europe. German and Jewish groups spearheaded the lobbying of the European Congress of Nationalities, while Stresemann identified himself closely with the cause of reforming the Geneva machinery by creating a permanent minority rights commission. His efforts had limited results, partly because they were suspected to form part of a more general effort to revise the Versailles settlement. Stresemann merely managed to convince German nationalists at home that the League would never adequately protect ethnic Germans abroad.[5]

At the same time, the minorities treaties were bitterly resented as a humiliation by the countries concerned. They were particularly irritated by the fact that there was no universal minority-rights regime; they wondered why they had been singled out when no such obligations had been imposed on Germany or on Italy when it persecuted the German-speaking minority in the South Tyrol.

It is true that of the approximately thirty-five million estimated minority inhabitants in interwar Europe, only some 8.6 million lived in Western Europe (roughly one in twenty of the total population) whereas about twenty-five million lived in Central and Eastern Europe (one in four). Thus the minorities question *was* numerically far more important in the East. Even so, the lack of a universal regime was an embarrassment for the Great Powers.[6]

Such an idea had in fact been considered in 1919 in Paris, only to be rejected. As James Headlam-Morley, one of the key figures behind the minorities guarantees, noted at the time, fundamental issues of state sovereignty were at stake:

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> At first there was, so far as I recollect, a proposal that there should be inserted in the League of Nations some general clause giving the League of Nations the right to protect minorities in all countries which were members of the League. This I always most strongly opposed. . .for it would have involved the right to interfere in the internal constitution of every country in the world. As I pointed out, it would give the League of Nations the right to protect the Chinese in Liverpool, the Roman Catholics in France, the French in Canada, quite apart from the more serious problems, such as the Irish. This point of view was, I think, not seriously opposed by any except the unofficial bodies who wished the League of Nations to be a sort of super-state with a general right of guarding democracy and freedom throughout the world. . . . My own view was that any right given to the League of Nations must be quite definite and specific, and based on special treaties entered into because of definite exceptional cases, and that such a right could only be recognized in the case of a new or immature state of Eastern Europe or Western Asia. Even if the denial of such a right elsewhere might lead to injustice and oppression, that was better than to allow anything which would mean the negation of the sovereignty of every state in the world.[7]

Thus the Great Powers were happy to interfere in the internal affairs of "new" states but allowed no meddling in their own affairs. This supremely paternalistic stance assumed that "civilized" states such as those in Western Europe had evolved procedures to facilitate the assimilation of minorities that did not yet exist in "immature states." That view was, to some extent, true: it was easier for Welsh or Catalan children to make careers in the professions or the civil service than it was, say, for Ukrainians in Poland or Hungarians in Romania, where hatreds were more recent. Breton children might suffer at school, but they did not have their homes and villages burned down. The minorities treaties were a way of educating less civilized nations in international deportment.

But the underlying premise was that assimilation into the civilized life of the nation was possible and desirable. As a Brazilian delegate put it in Geneva in 1925, the goal of the treaties was not to perpetuate a state of affairs in which certain groups in society saw themselves as "constantly alien," but, rather, to establish the conditions for "a complete national unity."[8]

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After 1933, however, the "assimilation thesis" (as it was dubbed by opponents) was spectacularly refuted with the rise of the Third Reich. Ethnic nationalism as practiced in Warsaw or Bucharest had limited scope for assimilation; racial nationalism of the kind that spread across Central and Eastern Europe in the 1930s allowed none. The rise of institutionalized anti-Semitism in Hitler's Germany therefore undermined the whole basis of the League's approach to minorities. A supposedly "civilized" state was rejecting the assimilationist idea in the most sweeping fashion possible. In October of 1933, Nazi Germany left the League. A year later, the Polish premier, Colonel Beck, drove another nail into the League's coffin when he denounced Poland's minority-rights obligations "pending the introduction of a general and uniform system for the protection of minorities." The number of minority petitions received at Geneva fell sharply from 204 in 1930 to fifteen in 1936. This drop can be taken as a barometer of the waning confidence felt by European minorities in the value of the League.[9]

Let us not, however, be too hasty in writing off the League's minority system altogether. In the first place, it did notch up a few successes that offered valuable lessons for the future and showed what was possible with astute and far-sighted government. If these today have been forgotten, it is perhaps only because they were too peaceful for the history books. The Aaland islands dispute between Sweden and Finland, for instance, was resolved quietly in 1921: the islands remained Finnish, but the Swedish islanders were granted a high degree of administrative autonomy. This compact formed the basis of a solution that removed a major source of tension between the two countries.

The Estonian government took the remarkable step of granting cultural autonomy to its "national minorities"; the Latvians did not go quite this far but did offer some concessions in education. These, to be sure, were exceptions. More usually, as in the Lithuanian and Polish cases, promises made were not kept. The number of Ukrainian schools in Poland, for instance, dropped from 3,662 to 144 in the interwar period. Too often, *numerus clausus* clauses kept minorities out of universities and the civil service.[10]

Those who condemn the League's minorities system might also ponder the alternatives. Nation-states were a reality, not merely a creation of wartime Great Power diplomacy. The conversion of

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the Ottoman Empire into a Turkish national state, for instance, could hardly be attributed to forces outside the country; Mustafa Kemal made the running there, not Lloyd George. And as the Turkish example demonstrates, there were several other ways of treating minorities. "First we kill the Armenians, then the Greeks, then the Kurds," a Turkish gendarme told a Danish Red Cross nurse in July 1915 as the war accelerated the Turkification of the Ottoman Empire. Even friendly German observers concluded that, beyond the professed concern for military security in border areas, the Turks aimed for "the planned extermination of the Armenian people." Later this would be termed "genocide" and, later still, "ethnic cleansing." Neither mass murder nor population transfer offered a way of solving Eastern Europe's ethnic problems that was acceptable to liberal opinion.[11]

If proof was needed of the horrors such alternatives held in store, it was provided by Hitler's use of both mass murder and population transfer in his own effort to construct an anti-liberal new order in Europe. The "final solution of the Jewish question" formed part of this thoroughgoing Nazi attempt to redraw the racial map of the continent. A policy based on international law and state sovereignty was replaced by one that repudiated the very foundations of both: Nazi legal theorists attacked Geneva's "juridification" of international relations and its pathetic belief in a "common rule of law" applicable to peoples of differing racial worth.[12]

The Third Reich proposed to replace international law with a doctrine that legitimized German intervention in the internal affairs of other states on behalf of ethnic Germans abroad. The state, after all, was merely the expression of the racial *Volk*. "Blood is stronger than a passport," wrote a prominent pan-Germanist in 1937.[13] The German minorities in Eastern Europe were "racial comrades" of Reich Germans. They could be protected through invasion—as in Austria and the Sudetenland—or through the "trustee rights" that Germany acquired in its Danubian client states in the second Vienna accord of August 1940. German commentators hailed this last step as a vast improvement on the old League system of minority protection. These "laws for the protection of the folk-group" gave the "mother country" the right to intervene directly with the host government on behalf of the minority. They

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turned the entire "folk-group" into a collective legal entity. Such legislation looked a lot more attractive at the height of German power than it did a mere four years later. By 1945 collective justice had been turned on its head, as millions of ethnic Germans were expelled westwards.

* * *

During the war itself, the League's record towards minorities came under scrutiny. Had its policy of protection by treaty been too ambitious or not ambitious enough? Had it failed because the machinery was unworkable or because the political will to operate it was absent? As plans emerged to replace the League with a successor organization, these questions could not be shirked. The racial basis of Nazi jurisprudence and Germany's abandonment of the accepted principles of international law had been regarded since the late 1930s as among the principal causes of the breakdown of order in Europe. Nazi aggression had undermined the very existence of an "international community." At the same time, Nazi treatment of the Jews persuaded many people that if the individual was to be protected against the state, the traditional doctrine of state sovereignty in domestic affairs would have to be reconsidered. A revival and reinvigoration of international law thus emerged as the natural adjunct to liberal concern for world peace and, in particular, for the safeguarding of human rights.[14]

"Effective international organization is not possible," wrote Quincy Wright in 1943, "unless it protects basic human rights against encroachments by national States." Wright observed that unlike Poland or Czechoslovakia, Germany had not been obliged to conclude a minorities treaty with the League of Nations, with the result that "there was no formal ground on which the League of Nations could protest against the beginning of the persecutions in Germany. It was a general principle that a State was free to persecute its own nationals in its own territory as it saw fit."[15]

But the protection of human rights required the existence of a body superior to the state to which the individual could have recourse. The Austrian jurist Hans Kelsen insisted that "a right consists only in the legal possibility to invoke a court. . . . [International law] can confer rights on individuals only under the condi-

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tion that individuals have direct access to an international court." His colleague Hersch Lauterpacht warned that the international protection of human rights "touching as it does intimately upon the relations of the State and the individual. . .implies a more drastic interference with the sovereignty of the State than the renunciation of war." But in his aptly-named *Peace through Law,* Kelsen argued that only people who believed in a "theology of the State" refused to recognize the need for all states to be bound by international law. Sovereignty was simply a red herring. "We can derive from the concept of sovereignty," he went on, "nothing else than what we have purposely put into its definition."[16]

The limits of sovereignty, then, reflected political rather than jurisprudential or philosophical considerations. But who was going to make states acknowledge the supremacy of international law? Liberal thought in the interwar period had reposed its confidence in the pressure of world public opinion to safeguard human rights. It was obvious that a more effective instrument of enforcement would be required in the postwar period. What complicated matters was the Allies' commitment, as enshrined in the Atlantic Charter, to respect traditional ideas of state sovereignty. The postwar state, in other words, was being asked in some measure to acquiesce in its own weakening. Experienced lawyers like Kelsen and Lauterpacht saw no other realistic way to persuade individual states to make their international obligations a part of domestic law. The alternative was to push for some form of world state, but this they regarded as utopian.

At the heart of this debate was the question of whether the human rights to be enshrined in the new postwar order should be individual or collective. This was where the post-1945 order would deviate most sharply from Geneva's approach. The League of Nations had chosen the latter in its system of protection for ethnic minorities in Eastern Europe. The war had done little to diminish the gravity of the problem of ethnic strife. Indeed, Raphael Lemkin coined the term "genocide" in his 1944 study of *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe,* and called for the development of "adequate machinery for the international protection of national and ethnic groups against extermination attempts and oppression in time of peace."[17]

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Yet despite the obvious importance of safeguarding minorities, strong arguments were advanced in favor of demolishing rather than improving the collective-rights approach pioneered by the League. President Beneš and the Czech government in exile denounced the League system on the grounds that experience had shown that it had actually jeopardized their national security. "Every protected minority will ultimately find its Henlein," warned one observer. In addition, the states of Eastern Europe resented the fact that they had been singled out for special obligations towards their minorities, whereas the Great Powers, including Italy and Germany, had not had to suffer such an indignity. "In the end," wrote Beneš in 1942, "things came to such an extraordinary pass that the totalitarian and dictator states—Germany, Hungary, and Italy—persecuted the minorities in their own territories and at the same time posed as the protectors of minorities in states which were really democratic." Rather than attempting to restore the League system, Beneš suggested that the postwar approach to minorities should be based upon "the defense of human democratic rights and not of national rights."[18]

In addition to this opposition from Eastern Europe, the major Allied powers—Britain, France, and the United States—also showed little enthusiasm for reviving a system that had succeeded in internationalizing the most serious source of tension in Europe without finding adequate means of resolution. As the postwar settlement in Europe would show, the main interest of the major powers was in limiting their obligations to minor states; this meant that they too were happy to bury the League's approach to collective rights. The result was that the UN's eventual commitment to individual human rights was as much an expression of passivity as of resolve by the Allies. It was a means of avoiding problems, not of solving them. This fact helps us understand why so few of the wartime hopes for a reinvigoration of international law were to be realized.

Behind the rhetoric, the UN's commitment to minority rights was as weak as its overall position in power politics. In terms of the protection of minorities, the UN Charter represented a definite step backwards from the League. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 underlined the new status of the individual in international law and revealed a lasting mistrust of the Nazi doctrine of state supremacy, but it contained no provisions for

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enforcement. Minorities were scarcely mentioned, and their study was confined to an obscure Sub-Commission of the Human Rights Committee. A UN Secretariat study of 1950, which provided a sharp distinction between the League's outmoded approach and the new "general and universal protection of human rights," has been described by one commentator as "disastrous for the international protection of minorities."[19]

More far-reaching in its implications was the 1948 Genocide Convention—passed after a remarkable one-man crusade by Raphael Lemkin, who had been disappointed at the refusal of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg to judge acts committed by the Nazis before 1939. Lemkin and others had seen the war-crimes trials as an opportunity to secure world peace by increasing the powers under international law to take action against individuals as well as states. The Genocide Convention added an important new crime to those recognized under international law and imposed obligations upon ratifying states to act to prevent or punish its commission. But the convention's potential has been ignored by the international community, and there has been little evidence to back the UN's confident assertion that "the feeling will grow in world society that by protecting the national, racial, religious and ethnic groups everywhere in the world we will be protecting ourselves." Over four decades, a series of genocides went unpunished outside Europe; in 1992 that indifference extended to Europe itself.[20]

* * *

During the Cold War, Europe's minorities problems—already much reduced by the dramatic shifts of populations that took place in the 1940s—were simply put into a deep freeze. On each side of the Iron Curtain, potentially destabilizing disputes were managed bilaterally, under the gaze of the presiding superpower. Neither Austro-Italian differences over the South Tyrol nor Hungarian-Romanian disputes over Transylvania were allowed to jeopardize bloc cohesion. The German problem was no longer one of minorities—as it had been between the wars—but rather of a divided country. The brutal stability the Cold War brought to Europe disguised the fact that the international regime on minority rights

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had regressed rather than advanced after the interwar years. In the 1990s, as the international response to the outbreak of war in Yugoslavia showed, thinking on minority rights had to start from scratch again.

There is a striking contrast between the ambition and confidence of international policy in the 1920s and the uncertain, reactive style of the 1990s. Population transfer along the lines of the 1923 Greco-Turkish exchange may have appealed to some Western policymakers as they tried to manage the war in Bosnia, but none had the assurance to offer it explicitly as a solution. It remains instead one possible interpretation of that masterpiece of obfuscation, the Dayton peace accords.

As for a fully developed international regime of minority rights protection, the League's effort must seem from today's perspective the product of an almost unimaginably activist and idealistic political elite, confident of their right to reshape half a continent according to the tenets of Western liberalism. Their effort remains of interest as the most sustained attempt in Europe's history to solve the dilemmas of nationalism through international law. But today the map looks very different. The two great minorities of 1918, the Germans and the Jews, have in different ways been eliminated; minorities also generally form a smaller proportion of national populations in Central and Eastern Europe today than before the war. At the same time, liberal confidence in history as an engine of ethnic assimilation has disappeared, perhaps for good.

The international community has grown in size and shrunk in resolve; emulating Geneva therefore seems unlikely. There may be some talk of rewarding Eastern European countries for good behavior, but when the Council of Europe admits Tudjman's Croatia as a member, it is hard to take this very seriously. The breakup of Yugoslavia eventually impelled the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) to appoint a High Commissioner on National Minorities, and it accelerated the publication of the UN's own belated "Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities." So far, however, these initiatives remain tentative; the League's policies look forceful and coherent in comparison. Internationally as well as domestically, it seems as though history is more about forgetting the past than about learning from it.

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Let me conclude, then, with a paradigm of forgetting. The island of Ada Kaleh was the site of a Turkish fortress on the Danube just above the Iron Gates. It contained a mosque, a library, and a small village. When the Ottoman grip on the Balkans slackened in the nineteenth century, Ada Kaleh was overlooked. It was apparently forgotten by the diplomats at the Congress of Berlin and remained a curious Turkish anomaly, stranded midstream between the newly-created kingdoms of Serbia and Romania. In 1919 its three hundred Muslim inhabitants were handed over to Romania. Tourists used to row across from the mainland to view these "human curiosities," drink their coffee, buy their figs and rose-water and Turkish delight, and peer inside the last remaining harem in Europe. At a time when Atatürk was creating a secular state in Turkey, these few islanders preserved the traditional Ottoman ways. Today one will search in vain on the map for Ada Kaleh. It lies beneath the waters of the Danube, sacrificed in the 1950s to the ambitious hydroelectric plans of Romania's communist rulers. Is not Ada Kaleh just as appropriate a symbol of our manner of dealing with minorities this century as any of Europe's Cultural Capitals?

ENDNOTES

[1]Acton, quoted by C. A. Macartney, *National States and National Minorities* (New York: Russell & Russell, 1968), 17; Robert Cecil in Victor H. Rothwell, *British War Aims and Peace Diplomacy, 1914–1918* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 159.

[2]See especially Arnold Toynbee's deliberately titled *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey: A Study in the Contact of Civilizations* (London: Constable and Company, Ltd., 1922).

[3]See Mark Levene, *Wars, Jews and the New Europe: The Diplomacy of Lucien Wolf, 1914–1919* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992); Israel Cohen, *Travels in Jewry* (London: E. Goldston, 1952), 87.

[4]Cited by P. B. Finney, "'An Evil For All Concerned': Great Britain and Minority Protection After 1919," *Journal of Contemporary History* 30 (1995): 536–537.

[5]C. Fink, "'Defender of Minorities': Germany in the League of Nations, 1926–1933," *Central European History* 5 (4) (1972): 330–357.

[6]Figures from Otto Junghann, *National Minorities in Europe* (New York: Covici, Friede, 1932), 116, 119.

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[7]James Wycliffe Headlam-Morley, *A Memoir of the Paris Peace Conference, 1919* (London: Methuen, 1972), 112–113.

[8]S. Sierpowski, "Minorities in the System of the League of Nations," in Paul Smith, ed., *Ethnic Groups in International Relations* (New York: New York University Press, 1991), 27.

[9]Cited by Inis Claude, *National Minorities: An International Problem* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1955), 30; numbers of petitions in Macartney, *National States and National Minorities,* 504, and Jacob Robinson et al., *Were the Minorities Treaties a Failure?* (New York: Institute of Jewish Affairs of the American Jewish Congress and the World Jewish Congress, 1943), 252.

[10]A. J. Motyl, "Ukrainian Nationalist Political Violence in Inter-War Poland, 1921–1939," *East European Quarterly* 19 (1) (March 1985): 46.

[11]Manoug J. Somakian, *Empires in Conflict: Armenia and the Great Powers, 1895–1920* (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 1995), 137, 86; Arnold J. Toynbee, *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey,* 2d ed. (London: Constable, 1923), 16–17.

[12]J. Herz, "The National Socialist Doctrine of International Law and the Problems of International Organization," *Political Science Quarterly* 44 (4) (December 1939): 536–554.

[13]Cited in United States, Department of State, Division of European Affairs, *National Socialism: Basic Principles, Their Application by the Nazi Party's Foreign Organization and the Use of Germans Abroad for Nazi Aims* (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1943), 70.

[14]Raphael Lemkin, *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1944), xiv; W. Friedman, "The Disintegration of European Civilization and the Future of International Law," *Modern Law Review* (December 1938): 194–214; J. Herz, "The National Socialist Doctrine of International Law," *Political Science Quarterly* (December 1939): 536–554.

[15]World Citizens Association, *World's Destiny and the United States* (Chicago, Ill.: World Citizens Association, 1941), 102–105.

[16]Ibid., 113; Hersch Lauterpacht, *An International Bill of the Rights of Man* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1945), vi; Hans Kelsen, *Peace through Law* (Chapel Hill, N.C.: The University of North Carolina Press, 1944), esp. 41–42.

[17]Lemkin, *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe,* xiii.

[18]E. Beneš, "The Organization of Postwar Europe," *Foreign Affairs* 20 (1) (January 1942): 226–242; Claude, *National Minorities: An International Problem,* 55–59.

[19]I. Szabo, "Historical Foundations of Human Rights and Subsequent Developments," in Karel Vasak, ed., *The International Dimensions of Human Rights* (Paris: UNESCO, 1982), 11–42; Hersch Lauterpacht, *International Law and Human Rights* (New York: F. A. Praeger, 1950), 353; Hersch Lauterpacht, *Report: Human Rights, the Charter of the United Nations and the International Bill of the Rights of Man* (Brussels: n.p., 1948), 22; P. Thornberry, "The UN

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Declaration: Background, Analysis and Observations," in Alan Phillips and Allan Rosas, eds., *The UN Minority Rights Declaration* (Turku, Abo: Abo Akademi University, Institute for Human Rights; London: Minority Rights Group, 1993), 15.

[20]Nehemiah Robinson, *The Genocide Convention: A Commentary* (New York: Institute of Jewish Affairs, World Jewish Congress, 1960), 52; see also Hans Kelsen, "Collective and Individual Responsibility in International Law with Particular Regard to the Punishment of War Criminals," *California Law Review* XXXI (December 1943): 530–571; Hersch Lauterpacht, "The Subjects of the Law of Nations," *Law Quarterly Review* LXIII (October 1947): 438–460; *Law Quarterly Review* LXIV (January 1948): 97–116.

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Euphoria is always brief, whatever causes it. The "postcommunist" euphoria is over and the premonitions of imminent dangers are mounting. The monster is dying in its own monstrous way. Shall we see another monster take its place, a series of bloody struggles between its various remnants? How many new countries will emerge from the chaos and what will they be: democratic, dictatorial, national-fascist, clerical, civilized, barbaric? Will millions of refugees, escaping from famine and war, stampede into Europe? Every day newspapers provide gloomy warnings; many are written by knowledgeable people. The only thing we know for certain: nothing is certain; nothing is impossible. . . . "Laws of history" and "historical inevitability" are Hegelian-Marxist fakes. There was no historical necessity in that relatively weak Athenian infantry defeating the powerful Persian army at Marathon. Had the Greeks lost—as any outside observer must have rationally expected—there would have been no history of Europe as we now know it. No historical laws prevented Mohammed from being killed before his escape from Mecca; none ordered Martin Luther, an obscure monk from a provincial town, to initiate the debate about who is entitled to forgive sins. There was no inevitability in the success of the Bolshevik revolution—indeed an unpredictable coincidence of many accidents assured its victory—or the Red Army's defeat by the Poles in 1920 and failure to conquer Europe, or Hitler's establishment of dictatorship in Germany. These momentous historical events were produced by chance, or if one prefers, by miraculous interventions of Providence.

Leszek Kolakowski

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Vernon Bogdanor

Forms of Autonomy and the Protection of Minorities

POLITICAL SCIENTISTS HAVE DEVOTED much attention to the question of how societies divided by language, religion, or ethnicity ought to be governed. This is clearly a problem of vital importance for many of the new democracies, for Russia and the Baltic states, for many other parts of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and for the former Yugoslavia. It is a crucial problem for South Africa as well as for Northern Ireland, where the British government has been groping for two decades to find a form of government that will satisfy both majority and minority communities.

A few—a very few—countries have solved these problems. Switzerland is an obvious example whose peaceful evolution remains the envy of much of the world. Yet, until the mid-nineteenth century, Switzerland was riddled with conflict; it was the Ulster of Europe. It was only in 1848, after the *Sonderbund* wars and under a new federal constitution, that there was conciliation between the Protestant and Catholic cantons. Belgium has recently undertaken the experiment of turning itself into a quasi-federal state so as to accommodate the two linguistic groups, though it is far too early to offer any sort of verdict on the success of this experiment.

The European Union is currently seeking to create a multinational community so that nationalism can be contained. This experiment is a response to World War II, which is seen by many on the Continent as less a struggle between nation-states than a war of faith in which the nations themselves were divided. The most

Vernon Bogdanor is Professor of Government at Oxford University.

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sinister of these faiths—national socialism—was nothing more than an extreme and highly perverted form of nationalism. The European movement came into existence as a reaction against nationalism, and the European Union seeks to transcend it. But the success of the European Union, like that of Belgian federalism, must remain a matter of some doubt.

In the United States, much emphasis is placed on the courts and on judicial review as a means of accommodating minorities. In Europe, by contrast, the solution is sought in the political rather than the legal kingdom. Political scientists agree that there is one common feature marking those societies that have been able to remain peaceful despite conflicts of language, religion, or ethnicity. That common feature is a departure from the Westminster model of majority rule, based on the alternation or potential alternation of governments. In place of this model, divided societies that have attained stability have all adopted a model of government whose essence is the sharing of power. Some kind of power-sharing has been a feature of governments in all societies that have successfully overcome their internal divisions; I am not aware of any divided society that has been able to achieve stability without power-sharing. The precise arrangements in successful societies differ, but in all of them there is some set of arrangements whereby the different segments of the population share power roughly in proportion to their numerical strength, so that no segment feels permanently left out in the cold. European experience tends to confirm that the best protection for minority groups lies not so much in statutory provisions as in institutional instruments that assist in the sharing of power.

The essence of power-sharing is the departure from majority rule that enables all the major groups in the country to play their part in government; majority rule is bound to lead to alienation and instability on the part of minorities who have no chance to participate. Under majority rule, the Germans would always rule in Switzerland, and the Protestants likewise in Northern Ireland. So long as electors voted along national or religious lines, there would be no possibility of alternation, and so the Westminster model could not work. There would be no check upon the power of the majority, and the consequence would be that the minority would be alienated from the state. Therefore, democracy in di-

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vided societies must be equated not with majority rule but with power-sharing.

Power-sharing can be employed at three different levels of government: *1)* at the *territorial level,* through federalism or devolution; *2)* through *electoral* devices; or *3)* through devices at the *executive* level of government. These three methods will be considered in turn.

FEDERALISM

Where groups are divided on a territorial basis, it would be natural to establish a federal state or one that has regional or local parliaments in which different groups can enjoy autonomy. Federalism offers groups that are a minority in a country as a whole but the majority in a particular territorial segment the opportunity to exercise some degree of power. Indeed, one main reason for the adoption of a federal, as opposed to a unitary, system of government is the existence of diversity, whether ethnic, linguistic, religious, or racial. In such situations, the sense of a shared national identity may be very weak, or it may hardly exist at all. National identity, it may be argued, can be created more easily through a federal system than through a unitary state wherein all power is concentrated at the center. The hope is that federalism will gradually lead to the development of a stronger sense of national identity. Even if it does, however, there may still be strong arguments for federalism as a means of decentralizing power and allowing for the expression of regional and local interests.

A federal system, however, is far more complex to operate than a unitary one. Governments contemplating the establishment of a provincial or regional tier of government, whether by dividing power (federalism) or devolving it (regionalism), have a number of difficult decisions to make on the form and scope of the distribution of powers. These decisions are generally posed in the language of juridical principle, but in practice the outcome of federalism or regional devolution is likely to depend less upon the principles chosen or the institutional structures that ensue than upon the constellation of political forces within the state. It is partly for this reason that it is so difficult—if not impossible—to develop a practical corpus of comparative knowledge for the guidance of

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policymakers in different countries. The student of comparative government can do little more than advance a few, highly tentative generalizations about such complex interrelationships, of whose inner logic we comprehend so little.

One of the most important decisions to be made by a government contemplating the establishment of a provincial layer is whether to establish a system of the *vertical* type, in which wide *legislative* powers over a large area of policy-making are transferred (the classical model exemplified in the federal constitutions of Australia, Canada, and the United States), or, alternatively, to establish a system of the *horizontal* type, based upon a division of function, with legislative power remaining predominantly with the central government but executive powers being transferred (the model of federalism adopted by Austria, the Federal Republic of Germany, and, to a lesser extent, Switzerland). There is, indeed, no pure example of the horizontal model in any federal state in which the totality of legislative powers remains with the center, with only executive powers being transferred—although the 1978 Wales Act, which never came into effect, would have been such an example. In Austria, Germany, and Switzerland, the provincial levels of government do enjoy some legislative competence.

The premise behind a division of power of the *vertical* type would seem to be that a clear-cut division of responsibility for different areas of policy can be established. The central government would have a defined list of functions comprising, as a minimum, control of foreign affairs, defense policy, and the fundamentals of economic policy, while the provinces would have responsibility for functions that were considered to have a provincial character, primarily the social and environmental functions of government.

Yet it is highly doubtful whether it makes sense to conceive of a legislative division of powers in this way. Indeed, there are grounds for believing that it does not even represent how the founding fathers conceived of the division of powers in the Constitution of the United States. The "idea of an absolute separation and independence" between state and national governments, declared Madison in 1830, "as if they belonged to different nations alien to each other has too often tainted the reasoning applied to Constitutional questions."[1] Certainly the world of twentieth-century gov-

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ernment has no place for the "watertight compartment" view of federalism or regionalism. In most advanced industrial societies the electorate will expect public services to be administered fairly, not only between individuals, but also between different regions of the country; and it will hold government accountable if it is found, for example, that educational standards or health-care facilities differ widely in different parts of the country. Territorial justice is a fundamental aspiration in most democracies, and it can easily serve to reconcentrate at the center powers that the Constitution gives to the provinces.

The modern welfare state places a further strain upon traditional conceptions of the division of powers. Provincial governments have often found that they are unable to sustain a sufficiently buoyant tax base to pay for the level of welfare provision demanded by the electorate. This means that they have to rely upon the center for finances, and power again comes to be reconcentrated at the center.

In this way, what seemed to be a division of legislative power into separate compartments comes to be a *sharing* of power between different levels of government. The history of federalism in Australia, Canada, and the United States shows convincingly that if electors demand a standard of service that the provincial or state governments cannot provide, then the federal government will assume the necessary powers, regardless of the formal division of powers as laid down in the Constitution. Methods will be found to circumvent the constitutional division of power; in modern federal systems, therefore, the distribution of legislative powers is less important as a guide to the actual configuration of power than the administrative and financial arrangements that serve to link *together* the federal and provincial layers of government. Federalism involves a cooperative relationship between different levels of government, with the result that most areas of policy—and certainly those involving social welfare—involve national, provincial, and perhaps also local levels of government simultaneously. The degree of autonomy open to any particular level of government comes to be comparatively limited, and its power and influence depend upon its negotiating and bargaining skills with other levels rather than on any constitutional guarantees. Interdependence is

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today the central characteristic of federal or regional systems of government.

Given the complex realities of twentieth-century government, therefore, it could be argued that the *horizontal* model of federalism or devolution—the transfer of executive powers—is more suitable than the classical model of a legislative division of powers. The horizontal model explicitly recognizes the interdependence of different levels of government. It avoids the transfer of meaningless powers—powers that the Constitution seems to give to the provinces but that in practice come to be reconcentrated at the center. By dividing the responsibility for major areas of public policy between two branches of government, the horizontal model acknowledges that the exclusive allocation of powers is a legal fiction that does not acknowledge the reality of governmental operations in our time; the horizontal model seems more in accord with the spirit of modern government than does the model of transferring legislative powers. But it gives rise to problems of its own, which require a high degree of consensus and cooperation between different levels of government if they are to be resolved.

The horizontal model of federalism or devolution may initially appear to be merely a weaker version of the vertical model. But what seems a difference in degree is in reality a difference in kind. The legislative transfer of powers involves the decision of whether to transfer responsibility for a particular field of policy—for example, education—to a provincial layer. But the transfer of executive powers involves the additional decision of *how much* responsibility for policy in a particular field should be transferred. What should be the scope of the executive powers that the provincial government is to enjoy in education? With the transfer of legislative power, there is just one question to answer: what areas of policy should be transferred. With the transfer of executive power, by contrast, there are *two* questions: what functions should be transferred and how much control over particular functions should be transferred.

The question of how much control should be transferred is quite crucial to the balance of power between the provincial unit and the center. If legislation is drawn up loosely so as to leave wide scope for subordinate legislation at the provincial level, the provinces will enjoy considerable power. If, on the other hand, legislation is

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drawn up tightly so as to leave little scope for secondary decision-making, then the provincial government will enjoy little power. In the absence of a coherent set of principles determining what should be regulated by primary legislation and what by subordinate, it would always be possible for government at the center to limit the powers of provincial governments by drawing up legislation that leaves no room for real provincial influence, thus frustrating the purpose of federalism or devolution.

The problem of drawing up principles to regulate the division between legislative and executive powers is easier to resolve in a country such as the Federal Republic of Germany, where statutes are generally drafted in broad declaratory terms that lay down merely the framework of policy and allow the *Länder* considerable initiative, than in a country such as the United Kingdom, where there seems to be no clear principle separating what is embodied in primary as opposed to secondary legislation, since the division between primary and secondary legislation was never intended to form the basis for a division of power between different tiers of government. Without a principle articulating the division between legislative and executive powers, the danger would always be that the actual extent of the powers that the provincial governments enjoy would be dependent upon the *political* judgment of the center.

The horizontal model of the transfer of powers relies, then, upon a particular conception of public law, a more rationalistic one than is commonly favored by jurists in English-speaking countries. The model can thus be accommodated more easily by some legal systems than by others.

The basic rationale of the horizontal model is, as we have seen, a recognition of the interdependence of different levels of government in the modern state. The central government will be responsible for the broad legislative framework, but it will be dependent upon the provinces for the implementation of policy. The provinces in turn will be dependent upon local authorities for the actual administration of particular services and upon central government to yield the necessary authority for effective action. This interdependence, however, has its dangers. Deprived of executive functions and its day-to-day caseload, central government will find it difficult to determine long-term policy without the coopera-

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tion and support of the provinces, which will be in more regular contact with local authorities. The provinces, though they will have the advantage of contact with those actually administering services in local authorities, will have no constitutionally guaranteed role in drawing up primary legislation. Therefore, they must rely upon cooperation with central government: the center must be willing to listen to the provinces to ensure both that primary legislation is based upon concrete realities and that the provinces are able to promote legislation on matters that concern them. For government to be successful, the provinces should have considerable influence on primary legislation as well as on the pre-legislative stage, where that is constitutionally possible.

It will be apparent, therefore, that the horizontal model of federalism or devolution presupposes a high degree of consensus between the main political forces in a country. There will, no doubt, be frequent occasions when central government is in the hands of one party while the provincial governments are controlled by an opposing party. Without the willingness to cooperate, the outcome will be deadlock or stagnation, a system of government in which it is difficult to get anything done. The horizontal division of powers works better in countries such as Austria, Germany, and Switzerland, where there is a basic consensus about the fundamentals of economic and social life, than it would in countries such as the United Kingdom and France, where the gap between the Left and the Right may be too great to be bridged. If federalism and devolution are seen not only as methods of dispersing power but also as methods of sharing power, then it is clear that a commitment to active cooperation is required on the part of different layers of government. Where such a commitment does not exist, effective government is likely to demand centralization.

If this analysis is correct, then the delimitation of the powers to be transferred to the provincial level is *not* in fact the main problem for the designer of a federal or regionalist constitution. Indeed, there is comparatively little disagreement as to which functions are most appropriate for provincial governments: broadly, the social and environmental functions of government, including health, the social services, education, housing, regional planning, transport, and the supervision of local government. In addition, some devo-

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lution of industrial, agricultural, and energy functions should be anticipated, although the precise division of powers with regard to industrial matters and economic policy generally is a highly contentious issue in many countries.

But if the essence of federalism or regionalism is the sharing rather than the division of power, then its precise flavor cannot be captured by citing the constitution or a set of juridical principles. Even where a constitution provides for the transfer of power, it is unlikely that the central government will completely relinquish all responsibility for a particular function. If, for example, we consider the division of responsibility for education in the United States—a system of vertical federalism—we can see that, although the Constitution says nothing about federal responsibility for education, the federal government is nevertheless deeply involved. It is responsible for, among other things, ensuring that certain basic standards of civil rights, such as school desegregation, are observed, and it provides grants to state and local governments. The federal government plays a major and increasing role in education, and indeed in no advanced industrial society is central government able to divest itself of any concern with the educational system. The same, of course, is true of other functions formally transferred to provincial governments—health, the social services, housing. These must be national as well as provincial responsibilities.

What is therefore required of a federal or regionalist constitution is *not* that it provide for a strict and detailed delimitation of powers, for that is likely to prove too inflexible to allow for the bargaining and adjustment needed to make a system of shared powers operate effectively. Instead, powers should be enumerated in broad terms so as not to impair adaptation to the process of change. The objection may be raised that the enumeration of powers in broad terms is likely to lead to greater uncertainty, because it will be unclear precisely why powers have been transferred. But the assumption behind this objection is that the provincial governments cannot be trusted to use their powers in a responsible manner, that they will seek conflict rather than agreement. If that assumption is correct, then the conditions for successful federalism or regionalism may well not exist, since the basis of trust needed to operate the system is too weak.

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Napoleon is said to have declared that a constitution ought to be short and obscure; that is not necessarily a bad guide for the designer of a federalist or regionalist constitution. The areas of doubt concerning the precise powers being transferred ought to be regarded as a necessary concession for the successful implementation of the system rather than as a defect. The corollary, however, must be that institutional mechanisms are developed to reconcile differences. There must be an appropriate system of judicial arbitration as well as flexible mechanisms of political adjustment, enabling changes to occur without going through the process of constitutional amendment. The experience of federal and regionalist systems shows that constitutional amendment may be a comparatively unimportant source of adjustment and that the main burden may fall instead upon political and administrative mechanisms.

Although comparatively little can be said in general terms about the appropriate distribution of powers between the center and the provinces—and indeed notions of what is appropriate will legitimately differ from one country to another, according to circumstances—nevertheless, there are likely to be limits to the powers that the center is willing to transfer. The principal rationale lying behind these limits is best expressed in Article 72(2) of the Basic Law (Constitution) of the Federal Republic of Germany, which declares that a need for federal regulation exists to secure "the maintenance of legal or economic unity, especially the maintenance of uniformity of living conditions beyond the territory of any one *Land*."

In modern federal states the center will, in general, be determined to ensure that basic civil rights, including the realization of minimum standards in public services, are achieved. The willingness to transfer education would not normally mean, for example, a willingness to tolerate racial discrimination in education; the willingness to transfer health would not mean that the provinces were without obligation to provide at least a basic minimum standard of health care. Indeed, the desire to ensure that certain minimum standards in both civil rights and social welfare are met has been a crucial factor in the expansion of the role of the federal government in long-established federations such as the United States, Canada, and Australia.

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More difficult questions for the jurist are raised by the requirement that the "legal and economic unity" of the country be preserved. This will obviously mean that the center must retain responsibility for foreign affairs and defense, although, as the example of Quebec shows, this need not preclude the provinces entering into relationships with other countries. But what is entailed by "economic unity"? Clearly the center must retain basic responsibility for economic policy and must retain the central tools of demand management and macroeconomic strategy. More than this is required, however, if equity between different provinces is to be achieved.

It is a fundamental principle of the modern welfare state that resources should be distributed not on grounds of geography but of need. It would be wrong for a disadvantaged child in one region of a country to receive more resources than a similarly disadvantaged child in another region simply because the former region enjoyed a stronger voice politically. Central government is the only body constitutionally able to secure a fair balance of resources between the various provinces within a country; federalism or divination will otherwise lead to an allocation of resources that is dependent on the political strength or "clout" wielded by particular provinces rather than on criteria of territorial justice. The center must retain a role in the distribution of financial resources to the provinces in order to ensure that this distribution reflects considerations of need.

The central government will also need to retain some authority over industrial policy. It will want to ensure that the provinces do not indulge in wasteful competition by bidding on regional incentives. In this area of policy also, the center plays a vital role in that it is the only body constitutionally empowered to secure a balance between the regions. Finally, the center will require some degree of control over the global total of public expenditure so as to prevent provincial governments from frustrating the general management of the economy.

None of this, however, need mean that provincial governments cannot be entrusted with significant and indeed substantial economic powers. So long as there is a limit to the amount of borrowing that provincial governments can undertake, they can be given very wide autonomy over spending policies. The transfer of indus-

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trial powers may well be positively desirable, since the provincial government is the body best able to appreciate the needs of the province as a whole; the perception of the center will inevitably be colored by the functional outlook of particular services. The transfer of industrial powers will prove beneficial if it means that industrial development is fashioned with a greater regard for provincial needs. Indeed, if industrial policy is to be successful, there must be a careful coordination of responsibilities between central and provincial governments, a recognition that their roles in the process of economic development are complementary and not conflicting.

In general, the extent of the powers that it is possible to transfer to a province will depend upon the likely degree of consensus between province and center. The greater the agreement, the greater the powers that can safely be transferred; the greater the likelihood of conflict and the danger of separatism, the more the center will feel constrained to keep power in its own hands.

It is the possibility of sharing powers that enables provincial governments to be given a role in economic and social policy. Were federalism or regionalism to consist of clearly separated powers and exclusive responsibilities, then most of the powers of the provinces in these areas would be eliminated. Thus the attempt to secure decentralization by defining functional fields with which central government should have nothing to do would, paradoxically, produce greater centralization than is needed under a system of shared powers.

The principles constraining the transfer of powers will thus be determined by the political situation rather than by the constitutional lawyer. For this reason, the question of how powers should be divided is one that cannot be answered in the abstract. It depends upon a more fundamental question: what is the likelihood of agreement between the provinces and the central government? If the essence of federalism or regionalism is power-sharing, then the central question to be asked of any federal or regionalist system is whether it is conducive to cooperation or conflict. The answer to that question is more integral to the success of federalism or regionalism than the traditional juristic question concerning the appropriate division of powers. Fortunately, political scientists may be of some help in the task of designing a system that maxi-

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mizes the chances of cooperation and minimizes the possibilities of conflict.

A federal or regionalist system of government can minimize conflict if the divisions between the provincial units cut across other cleavages, such as those of language, religion, or class. Switzerland is an excellent example of a federal system based on such *cross-cutting* cleavages; the four lines of cleavage—language, religion, class, and central affiliation—cut across each other so that separate coalitions come to be formed on different issues. Neither alliances nor enmities are permanent, and this seems to account for the remarkable stability of Swiss federalism and the tolerance displayed towards minority linguistic groupings in the national community.

In Canada, by contrast, cleavages are *reinforcing*. The division between French and English speakers is reinforced by the boundary dividing Quebec from the other provinces, and also by the party system. Until the 1984 general election the Liberal strongholds were in Quebec and Ontario; in the general election of 1980, no Liberal west of Winnipeg was returned. Conversely, before 1984, the Conservatives were strong in the West but unable to secure representation in Quebec. This was in part the result of the "first past the post" electoral system, which denied the Liberal minority in the West and the Conservative minority in Quebec effective representation in the legislature.

The Belgian pattern, is, on the whole, more akin to the Canadian than the Swiss. The division between Flemings and Walloons is reinforced by the boundaries of the regional institutions and also by the party system, with the Christian Social Party being dominant in Flanders and the Socialists in Wallonia. Unlike Canada, however, the use of proportional representation for all elections in Belgium ensures that minority political viewpoints in Flanders and Wallonia secure accurate representation. Nevertheless, with hindsight it can be suggested that a regional structure based not on the Flemish and Walloon communities but upon the nine preexisting provinces might have been more conducive to stability, since it would have been more likely to give rise to cross-cutting cleavages than the solution actually adopted.

The cooperative model of federalism or regionalism requires some linkage between the center and the provinces if it is to work

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successfully. The very fact that it has been found necessary to recognize subnational identities by establishing provincial units of government means that government cannot function purely on the basis of national majorities. Instead, "two political logics" need to be recognized: "One is the classical democratic logic of one man, one vote, and the other is the logic of cooperation between political entities differently constituted."[2] Rather than functioning on the basis of national majorities, therefore, governments in a federal or regionalist state must adopt Calhoun's principle of concurrent majorities, i.e., that there must be both a national majority and a majority of the "political entities differently constituted," the provinces.

THE ELECTORAL LEVEL

Some ethnically divided societies employ devices such as separate electoral rolls for different groups. In India, for example, until 1985, 15 percent of the seats in the federal lower house were reserved for the so-called Scheduled tribes and Scheduled castes (Untouchables). The short-lived 1960 Cyprus constitution used a similar device. Other countries, while employing a common voting roll, have provided for a fixed number of national seats for each community. Devices of this kind, however, can easily institutionalize ethnic differences; the danger is that all issues take on an ethnic form. Methods of separate representation, therefore, may actually worsen ethnic relations by concentrating too much attention on them to the exclusion of other political issues. Moreover, these methods of separate representation do have connotations, even if faint, of apartheid.

Modern democratic practice generally requires that there be some concept of political equality according to which electors are to be represented as individuals and not merely as members of ethnic groups. Democratic states, therefore, generally choose to be governed under a common electoral roll. Even so, there are a number of ways that the electoral system can play an important part in protecting minorities without departing from the principle of a common roll.

Most of the new democracies have adopted one of the proportional electoral methods to elect their legislatures; indeed, none of

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them have adopted the British "first past the post" system. Proportional representation, however, is not the name of a single electoral system but a generic term covering a wide range of different systems, all with different political consequences. There are some proportional systems that can do a great deal to help accommodate minorities. Some systems based on party lists, such as those used in the Netherlands or Israel, entail tight party control of the candidates. But there are systems, such as those in Finland or the Irish Republic, that allow voters to choose between different candidates of the same party: a kind of primary election is built in, to be combined with the legislative election. Proportional systems of this kind are much more likely to allow for minority representation, since they allow voters from minority communities to select those representing their community. Indeed, it is to the advantage of political parties to put up candidates from minority communities in areas where such minorities are concentrated. Thus, such systems of proportional representation enable minorities to be represented within the existing party system without any need to form separate ethnic minority parties that could do damage to the internal cohesion of the state. In addition, devices used in Switzerland such as *panachage,* whereby electors can vote across party lists, and cumulation, whereby in multimember systems voters can cast two votes for a single candidate, can also do much to assist minority representation within the framework of a national party system. They allow voters from minority communities to concentrate their votes on the candidates from their communities.

Proportional representation cannot of itself, however, do anything to ensure that minorities have a say in government; indeed, it is not designed to do so. What is achieved is the fair representation of minorities. But a minority in the population will still remain a minority in the legislature, and, under the Westminster model of democracy, it will remain without a share in government. It will still be at the mercy of a determined majority that gains control of government and is prepared to use its powers to the fullest. So it is that the introduction of proportional representation for local and European elections in Northern Ireland has not altered the basic fact that the Catholic population is a minority there. Proportional representation cannot convert a minority into a majority; it can only try to accurately represent both. It cannot

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ensure that minorities are treated fairly, only that their voice is heard.

Where minorities are territorially concentrated and there is a federal system of government, it is particularly important that the protection of rights is guaranteed at the national rather than provincial level. Otherwise, a national minority that, by virtue of territorial concentration, has a majority at the provincial level may in turn come to oppress local minorities. In Canada, for example, where the implementation of minority language rights lies with the provinces, the provinces have been found rather unwilling to provide adequate funding to secure these rights. It is particularly important in a federal system that local minorities can look to the central state for protection.

Federalism, however, will not be very helpful when minorities are territorially concentrated and do not constitute a majority in any part of a country. Indeed, in the modern world, ethnic relationships tend to transcend geography. For the particular problems faced by countries where minorities are territorially dispersed, it might be worth adapting the principle of what has been called "personal federalism."[3] This is considered later in this essay.

GOVERNMENTAL LEVEL

Minorities require more than fair representation if their rights are to be effectively secured. We need, therefore, to look at the machinery of government in addition to that at the electoral level, for power-sharing can also be introduced at the level of the federal executive. In Switzerland, for example, the Federal Council by convention always contains a minimum of two out of seven seats for the French-speaking cantons and guarantees a balanced representation of religious and linguistic communities. In Belgium, Article 99b of the new constitution requires that "with the possible exception of the Prime Minister, the cabinet comprises an equal number of French-speaking and Dutch-speaking ministers," thus overrepresenting the Francophone minority. In Canada, convention rather than any constitutional rule provides for a cabinet balance between Anglophones and Francophones. In the Austrian *Länder*—with the exception of Vorarlberg—power-sharing at the executive level is secured in a novel way. The *Land* parliaments,

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elected by proportional representation, choose *Land* executives by proportional representation also, thus assuring that minorities are represented in government. This is similar to the model of the ill-fated Northern Ireland assembly of 1974, designed to ensure that the minority as well as the majority were able to participate in government in a divided society.

The emphasis on power-sharing at the executive level can be strengthened by requiring weighted majorities on issues that affect the interests of particular groups. In Belgium, for example, each chamber is divided into two linguistic groups, Flemish and Francophone. Article 107d of the Constitution abrogated in 1992 required that certain laws "be passed with a majority vote within each linguistic group of both Houses, providing that a majority of the members of each are present and on condition that the total votes in favor of the two linguistic groups attain two thirds of the votes cast." The Constitution provides for an "alarm bell" procedure (Article 54) for those laws, excluding the budget, not requiring a special majority. In the case of such laws, three-quarters of the members of one of the linguistic groups "may declare that the provisions of a draft or proposed bill which it specifies are of such a nature as to have a serious effect on relations between the communities." In such cases the Cabinet—in which, as we have noted, each linguistic group enjoys parity of representation—reconsiders the bill, and parliamentary consideration of it is suspended for thirty days. A suspensive veto of this kind has the virtue of protecting the interests of particular groups while avoiding the dangers of inflexibility to which an absolute veto can give rise. Frequent recourse to the veto can immobilize government so that no decisions at all can be made. In Cyprus after 1960, for example, overuse of the veto by the representatives of the Turkish minority on tax bills was a major reason for the failure of the Cypriot constitution. Thus the scope of the veto should be as narrow as is consistent with the provision of a feeling of security for the various groups. "The veto power," it has been said, "must be regarded as a kind of emergency brake," and not as part of the normal machinery of government.[4]

Such methods of power-sharing at the executive level, if they are to be successful, require modification of the constitutional convention characteristic of the Westminster model of collective respon-

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sibility. Members of the executive branch will tend to see themselves as brokers for their ethnic groups as well as ministers in a cohesive government. Such a brokerage role may also prove incompatible with strong political leadership on the part of the prime minister. Decision-making under a power-sharing government may be slower and more difficult than it is under a more cohesive form of government; yet the decisions made may be more lasting and more legitimate if care is taken to make sure that the main ethnic groups in a country are all committed to them.

But in most of the new democracies, minorities are not territorially concentrated, and federalism will be of little help. There are likely to be territorially dispersed minorities that do not constitute a majority even in very small local constituencies. How can the participation of minorities be assisted in such situations?

The problem of securing communal autonomy in multinational states was one that occupied many (and, in particular, the Austrian Social Democrats) in the last years of the Hapsburg Empire. They sought to adapt the idea of federalism to a situation of territorially dispersed minorities by means of a highly original idea known as "personal federalism."

According to the concept of personal federalism, the state was to be divided into nonterritorial associations, each of which was to comprise members of a given ethnic community. Membership of the associations, however, was to be voluntary. These nonterritorial associations were to be entrusted with the administration of educational and cultural affairs, while political and economic questions would continue to be dealt with by the authorities of the Empire. In their Brunn program of 1899, the Austrian Social Democrats proposed that the associations be known as "National Universities" and that citizens would have the right to register with them regardless of their place of residence. This was indeed an adaptation of the millet system under the Ottoman Empire by which the affairs of cultural and religious minorities were regulated through autonomous communities of their own.[5]

The Hapsburg Empire never succeeded in resolving its nationality problems, but the methods advocated by the Social Democrats have continued to be applied in other countries. In modern Belgium, for example, the new constitution combines territorial federalism with personal federalism. There are three regional authori-

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ties (in Flanders, Wallonia, and Brussels) and also three linguistic communities defined partly in nonterritorial terms (Flemish, French, and German-speaking). The Flemish region and the Flemish community have one common executive and legislature, but the Walloon region and the French community are not coterminous, for the French community includes the French-speaking population of Brussels, while the German-speaking population has a community authority but no region. Community powers comprise what is known as "matters linked to the person" and include cultural affairs, social affairs, health, and welfare; the regional powers concern matters linked to territory, such as environmental protection, physical planning, housing, regional economic policy, and energy policy.

Among the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Estonia stands out as having sought to adopt this method of providing for the self-expression of minorities, both between the wars and also more recently. The Estonian Law of Cultural Autonomy of 1925 provided for the right of ethnic minorities numbering over three thousand people to create their own self-governing cultural councils through separate elections among their members. These councils received state support and were, in addition, allowed to tax their members to support minority language schools and other elements of minority cultural life. The cultural autonomy law was particularly beneficial to Estonia's German and Jewish communities, which were territorially dispersed and would have otherwise faced considerable difficulties in organizing their educational and cultural life.

In the 1990s, Estonia's minority problems have assumed greater magnitude. In 1934, its minorities constituted 11 percent of the population. Today, they constitute around 38 percent of the population. Moreover, their composition has altered. In place of the Germans, who have either emigrated or been expelled, and the Jews, most of whom were killed by the Nazis, the main minorities are Russians, who constitute over three-quarters of the minority population, Ukrainians, and Belorussians.

In 1989, drawing inspiration from the law of 1925 on the same subject, the new democratic government in Estonia passed a law on Cultural Autonomy for National Minorities, once again grant-

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ing rights to members of minorities that are not linked to territory but instead can be exercised, in principle, anywhere in the country.

It is, of course, far too early to be able to judge how successful this new law will be. In any case, the introduction of personal cultural autonomy can only be successful if it is seen as one element—however important—in a broader pattern of minority protection, which must include legal provisions guaranteeing the use of minority languages outside the cultural sphere, for example, in the courts and in administrative procedures. Moreover, since many among the Russian-speaking population in Estonia are not at present Estonian citizens, there must be a rapid program of integration of the Russian minority within the state. They must be allowed to exercise their rights to establish their own institutions and to vote in elections for them.

A system of personal federalism can only work where there is full confidence in the practical application of the rule of law. Anyone who fears direct or indirect discrimination as a result of public affiliation to a given national minority will hesitate to apply for registration. That is particularly important if official enrollment in a particular ethnic group constitutes the only means of obtaining certain educational or cultural benefits.

There are many other difficulties with the Estonian model—difficulties involving the appropriate demarcation of responsibilities, especially financial responsibilities, between the government and the councils as well as the means of ensuring that the councils are representative and accountable. Nevertheless, the Estonian Law on Cultural Autonomy for National Minorities constitutes a revival of an original and sophisticated approach to minority protection. It is an approach well worth consideration by other democracies in the area, for it allows minority communities to unite without disrupting the state.

It would, of course, be wrong to suggest that there is just one method by which the participation of minorities can be secured, and that this one method should be considered a paradigm for all of the new democracies. The argument is only that there is a wide range of institutional devices, a number of which have been adopted in the plural societies of Western Europe, that may be of value to the new democracies. It is not the adoption of a specific institution that is crucial but rather the spirit with which minority problems

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are approached. What is needed is to assimilate the democratic logic of "one person, one vote" to a second democratic logic of cooperation between different groups. Once that second logic is accepted, the question of the appropriate institutional devices becomes merely a matter of what means is best adapted to secure an agreed end. The answer will legitimately vary from country to country.

But the problems of minorities cannot be resolved by internal reforms alone, however sophisticated these may be. As we have already seen, they give rise to problems of irredentism when a minority in one state is of the same ethnic composition as the majority in another. Irredentist claims can only be conciliated by establishing links between peoples such that minorities can realize their identity without compromising established boundaries. There must be power-sharing *between* countries as well as *within* them. An example of an attempt to create such links is the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985, one aim of which was to enable the nationalist population of Northern Ireland to express its identity by establishing institutional links between Britain and the Irish Republic.

Similar ideas have been advocated for the new democracies without yet having won acceptance. In January 1990, shortly after Poland and Czechoslovakia had returned to democracy, the American strategist Zbigniew Brzezinski proposed that a Polish/Czech federation be established, mirroring proposals during the interwar years for a Danubian confederation—a form of regional unity that might well have succeeded in containing Nazi Germany.

The need for interregional cooperation in Central and Eastern Europe is at least as important as the integration of the new democracies into the European Union. Yet such cooperation has remained underdeveloped for two reasons. The first is a fear, felt particularly by Hungary's neighbors, that the establishment of such institutions will be used as a basis for territorial revision. Therefore, a precondition for successful cooperation across borders must be that existing borders are accepted as inviolable, to be altered only by the free consent of all parties. This means that states must renounce border changes and irredentist claims in the interest of establishing a relationship with their kin in other countries.

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A second reason for the comparatively slow progress made by schemes for interregional cooperation is the fear that it would be used to delay the integration of the new democracies into the European Union. In consequence, the new democracies would have only second-class status in Europe. It is up to the members of the European Union, surely, to dispel such fears and to encourage the creation of institutional links between countries, analogous perhaps to those in Western Europe, so that the identities of minority groups can be effectively expressed. The challenge is to create institutions that can achieve the dual aim of encouraging the self-expression of different nationalities and creating a genuine union between peoples that allows the underlying unity of Central Europe to be displayed. Such a challenge is of course primarily one for the new democracies themselves. But it ought to be possible for those living in Western Europe to give practical manifestation to their generosity of spirit by helping their neighbors devise institutional structures. There could be no better way to show, by deeds as well as by words, that Europe is a single continent, a single civilization—something that, until 1914, hardly anyone doubted.

Shortly after Woodrow Wilson produced his Fourteen Points, his Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, declared with some prescience:

> The more I think about the President's declaration as to the right of "self-determination," the more convinced I am of the danger of putting such ideas into the minds of certain races. It is bound to be the basis of impossible demands. What effect will it have on the Irish, the Indians, the Egyptians, and the nationalists among the Boers? Will it not breed—rebellion? The phrase is simply loaded with dynamite. It will raise hopes which can never be realized. It will, I fear, cost thousands of lives. In the end it is bound to be discredited, to be called the dream of an idealist—What a calamity that the phrase was ever uttered.[6]

Woodrow Wilson's notion of self-determination was founded upon the nineteenth-century liberal idea that humanity was naturally divided into nations and that every nation should have its own state. Such an ideal, as we have seen, is not capable of being realized in Central and Eastern Europe where minorities are territorially dispersed, and there is no way in which they can be united

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by means of territorial revision. This means that there is an urgent need for new thinking about how the national identities of peoples can be made compatible with democratic stability.

The answer to the problem lies in de-emphasizing the concept of sovereignty, whether the sovereignty of the majority within the state or the sovereignty of the state vis-à-vis other states, and instead emphasizing the concept of power-sharing. But how likely is it that such a new approach will in fact be adopted?

It is not yet possible to tell whether the leaders of the new democracies will be able to defuse successfully the tensions aroused by minority and irredentist claims. It is only possible to hope that, having overcome the legacy of Lenin, they are also able to overcome the legacy of Woodrow Wilson. The need to transcend nationalism is the fundamental challenge facing the emergent democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. The democratic stability of the region and perhaps also the peace of the Continent depend upon their success in achieving this in overcoming the twentieth century.

ENDNOTES

[1]To Robert Y. Hayne, 3 April 1830, cited in Samuel P. Huntington, "The Founding Fathers and the Division of Powers," in Arthur Maass, ed., *Area and Power: A Theory of Local Government* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959), 191.

[2]A. P. Frognier, "Federal and Party Federal Systems, Institutions and Conflict Management: Some Western European Examples," in Desmond Rea, ed., *Political Cooperation in Divided Societies* (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1982), 203.

[3]See Ibid., 206ff.

[4]Arend Lijphart, "Consociation: The Model and its Application in Divided Societies," in Rea, ed., *Political Cooperation in Divided Societies,* 177.

[5]Dominic Lieven, "Western Scholarship on the Rise and Fall of the Soviet Regime: The View from 1993," *Journal of Contemporary History* 29 (2) (April 1994): 217, 226.

[6]Robert Lansing, *The Peace Negotiations* (1921), cited in Nicholas Mansergh, *The Irish Question, 1840–1921,* 3d ed. (London: Allen and Unwin, 1975), 302–303.

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The accidental politics of the 1990s poses new and serious difficulties for political theory and practice. Some of these difficulties were anticipated in earlier periods of political turbulence: Condorcet, for example, devoted great ingenuity to devising constitutional schemes whereby decisions could be drawn out, delayed, or reversed. Other difficulties are very largely new: they are such as to set the impartial regulation of broadcasting and of the new television, communications, and newspaper oligopolies at the very center of present politics. But the most disturbing of the new requirements is to discover a new tolerance for the accidental in politics. This is a very Humean politics, and Hume indeed observed (in his account of accidents from the point of view of the theory of knowledge) that "the custom of imagining a dependence has the same effect as the custom of observing it would have." Politics, like everything else in life, is a kingdom of emotions and customs, of the aesthetic and the accidental.

Emma Rothschild

From "What is Security?"
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Martin Kramer

The Middle East, Old and New

In 1902, THEODOR HERZL, the father of political Zionism, published a utopian novel entitled *Altneuland* (Old-New Land). The story is set in Palestine in the distant future of 1923, by which time a "New Society" has been established through the mass return of the Jews. The "New Society" is a cosmopolitan commonwealth, far beyond nationalism. There is no official language or religion. Its members are free to worship "in synagogue, church, mosque, in the art museum or the philharmonic concert." Jerusalem is dominated by a "Peace Palace" bearing the Latin inscription from Terence: "Nothing human is alien to me."

The "New Society" is also a showplace of the highest technology. Odorless and silent electric monorails whisk the inhabitants from place to place; power is generated by a huge inclined water tunnel linking the Mediterranean to the Dead Sea, which takes on the appearance of Lake Geneva. And although the "New Society" extends across the Jordan River, and even beyond Beirut and Damascus, there is no conflict between Jews and Arabs, and no need for armies. "The Jews have made us rich," says the book's one Arab character. "Why should we scorn them? They live with us as brothers. Why should we not love them?" On the title page of his book, Herzl inscribed this epigraph: "If you will it, it is no fairy tale."[1]

In 1993, the then-foreign minister of Israel, Shimon Peres, published a book entitled *The New Middle East.* In it, he announced that the familiar obsessions of the Middle East—nationhood, bor-

Martin Kramer is Director of the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies at Tel Aviv University.

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ders, territory, arms—had ceased to matter in an era of globalization. A new age had dawned. Nations would redefine their identities. Borders would be opened. Water and natural resources would be shared. Massive arsenals would be dismantled. The Middle East would become a single economic zone, devoted to the cooperative pursuit of prosperity.[2] "I feel that I have earned the right to dream," wrote Peres in his memoirs. "So much that I dreamed in the past was dismissed as fantasy but has now become thriving reality."[3]

From the "New Society" to the "new Middle East," dreamers across this century have imagined the transformation of the Middle East into a zone of peace, prosperity, and cooperation. The dreams of the Jews are familiar to the West, because they have been dreamt in translation. But similar dreams have been written and spoken in Arabic, Turkish, and Persian. In these visions, nations live in harmony, and religion is retired to the house of worship. The forces of division, now neutralized, cease to divide; the diverse peoples of the Middle East form around a shared interest, emulating the diverse peoples of Europe.

And have not the peoples of the Middle East usually followed the lead of the West? The national projects of this century were all inspired by European models. Zionism first emerged among the Jews of Europe, and its leaders worked to collect the Jews in a state that would take its place among the secular nation-states of Europe. Turkish nationalism not only attempted to remake a Muslim society into a secular nation-state but sought recognition for Turkey as part and parcel of Europe. Arab nationalism in all its forms drew its inspiration from Western models, liberal and illiberal, as did Iranian nationalism. Not all of these Middle Eastern nationalisms banished old loyalties, and most incorporated religion in some role. But in every case, their point of departure was the European nation-state. If the new point of departure is now the idea of Europe, is this not the next model for the Middle East?

Even the name of the region, the Middle East, suggests a willingness of its peoples to be redefined in new terms. An American naval strategist coined the term the same year Herzl wrote his *Altneuland*: it was a Western invention, defining the Middle East vis-à-vis the West as a transit zone for ships, railroads, and telegraphs.[4] Yet it was only a matter of a few decades before the

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peoples of the region adopted the term, to describe the part of the world they themselves inhabited. Could there be a more persuasive testimony to the willingness of these peoples to be redefined, transformed, and integrated in the networks of the world?

And yet, as the twentieth century closes, much of the Middle East resists. A "new Middle East" does exist in places, but there is still an "old Middle East" of tradition. The gaps between them have been filled with dictatorship, xenophobia, and fundamentalism. In some places in the Middle East, secular culture flourishes. But in other places, people live, die, and occasionally kill in the name of God. There are those in the Middle East who communicate from their computer terminals; their place could be any place. Others communicate in fervent prayer from holy ground; their place can be no other place. In the West, post–Cold War politics is no longer the competition of ideologies, but of interests. In the Middle East, however, politics is also the competition of identities. This sometimes obsessive search for authenticity does not fit the neat models of the political scientists and has left the politics of the Middle East difficult to understand and predict.

In this crisis of identities, the prospects for democracy, economic growth, and peace look uncertain. Western experts and the doctors of diplomacy who treat the region have been preoccupied with process: elections, economic reforms, economic sanctions, peace negotiations. But time and again, their ships run aground amidst the swirling currents of unsettled identities. French political scientists crafted a model electoral process for Algeria—and ushered in a ruthless civil war. The IMF and World Bank helped Turkey institute the most successful economic reform in the Middle East—and Turkey now has an Islamist prime minister. The United Nations imposed the world's most drastic sanctions on Iraq and Libya—and their leaders rule on in defiance. Norwegian peace processors engineered a compromise agreement between Israel and the PLO—and opponents killed Israel's prime minister and brought down its government. If the Middle East sometimes seems to defy the best-laid plans for its renovation, this is because it is also home to determined people who seek to implement other plans—those first revealed in the Bible or the Qur'an, in Nasser's speeches or Khomeini's sermons.

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The Middle East will not make only one choice. The region remains, as before, a mosaic—an analogy that is tired but still true—and its peoples are bound to make many different choices. It is composed of four major parts: Israel, the Arab lands, Turkey, and Iran. They are distinguishable from one another by a combination of differences—cultural, religious, linguistic, geographic, and political. The history of their formation can only be told at length.[5] In these few pages, the purpose is more immediate: to map the present disposition of forces in the Middle East's great debate about itself.

ISRAEL: CHOICES OF THE CHOSEN

In Herzl's *Altneuland,* the Old City of Jerusalem is vacated of its inhabitants and made into a giant museum. In September 1996, the new Israeli government of Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu sought to transform a small part of the Old City into just such a museum: it opened a two-thousand-year-old Hasmonean tunnel, running alongside the long-buried perimeter wall on the west side of what Jews call the Temple Mount and Muslims call the Haram al-Sharif. The tunnel opening, in the midst of a stalled peace process, ignited a Palestinian explosion. Palestinian police and Israeli forces fought pitched battles; there were dozens of casualties.

The tunnel episode, in its incidental way, epitomized the two dilemmas that face Israel a century after the birth of political Zionism and half a century since the establishment of the state. The first, and the most obvious, is the resistance of Palestinian nationalism—a nationalism that Herzl, with literary license, could well ignore but that Israel has always had to confront, either in battle or in negotiations. Jerusalem is contested ground, coveted by both Israelis and Palestinians, and in its narrow confines every change has explosive potential, from archaeological digs to apartment construction. It is also the reservoir of symbols for the conflict as a whole, and when political aspirations are stirred or stymied, every symbol in Jerusalem becomes subject to political manipulation.

But beyond this, the digging of the tunnel exposed another inner dilemma, not between Israelis and Palestinians, but between Israe-

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lis and Israelis. Some Israelis came to the tunnel as tourists, interested in surveying a recovered remnant of their national "heritage." But other visitors came as Jewish pilgrims: the water tunnel allowed them to pass still closer to the "foundation stone" of the Temple Mount, where the inner sanctum, the "holy of holies" of the First and Second Temples, stood two millennia ago. (On that site today stands the Muslim shrine of the Dome of the Rock.) This point in the tunnel became a place where many offered fervent prayers. Heritage site or holy place? It depended upon the visitor's own identity. And in their identities, the tunneling Israelis were sharply divided.

The state of Israel was founded by a secular national movement that sought to persuade the Jews that they constituted a nation (*Volk,* wrote Herzl) and not just a religious community. Herzl entitled his programmatic treatise on Zionism, first published in 1896, *Der Judenstaat,* "The State of the Jews." But he did not envision that it would be a Jewish state, governed in its policies by the legal precepts of Jewish law. Neither did Herzl's heirs, from Chaim Weizmann through David Ben-Gurion.[6] Many of the religiously orthodox took a dim view of Zionism and the state of Israel for precisely that reason: in their view, a secular state for the Jews was a false redemption.[7]

But after 1967, there emerged in full force a religious Zionism that did sense the approach of redemption. In that year, Israeli arms seized the most important Jewish holy sites: East Jerusalem, site of the Western (Wailing) Wall, and Hebron, location of the Tomb of the Patriarchs. Religious Zionists convinced themselves that Israel's "return" in 1967 to the biblical Judea and Samaria—East Jerusalem and the West Bank—was a sign of God's intent. And they made Jewish settlements in these territories the very definition not only of Zionism but of Judaism itself.[8]

This religious Zionism, seeing the hand of God in the "restoration" of the entire Land of Israel to the Jews, also rejected any peace based on compromise. A nation like any other nation may make territorial concessions. But a chosen people cannot concede chosen land. As one of the leaders of Israel's National Religious Party put it: "Israel's national connection to the Land of Israel is unique among the nations—it is (radically different) from the ties binding the French, English, Russian and Chinese people to their

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lands. . . . For us the Land of Israel is the land of destiny, a chosen land, not just an existentially defined homeland."[9]

By the 1980s, there could be no doubt that there existed two distinct Zionist cultures, one secular, the other religious. Each incorporates within it many subcultures; there are important overlaps, and any generalization must always be qualified. But in the broadest terms, secular Zionism regards the citizens of Israel as the only legitimate arbiters of Israel's fate. The decisions of their democratically elected governments are the only laws that obligate the state. In contrast, religious Zionism regards the "House of Israel" as the instrument of God, who is the sole legitimate arbiter of Israel's fate. God's law must take precedence over man's law, and government decisions that negate divine law cannot be legitimate.

It was possible to paper over the inherent contradiction between these two Zionisms until 1993, when the government of Israel recognized the PLO and signed a "Declaration of Principles" that promised an Israeli withdrawal from territory in the West Bank and Gaza. Rabbis close to the settler movement acted swiftly, issuing a religious ruling rejecting the government's right to make any concession by citing divine law:

> According to the laws of the Torah, it is forbidden to relinquish the political rights of sovereignty and national ownership over any part of the historic Land of Israel to another authority or people. All of the historic Land of Israel which is now in our possession belongs to the entire Jewish people, past, present and future, and therefore no one in any generation can give away that to which he [alone] does not have title. Therefore any agreement to do so is null and void, obligates no one, has no moral or legal force whatsoever.[10]

It was only one step from this position to the claim that the government of Israel, an instrument of secular Zionism, had committed a punishable sin against divine law for ceding control of parts of the land to non-Jews. Just such a logic inspired the assassin of Yitzhak Rabin, the Israeli prime minister who put the signature of the state of Israel to the agreements with the PLO. Until the accords, Jewish extremists had vented their rage on Arabs: the Israeli settler who massacred Palestinian worshippers in the Tomb of the Patriarchs in Hebron (and whose own tomb

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became a religious shrine for extremists) personified one form of resistance. But after the Israel-PLO accords, this same resistance turned inward, in a struggle between Israeli Jews over the relationship of their peoplehood to the land.

That struggle is not over, for it is not abstract: there are 150,000 Israelis living in dozens of settlements, and their future has yet to be addressed in the negotiations. But as the Palestinian Authority becomes rooted in reality, the outcome seems unavoidable. The Netanyahu government differs from its predecessor over the terms of Israel's historic compromise but has chosen to accept the principle of compromise all the same. The Hebron agreement, providing for a series of further Israeli redeployments, expresses the broad Israeli consensus behind the principle of exchanging land for peace. Most Israelis wish to be a people like all peoples: they seek the same recognition from their neighbors, the same certainty in their permanence, that the French, English, Russians, and Chinese enjoy. If peace demands territorial compromise—and no other formula has ever worked—then the majority of Israelis are willing to make it. After more than a generation, the dream of possessing all of the "Land of Israel" has vanished. The peace process still faces many hurdles, but the crucial decision has been made: the land will be partitioned.

Once that occurs, Israel will have to formulate a new policy toward the region. Will it seek integration or separation? The idea of a "new Middle East" articulated by Shimon Peres was greeted with dour skepticism by most Israelis. If integration means allowing the entry of many more thousands of Palestinian, Jordanian, or other Arab workers to fill the lower rungs of Israel's expanding economy, then Israelis have rejected it. Their preference for "guest workers" from Nigeria, Rumania, Thailand, and the Philippines is firmly established. (In this, Israel differs not at all from the Arab oil states of the Gulf, who also prefer non-Arab foreign workers.) If integration means closer economic ties and opportunities, this has more appeal, but limited promise. Israel's economy developed during Arab boycott, and its great strengths are in its high-tech exports to the vast markets of Europe, America, and Asia. As a result, per capita gross domestic product, now at $15,000, has grown rapidly; in absolute terms, Israel's GDP exceeds that of all its next-door neighbors combined—Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Leba-

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non, and the Palestinian Authority. Even if the entire Arab market were to open to Israel, it is no larger than a combination of the Netherlands and Belgium. The Arab market is unlikely, certainly in the short term, to offer the opportunities Israel has found elsewhere.

Culturally, the prospects for integration are slim. Perhaps half of all Israelis are Jews from Arab and Muslim countries or their descendents. But their cultural affinity with the region grows more attenuated with each passing year. The other half, recently reinforced by large-scale Russian Jewish immigration, is culturally of the West, and the ties to American Jewry effectively define the West as America. It is not surprising, then, that with the exit of Shimon Peres, the slogan of a "new Middle East" disappeared almost entirely from Israeli political discourse. Israel's place in the region is now much less debated than the nature of Israel itself.

The emergence of Palestine alongside Israel—and the final fixing of the borders between them—is already intensifying that debate. Since its inception, Israel has been a state for the Jews. It has favored Jews, most notably in the law of return, guaranteeing immediate citizenship to any Jewish immigrant (although the definition of a Jew is the subject of continuing controversy). Might this change? Today, part of the Jewish Left defines itself as post-Zionist, while one of every five Israelis is an Arab—and a non-Zionist. Will they manage to persuade the majority that Israel at peace should become a fully secular and denationalized state—no longer a state of the Jews but a state of its citizens, Jewish and Arab? "There is no Jewish democracy, just as there is no Islamic democracy," writes a Jewish veteran of the Left. "A state with discriminatory if not racist laws, like the 'who is a Jew' law, or the present law of return, or—more serious still—a law defining the state of Israel as the state of the Jewish people (and not a state of its citizens, as in any normal state), is not a democratic state."[11] Post-Zionism so far has been limited to marginal circles of intellectuals, but in a state of peace, its appeal could widen.

But pressure will also be exerted from the opposite direction, for while Israel is a state of the Jews, it is not a Jewish state: its public law and state institutions are secular. Will an alliance of religious Zionists, traditional Jews, and ultra-Orthodox believers have the political clout to Judaize the institutions of the state? The same

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rabbis who once warned against compromise with the PLO also warn against "the present trend that aims to create a secular culture here which is to blend into a 'new Middle East'—a trend which will lead to assimilation."[12] The definition of Israel's political borders, which will separate Israel clearly from its neighbors, could well enhance the appeal of more strongly defined cultural borders—a role long played by Judaism through the centuries. Israel's May 1996 elections saw an increase in the support for parties advocating just this choice.

Israel thus stands at a crossroads. It still relies on the strongest national, social, and cultural consensus in the Middle East—the cohesion of a small people in hostile surroundings. Its democratic institutions are resilient, and its multiparty politics, critical press, and free markets define it as a Western country. Ballast has been provided by an expanding economy, and Israel's military maintains a comparable edge. This underlying self-confidence makes Israel's debate over its own identity far more open, and much less violent, than the struggles underway in neighboring countries. But the parallels are close ones, and they suggest that the greatest tests of Israeli democracy still lie ahead.

THE ARABS: DIVIDED IN INDECISION

In Cairo last summer, two events stirred the memory of a not-so-distant time when Arabism still moved the Arabs. The election of Binyamin Netanyahu prompted an Arab summit conference in June, the first since 1990. The Syrian-born poet Nizar Qabbani celebrated the event in verse, in a poem addressed to the assembled heads-of-state in Cairo:

> If Binyamin Netanyahu has been able to remind you of your identity, of the place and date of your birth, to restore to you your Arab nationality, how beautiful it is what he has done.
>
> If this man has been able to restore the Arabs to their Arabism, and the children of stones to their childhood,
>
> If he has been able to remind us of our names, and the names of our fathers, and the names of our children,

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> A thousand welcomes to his arrival.
>
> Gentlemen, this is the last occasion of love open to you before you become extinct.[13]

This was not the only summer spasm of nostalgia. On July 26, the fortieth anniversary of Gamal Abdul Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal, there premiered in Cairo a new film, *Nasser '56*. The film packed theaters in Egypt and other Arab countries. The celluloid saga followed Nasser, Egypt's Arab paladin, as he outmaneuvered the combined forces of British, French, and Israeli aggression. Here, too, there was literary license: the film made no mention of Nasser's failed Arab socialism, the regime's sordid prisons, or the later debacle of 1967. It preferred to tell a clean tale of Arabism's golden moment in a drama that left many viewers in tears.[14]

Arab unity, Arab socialism, Arab steadfastness against Israel—these were the slogans that resounded in Arabic through most of this century. The Arabs constituted a nation, argued the Arab nationalists, and must never accept their division by foreign powers—the post–World War I division that created some twenty separate states. Nor should they accept the alien presence of Israel, or the economic models of the imperialist West. The Arabs should draw only on authentic sources, the same sources that made them powerful through history. Arab nationalism promised power, and to achieve it, the Arab peoples put up with deprivation, dictatorship, and war.

But the reward never came. The unity schemes did not work: each Arab state had its own interests to defend, each regime had its own privileges to preserve. In many places, the slogan of unity became a cover for bullying and aggression, legitimizing the violence of Arabs against Arabs. Arab socialism also proved to be a dry well: some Arabs became more equal with one another, but collectively they became poorer. As for the war to break Israel, it proved costly and dangerous, and nearly broke the Arabs themselves, both in spirit and in resources.[15]

Arab nationalism, the battered preference of an entire generation, may still inspire poetry and films. But to feed mouths, the Arab states now must look elsewhere. The latest "Unified Arab Economic Report" summarizes the problem.[16] Between 1980 and

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1994, the population of the Arab countries grew by 48 percent (from 165 million to 245 million—as though the Arab world added another Egypt and a half). Its gross domestic product grew by only 15 percent. This has meant a decline of 22 percent in the per capita gross domestic product in real terms, from $2,600 a year to $2,000 a year. As a result, the Arab states have become more dependent on the outside world for goods and the means to acquire them. Food production is now billions of dollars short of consumption; a part of the world that was once able to feed itself can no longer do so. Both oil and non-oil producers have seen a rapid expansion of debt. If the gross domestic product continues to decline—and it could plummet if the centrality of oil as an energy source diminished sometime in the next century—the Arab lands could end up very close to the bottom of humanity.

For the Arabs, then, it may be the eleventh hour, a truth understood nowhere better than in the Egypt of President Hosni Mubarak. Last November, Cairo hosted the third Middle East Economic Summit. Here, "the New Arabs," as one journalist called them, assembled to do business: "The New Arabs lined the corridors of the Congress Center in [the Cairo suburb of] Heliopolis in their hundreds, equipped with tailored suits, quiet ties and exceptional English. Many of them prefer English over Arabic even when speaking among themselves."[17] True, the Egyptian organizers announced that the objective was to create more Arab-to-Arab links, and that regional economic cooperation would not depend on "one particular country"—meaning Israel. But Israelis, too, were present in Cairo, and there could be no doubt that even Arab-to-Arab links now depended upon Middle Eastern peace—and Israel.

Yet while Arab pragmatists put ideology behind them, there is still an unease in Arab lands, a sense that the most flammable fabrics of identity could be set ablaze. In many places, what is variously called Islamism or Islamic fundamentalism has already made sparks fly. Islamism in Arab lands rests upon many of the same premises as Arab nationalism: it too claims that a return to authentic sources is the only way to strengthen the Muslims and confer power upon them. But Islamism pretends to more authenticity than even Arabism. Arab nationalism, despite its anti-imperialist posture, borrowed its idea of the nation from Europe: Arabs spoke one language, thus Arabs formed one nation. But Islamism

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avows that religion, not language, is the basis of identity. The community of Muslim believers constitutes the nation and the focus of natural solidarity, as it did for the first millennium of Islam. This idea in Arab lands goes back to the Muslim Brotherhood, who first organized in Egypt between the world wars. Since the mid-1970s, Islamism has found a following in most Arab countries, and it has become the most widespread form of dissent.

But the appeal of Islamism also has its limits. Much of this has to do with a certain divorce from changing realities. Most notably, Islamism proposes to intensify the Arab struggle against Israel. "The extermination of the Jews is a specific obligation placed on the people of Palestine, Syria, Jordan, Egypt and Lebanon," says the exiled leader of the Saudi Islamist opposition in a typical statement, "because they have occupied their land." Islamic law obliges Muslims to "destroy the Jewish entity and annihilate it from its roots through holy war."[18] Such words sometimes have been translated into deeds, most strikingly in the Hamas bombings in the heart of Israel's cities in the spring of 1996. The words and the deeds are not without sympathizers: there long will be a profound sense among the Arabs that Israel is the offspring of aggression and usurpation. But far fewer Arabs accept the Islamist claim that a pragmatic compromise would defy the will of God, and most know well that an Islamist "holy war" would risk the destruction of the Arabs themselves. Islamists aside, most Arabs have concluded, sometimes ruefully, that it is preferable to live in peace alongside an Israel that has parted from some territory and ceded some power.

But Islamism also stirs another, even deeper resistance among many Arabs. Islamism is an ideology of difference: between Muslim and non-Muslim, believer and secularist, men and women. Islamism does not simply erect barricades between Islam and Israel; it also erects barricades right through the heart of society. Everywhere it arises, it exacerbates those differences, and so carries with it the potential of civil war. Today, Islamists hold power in one Arab country, Sudan—and it is a country torn by civil war, between Muslims of the north and non-Muslims of the south. Islamists came close to power in one other Arab country, Algeria—and that too is a land ravaged by civil war, between Islamists and secularists. Islamism, which pretends to unify, in practice

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divides societies against themselves, and where that has happened, the costs have been immense, in lost lives, devastated homes, and ruined economies.

Arab regimes have rallied against the Islamists over the past few years, and the initiative is now back in their hands. Much of their success is due to the effectiveness of their suppression. But it is also due in no small measure to the choice of millions of dispossessed and alienated people who nevertheless resist the siren call of Islamism, lest they too suffer the fate of Sudan and Algeria. "Islam is the solution," chant the Islamists; but enough Arab Muslims have concluded that Islam, as understood by the Islamists, is one more problem.[19]

If Islamism now follows Arabism down the same road to failure, what choices are left? One is the "Middle Easternism" previously put on offer by Israel and promoted by American peace diplomacy. For a brief moment, the Arabs entertained the option. Yes, we are Arabs, the argument went, but we also belong to a Middle Eastern "system" of which Israel is also a part. But as disillusionment with the pace of the peace process seeped into the Arab elites, "Middle Easternism" became discredited. It is now regarded as a framework that privileges Israel and even as a dark conspiracy to establish Israeli economic hegemony over the Arabs. (In bookstores in Arab capitals, *The New Middle East* has been spotted often alongside *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion.*) At best, "Middle Easternism" is seen as a necessary plane of Arab policy in specific areas such as arms control and water sharing. As a formula for a new level of identity, it has almost no resonance.[20]

For some in the Arab lands, the preferred solution is an identity that links them at some level with the West. The idea is not new. In 1938, the Egyptian critic and novelist Taha Husayn published a book entitled *Mustaqbal al-Thaqafa fi Misr* (The Future of Culture in Egypt). Husayn argued that Egypt and the neighboring countries in the Levant belonged to Europe at the deepest level of culture. Their true identity as Europeans had been suppressed by conquerors from the East. But the eastern Mediterranean drew upon the same cultural reservoirs as Europe: Greek philosophy, Roman law, Christian morality. The time had come to rejoin Europe and demolish the artificial division between East and West.[21]

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Sixty years later, this idea takes the much modified form of what some Arabs have called their "Mediterranean option." Its discussion was prompted, above all, by the Barcelona Conference of November 1995, which brought together the members of the European Union and twelve "partners" from the southern and southeastern Mediterranean. The Barcelona Declaration initiated what is called the "Euro-Mediterranean partnership," designed to promote cooperation in the fields of security, economics, and culture. Its most ambitious objective is the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean free-trade zone by the year 2010. In the meantime, the partnership has become the principal avenue for EU aid and loans to Arab countries.[22]

The idea of "Mediterraneanism" now has moved to the fore of the Arab debate. In every respect, it is less threatening than "Middle Easternism." In a broad Mediterranean framework, Israel is not an economic giant but one more partner, effectively balanced by Europe. The "Mediterranean option" also marginalizes the United States and offers a flicker of hope that some kind of great power rivalry might be reintroduced into the region and enhance Arab maneuverability vis-à-vis Israel. But when "Mediterraneanism" is discussed as identity, the discussion does not go far, since nearly every Arab analyst is at pains to emphasize that it cannot be an alternative to Arab-Islamic identity.[23] Since the advent of Islam, the sea has been a boundary between cultures, not a bridge, and so it remains.

Indeed, for Europe, the point of the Barcelona process is to promote separation, not integration: Europe is to provide the southern Mediterranean with sufficient food, housing, jobs, and hope so that its multitudes do not cross the sea as migrants. Nothing so exposes the myth of the Mediterranean as the tension-filled relations between migrant Arabs and the host societies of southern Europe. If the Mediterranean's emerging institutions work as they are intended, especially the Euro-Mediterranean free-trade area, they will open a bridge over the sea for trade and aid—but close it to people.

Still, this cooperation with Europe is now the hope of elites and middle classes on the Arab shores of the Mediterranean. For these people, besieged by burgeoning populations and Islamist threats, the infusion of resources from across the sea might make a differ-

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ence. All indications are that the Arab states that have liberalized their economies are poised for modest growth, and that populations will not expand as rapidly in the next decades. If so, the "Mediterranean option" could jump-start the region and may eventually develop the cultural dimension it now lacks.

But if there is one abiding obstacle to the Arabs imagining themselves as part of the post–Cold War West, it is the leaders-for-life who still determine the parameters of Arab politics. The Islamists tried to break that monopoly, but their own indiscriminate violence reinforced it, and the men who have ruled the Arabs for two decades or more continue to rule. With each passing year, these leaders grow one year older while the populations grow ever younger. There is little sign that the rule of one man and one party is likely to collapse in any Arab country; nowhere are elections held that could be described as free and fair. The Gulf War that followed the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait had no effect on this pattern of governance, which is evidence of its tenacity.

But whatever one thinks of Arab authoritarianism—and its failings are legion—it is responsible for one basic transformation. It has established the primacy of the state in the hierarchy of loyalties in Arab lands. For now and for the foreseeable future, no other identity can compete effectively with the separate identity promoted by each of some twenty Arab states. Yes, these people are Arabs, and the great majority are Muslims. But for purposes of political identification, most prefer to call themselves Egyptians and Iraqis, Jordanians and Moroccans, Palestinians and Syrians. In Arab lands, the state is stronger than society: it displays power, dispenses patronage, guarantees order.[24] Western powers created many of these states *ex nihilo,* yet they have become the focus of practical loyalty for most of their citizens or subjects. This is a pragmatic choice to avoid choice; it is identity by default.

Given the failure of past ideologies, this resolute pragmatism is the one option that has not been tried and found wanting. If it leaves even some parts of the Arab world more productive, peaceful, and stable, it will have surpassed every populist ideology ever framed in modern Arabic. Such an outcome would itself constitute a new order—not a borderless utopia, but a place where borders are finally respected, where every state is legitimate, where reasons

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of state open room for compromise. The formula might work—if it is not already too late.

TURKEY AND IRAN: GROWING DOUBTS

The massive pinkish building that is now the museum of Aya Sofya in Istanbul was first consecrated in 537 as a cathedral by its builder, the Byzantine Emperor Justinian. Following the Ottoman conquest of the city in 1453, Mehmed the Conqueror transformed the church into a mosque. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk ordered it made into a museum in 1934. The secularizing of Aya Sofya complemented the many reforms of Atatürk, all meant to proclaim that Turkey was a secular nation-state and a part of Europe.

But in the 1990s, voices were raised in Turkey demanding that Aya Sofya again be made into a mosque. An Islamist party, the Refah (Welfare) Party, had gained strength in Istanbul, capturing the municipality in 1994. An area of the museum was marked off for Muslim worshippers; its minarets began to broadcast the call to prayer. This was but a prelude: in December 1995, the Islamists made their strongest showing ever in parliamentary elections, and by the spring, Turkey had its first Islamist prime minister, Necmettin Erbakan.

It was a striking paradox. Turkey had made the most resolute choice in favor of secularism of any Muslim country. Beginning in the nineteenth century, intellectuals began to set aside the long history of conflict with Europe to advocate emulation. "We are bound, whether we like it or not, to Europeanize," wrote one influential thinker at the turn of the century. "Let us leave those Arab books and embrace passionately the modern books which can fill our brains with the sciences and techniques. Surely, we shall find these not among the Arabs, but in the West."[25] Atatürk made this preference a political and ideological program, declaring secularism to be a basic principle of the Turkish national state that he constructed from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire. Republican Turkey's constitution (Article 24) forbids "even partially basing the fundamental social, economic, political, and legal order of the state on religious tenets." The Turkish political class was also determined to make modern Turkey part of Europe—and, after

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the outbreak of the Cold War, part of the Western alliance. In 1952, Turkey was admitted to NATO as a full member.

But the identity chosen by republican Turkey in the first half of this century has come under mounting pressure in the latter half. One force has been rapid population growth. Istanbul is the part of Turkey that lies physically in Europe; it has always worn Europe's garb most comfortably. Its transformation is telling. In 1970, Istanbul's population was three million; in 1985, over five million; and today, over ten million. It will soon be the most populous city in Europe, but its new inhabitants have come from villages and towns across Anatolia, where identity is still rooted in Islamic religion and rural tradition. These mobile masses are the reason why many in Europe refuse to entertain the inclusion of Turkey in the European Union—a fact the Islamists are quick to summon in their argument that Turkey, in turn, should reject Europe. Another disintegrative factor has been the rise of Kurdish separatism, an often violent reminder that Turkey has not achieved full integration as a homogeneous nation-state of Turkish-speakers.

Over the past two decades, the Turkish consensus has been slowly eroded. A rapidly expanding economy has cushioned the impact, and the military, which has intervened in the past to maintain the core principles of the state, remains in barracks for now. But the uneasy power-sharing between Islamist and secularist parties has brought the competition of identities into the cabinet, where it is now played out in battles over domestic and foreign policy. The Islamist half of the Turkish government has especially angered its NATO partners by overtures to Libya, and its American ally by flirtations with Iran. Now it is busy trying to put together a bloc of Muslim developing countries, with Turkey at its core, as an alternative to the EU—although the present trade among these countries is minuscule.

Turkey has not gone Islamist. The Refah Party won just over 21 percent of the vote; the vast majority of Turkish voters chose parties that divide over many issues but not over the secular character of the state. Even half of the Refah Party's voters prefer to describe themselves in polls as "secular." Prime Minister Erbakan knows this well, and he has shown due caution.[26] But the sharing of power by the Islamists has already changed the rhetoric of Turkish politics, and Turkey now emits mixed signals to its neigh-

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bors and the world. A significant minority of Turks has lost confidence in the choices made by Atatürk and his generation; they would throw open the issue of Turkey's identity for renegotiation. If Turkey's parliamentary democracy, its secular public order, and its Western alliances are ever cast into question, this would represent Islamism's greatest triumph since Iran's revolution. The irony is that the West, having won the Cold War, may prefer to see Turkey drift towards Islam than see more Turkish migrants drift into Europe's cities.

Another irony is that this comes at a moment when Iran's own choice of an Islamic identity has been cast into doubt. There are no reliable barometers for this generalization: in Iran, the electoral menu does not include avowedly secular candidates. The hopefuls who wished to run in the March 1996 parliamentary elections were first vetted; only 60 percent received the stamp of approval permitting them to run. Needless to say, none openly championed the cause of de-Islamization.

But evasion of Islamic strictures is rampant. Behind closed doors, secular Iranians conduct themselves as they would in London or Los Angeles. The clandestine secular society is impossible to repress and, for the most part, the regime does not try. While the authorities, with tens of thousands of morality police, can enforce Islamic norms in the streets, they cannot impose them on people's minds. The revolution still has a broad-based constituency. But beneath the surface, Iranians seem divided over who they are and what they value.

As in Turkey, secularism in Iran had nineteenth-century roots. In many instances, early Iranian secularists adopted a militantly anti-clerical and even anti-Islamic tone, calling for the complete disestablishment of religion. "The existence of philosophers and learned men has rendered the existence of prophets unnecessary," wrote a leading secularizer. "They say that science is more honorable than faith, and that it is better to understand than to believe."[27] This militant secularism went hand-in-hand with Iranian nationalism, the idea that there existed a racially-based Iranian people millennia before the advent of Islam. In this view, Islam represented the corruption of a great Iranian civilization by primitive Arab influences. It could be discarded at no cultural cost.[28]

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The Pahlavi dynasty attempted to do just that, through secularizing reforms comparable to those undertaken in Turkey. Their failure may be attributed to many causes—a smaller base of Westernization, the enduring authority of the Muslim clergy, the arrogance of the monarchy—but by the mid-1970s, Iranians had grown angry at this forced redefinition. The regime's denigration of their living traditions and memories, and its celebration of forgotten dynasties and lost civilizations, constituted an assault on their self-esteem. One revolutionary Islamist wrote that Iranians displayed two characteristics:

> (1) alienation, or even in some instances "hatred," from "self," from their own religion, culture, worldview, and character; and (2) a deep, obsessive, or even boastful pretension to attachment to the West, and rootless and vulgar modernism.[29]

Khomeini promised to restore the lost self-esteem. As Muslims, he assured them, they were God's chosen people, put upon this earth to right the wrongs done by the arrogant. In a swift revolution, Iran became an Islamic state, and its leaders told its people that as Muslims they had assumed the leading role in human history.

The first decade of the Islamic republic—Khomeini's decade—was dominated by a radical attempt to remake Iran in the image of the ideal Islamic state. But even Khomeini realized the dangers of pursuing revolutionary transformation too far, and the effort was abandoned by Khomeini's heirs. The most important reason was probably economic. Iran's population skyrocketed from 35 million in 1979 to more than 60 million today. The increase was so rapid that Iran's clerical leaders had no choice but to encourage birth control, seek foreign investment and Western loans, privatize companies that had been nationalized, and woo back entrepreneurial expatriates who had fled. Under the impetus of President Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, expediency has become the guiding principle of the state. Clerics continue to rule Iran, but effective Islamization has been restricted to public morality and some aspects of foreign policy.[30]

And so the Islamization of Iran, like the secularization of Turkey, is an uneven mix of success and failures. In Iran, the failures are easier to conceal: its elections are more difficult to read, and discontent is not allowed to show itself too openly in the street or

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the press. But the day will soon approach when most of Iran's mature inhabitants will be heirs to the revolution, not its makers. Today, 45 percent of the population is under the age of seventeen—a massive generation, born after the revolution. Have the young accepted the redefinition of identity in terms of Islam? Are they more West-stricken than ever? Or might they embrace a new nationalism, an amalgam of allegiances to Iran and Islam? There are no questions about the Middle East more speculative than these.

MIDDLE EASTERN ARCHIPELAGO

Is there a "new Middle East" in the making, despite the fact that the term itself has become the subject of ridicule and suspicion in every Middle Eastern language? Many of the Middle East's conflicts have subsided. The Arab-Israeli and Palestinian-Israeli conflicts, the Lebanese civil war, the Iran-Iraq war—these costly struggles largely exhausted themselves by the close of the 1980s. The end of the Cold War did much to promote these resolutions by removing great power rivalry from local equations and establishing the United States as the dominant arbiter. Iraqi president Saddam Hussein, in invading Kuwait, discovered too late that the United States had become a guarantor of the regional status quo. Iraq was driven back and put in isolation, and order has reigned ever since.

Today it can be said of the Middle East that nearly all its peoples enjoy self-determination. The states on the map enjoy more legitimacy; their borders are clearer. There are still keen rivalries and suspicions, and some states are using the moment to rearm for the next bout. The civil wars engendered by Islamism, in Sudan and Algeria, run on; the Kurdish question remains an open wound. But for the most part and in most places, the peoples of the Middle East are more independent than at any time in this century. Now they must redefine themselves if they are to compete.

And compete they must. Globalization is a ruthless master. The Middle East was once irrigated by a rich flow of oil revenues, aid, and arms; ideologies and their illusions grew luxuriant. But those days are gone. The Middle East strains under the weight of large populations that must be fed, clothed, housed, schooled, and em-

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ployed. If the Middle East is to take off, it cannot wait much longer. At the beginning of this century, the Middle East stood more or less on the same starting line as East Asia and Latin America. It has fallen far behind and must run a much swifter race.

In most places, the preparations underway are pragmatic ones. The Middle East is home to millions of people who will become who they must become to survive. That means, in this global era, that they must at least secularize their policies, if not themselves. The inhabitants of the Middle East have redefined themselves before; their ancient identities were submerged completely under the successive waves of Hellenization, Romanization, Christianization, and Islamization. It is now the turn of Westernization, marketed generically as modernization. The process has been underway in the Middle East for two centuries, in fits and starts. Its peoples have tinkered with it in the hope that it could be made less destructive of tradition. For the most part, the result has been a compromise that has failed to sustain modernity or preserve tradition. Now the choice cannot be deferred much longer, and many individuals have already made it.

Wherever the race is underway, there are winners and losers. The latter are ideologizing their religion, transforming faith from a part of their identity to the whole of it while reducing that faith to one unalloyed element—the "Law" for Muslims, the "Land" for Jews. In each setting, they challenge the secular choice: it will do too little for too few of us; better to run a different race, from the inside track. If we cannot create a rich society, let us establish a just one, for we have a blueprint in the Qur'an; if other peoples refuse to love us, let us love the land, for we have a title deed in the Bible.

One weakness of this kind of appeal is that those who make it cannot cooperate across the region's cultural boundaries. Any two violent deeds by a Muslim and a Jewish fundamentalist may complement one another, but their authors cannot coordinate their efforts, because they are divided by the deepest of all hatreds. This is not so for their opponents. They inhabit a kind of archipelago, strung out across the region, linked by whirring faxes. They confer, debate, disagree, exchange information, communicate, cooperate. They, too, are not above nationality and religion, but they cannot be defined only by nationality and religion, and they now

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appear to have a slight edge in the debate over the future course of the Middle East.

But that debate is far from over, if it can be won at all. The antagonists will be able to claim local victories here or there. But the Middle East has always been a zone of unsettled identities, of constant quests that once produced new religions and that now produce new resurgences. If the archipelago is not to be submerged, if it is to expand, its denizens must produce more growth, more progress, and more hope than their rivals. In the timeless Middle East, that will be a race against time.

ENDNOTES

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Hermann Giliomee

Surrender Without Defeat: Afrikaners and the South African "Miracle"

The future enters into us in order to transform itself in us long before it happens.

—Rainer Maria Rilke
Letters to a Young Poet

In South Africa the worst never happens.

—popular saying

INTRODUCTION

DURING THE FINAL MONTHS OF THE 1980s one of the last developments that pundits would have predicted for South Africa was that the ruling Afrikaner group would give up power more or less voluntarily, to be replaced by a stable, inclusive democracy. Over the longer run the more common prediction for the country was that of a low-level insurgency ending in a full-scale civil war and a racial conflagration. For the short to medium term most serious analysts anticipated power shifting from the existing Afrikaner monopoly to an Afrikaner-led, multiracial oligarchy ruling as coercively as the apartheid regime. In 1988, Ken Owen, a respected Liberal editor, commented on the white-black struggle: "Barring massive external intervention I would put my money on any alliance dominated by Afrikaners. They have the capacity to devastate the region *and yet to survive.*"[1]

The political supremacy enjoyed by Afrikaners as the 1990s broke was vast in proportion to their numbers. They formed just

Hermann Giliomee is Professor of Political Studies at the University of Cape Town.

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over half of the white group but represented only 8 percent of a total population of 40 million. Outwardly there was no indication that they were prepared to abandon power or its spoils. The National Party (NP) as the instrument of Afrikaner ethnic mobilization and of apartheid was then in its forty-second year of power, enjoying a safe majority in a parliament from which the black majority was excluded. Afrikaners were in a predominant position in the cabinet and controlled the top levels of the central state bureaucracy, the state television and radio, and the senior levels of the security forces. The Afrikaner advance into the private sector, which was dominated by white English-speakers, was progressing rapidly. In the late 1970s Afrikaner capital controlled less than 10 percent of the companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, but this figure increased to 20 percent by 1990. Managerial positions in the parastatal sector remained largely an Afrikaner preserve.

The NP government was far more responsive to Afrikaner lobbying than to representations from English big business or institutions commanding the support of blacks, who constituted 70 percent of the population. A study conducted in the mid-1980s fittingly described the South African state as a *Boereplaas*—literally an Afrikaner farm. Afrikaner students were alone in speaking approvingly and proprietorially of "our" government and "our" army.[2] This army was considered to be more than a match for anything that any African state or liberation organization could offer. Conscripting all white males, the state could count on loyal foot soldiers, particularly among Afrikaners. Asked in 1989, a few months before the African National Congress (ANC) was unbanned, how they would respond to a government controlled by that movement, 44 percent of Afrikaner students (as opposed to 10 percent of English-speaking white students) said they would resist physically, while a further 32 percent indicated that they would emigrate.[3] Cabinet ministers gave no indication that they entertained the idea of giving up power. A typical statement at the time was that of the most reformist of all ministers, Roedolf F. (Pik) Botha, who said in 1978 that power-sharing with blacks would not be accepted, "not now, not to-morrow, not in a hundred years."[4] Even worse was the statement "one man, one vote within

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one political entity." This meant "destruction," a "sort of suicide," which no nation in the world would be prepared to commit.

This Afrikaner state was challenged on several fronts, but nothing suggested its imminent demise. The state was being isolated by way of a dense mesh of sanctions; financial sanctions, taking the form of a refusal to roll over bank loans, made it all but impossible to attract new foreign investment or overcome the burden of a serious problem balancing payments. Nevertheless, trade sanctions were being circumvented, albeit at a cost, as new markets outside Europe and the United States opened up. The economy was projected to continue to grow at a rate of 2 to 3 percent per year. While with brief exceptions the urban centers and white residential suburbs remained calm, the state was severely shaken by a series of civil protests bordering on insurrection in the segregated black townships, leading first to the partial imposition of a state of emergency in 1985 and then to a nationwide one in 1986. The draconian emergency measures failed to stamp out all resistance, but by and large stability had returned by the late 1980s. In 1989 the leadership of the banned African National Congress, which spearheaded the struggle for black liberation, felt compelled to acknowledge to its cadres that it lacked the capacity to escalate the armed struggle in any significant way. Two years earlier Mangosuthu Buthelezi, the main black leader operating within the apartheid structures, had commented scathingly on the absence of any visible signs of the liberation struggle: "After 25 years of endeavor every bridge in the country is still intact. Every system of electricity and water supply is intact and there is not a single factory out of production because of revolutionary activity. The classical circumstances in which an armed struggle wins the day. . .are just not present in South Africa."[5]

The ANC-led resistance also took the form of a mass-based popular revolt consisting of rent and service charge boycotts, political strikes and stay-aways, and marches and demonstrations. These forms of mass action, which took place during the 1980s and after the unbanning of the ANC in February 1990, were far more successful in weakening regime morale than was the guerrilla struggle. But well-placed observers and leaders of the ANC struggle recognized that these actions would not defeat the regime. Chester Crocker, US Assistant Secretary of State in the 1980s, declared in

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a study published in 1992 that the resistance "had no hope of forcing the government to capitulate, but the government could no longer hope to regain the legitimacy it had lost in the 1980s."[6] This was confirmed by the ANC's chief strategist, Joe Slovo, who at a critical stage in the negotiations wrote in the ANC mouthpiece *Mayibuye*: "The enemy is not defeated."[7] In November 1996 Nelson Mandela spoke critically of "superficial" black journalists who "assume that we have defeated the whites on a battlefield and that the whites are now lying on the floor helpless and begging for mercy and that we can impose conditions on them."[8]

Yet by the end of 1996, less than ten years after Buthelezi's comment, the Afrikaners had lost all formal political power. The ANC held 62 percent of the parliamentary seats as opposed to 20 percent for the NP, the largest opposition party in a parliament that operated in the classic Westminster mode of majoritarianism. Having had its demand for a constitutionally entrenched, power-sharing cabinet rejected, the NP had withdrawn from the Government of National Unity in which the negotiating parties had agreed to participate for an interim period of five years, ending in 1999. At the senior levels of the bureaucracy and the state television and radio corporation, Afrikaner incumbents were rapidly replaced by ANC supporters, mostly blacks or Indians. While still headed by Afrikaners, the police and defense force showed every sign of being loyal to the new government and the constitution. A new economic advance was taking place, one spearheaded by two black companies financially backed by the largest Afrikaner conglomerate, Sanlam. The black share of companies on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange looked set to match soon or even surpass that of the Afrikaner.[9]

ORTHODOXY AND REVISION

These developments startled the world and prompted Nelson Mandela to refer to South Africa's transition as a "small miracle." The London *Financial Times* commented that the regime change was one of the most extraordinary political transformations of the twentieth century, where "the people have defied the logic of their past and broken all the rules of social theory."[10] One of the most common theoretical assumptions was that a ruling ethnic minority

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with a deep attachment to a "homeland" could neither be forced to give up power nor would it willingly do so. During the apartheid years these two propositions were recurring themes in the political writings of Alan Paton, novelist, foremost Liberal, and lifelong student of the Afrikaner mind. Paton was convinced that if attempts were made to force the Afrikaner to accept majority rule in a unitary state he "would rather be destroyed than yield." Yet Paton also believed that the Afrikaners could turn away from domination and choose what he termed "the common society" within a federal state. His latest biographer neatly captures the essence of his convictions on this issue. "[Change] would come about only when the Afrikaner leaders came to the realization that it must. He did not imagine that they would be forced from power by blacks, or that Liberals by some electoral ju-jitsu might take their place. The initiative, he believed, would remain with the Afrikaner until the Afrikaner chose to give it up."[11]

When the Afrikaners did give up power in the first half of the 1990s analysts tried hard to explain the unanticipated development. One explanation, succumbing to what Bergson called "the illusion of retrospective determinism" (i.e., what actually happened had to happen), deems it to have been inevitable. In this vein a recent study of the NP concludes that the combination of external and internal pressures made it "virtually impossible" for the apartheid government to maintain its existing practices by late 1989.[12] A much stronger case can, however, be made for the view that under President P. W. Botha, who resigned for health reasons in 1989, or under several possible successors other than Frederik W. (F. W.) de Klerk, the NP could and would have dominated the country into the next century, introducing new but quite unworkable policies designed to keep Afrikaner control. The question is, why did the Afrikaner leadership not pursue this course?

Some analysts embrace the explanations of what Walker Connor in a famous critique called the "nation-building school," which he contends generalizes on the basis of First World polities. Connor took issue with this school's central assumption that the wellspring of ethnic discord is not identity needs but economic demands, making it possible for ethnonational groups to be bought off if their material interests are guaranteed.[13] Among analysts studying the Afrikaners' surrender of power there is no shortage of

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those who believe that consumerism saved South Africa. One commentator wrote, "[We] avoided a civil war [because] many whites were presented with a choice between their political power and their consumer goods—and quickly chose the latter."[14] In a similar vein a sociological analysis states, "It yet has to be proven anywhere that a BMW-owning bureaucratic bourgeoisie with swimming pools and servants readily sacrifices the good life for psychologically gratifying ethnic affinities."[15] This ignores the fact that perhaps 90 percent of Afrikaners were not in this class and that more than four-fifths of Afrikaners in polls taken in the 1980s indicated that they believed that the income and living standards of whites under black majority rule would suffer. In August 1992, when it began to be clear that the ANC would dominate the next government, two-thirds of whites were "not at all convinced" that their pensions or savings were safe under a new government, against only 12 percent who were.[16] If the NP's constituency, as distinct from its negotiators, was so alarmed about its material prospects, the question that needs to be answered is not whether we are dealing with an effete bourgeoisie but why whites allowed their representatives to put their future at risk.

A third explanation explores the possibility that the Afrikaner surrender was the result not so much of rampant consumerism but of an ideological collapse. According to this view, there was an inherent weakness in the NP's "culture of domination" and a singular lack of moral authority when confronted by a confident ANC leadership extolling human rights and non-racialism—positions all backed by the Western world that the Afrikaners took as their frame of reference.[17] Again the question is: if it was inherently so weak, why did apartheid, as one of the world's most hated systems, last so long? Why were Botha and others prepared to prolong it well beyond 1994?

Finally, one can note a fourth explanation. This argues that the NP simply miscalculated in the negotiations and constitution-making process, which stretched from February 1990 to December 1996. Whereas de Klerk at one stage had openly expressed his conviction that the NP would "have its hands on the tiller for many years to come,"[18] he was reduced at the end of the process to a position of haggling over the perks that would go with the job

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of being the official leader of the opposition in a one-party dominant system.

This essay will align itself more closely with the latter two explanations but will discuss the themes and questions within the broader context of the Afrikaner mobilization and its ideology of ethnic survival. The basic argument is that, just as apartheid was based on the idea that it could ensure Afrikaner ethnic survival, the regime change of 1994 was brought about not so much by middle-class interests superseding the emotional identification in Afrikaner thinking but by the belief that apartheid could no longer be sustained by a shrinking white minority. Once the apartheid idea had collapsed there was no alternative ideology that could justify Afrikaner or white supremacy or even significant minority protection as distinct from individual rights.

CONFRONTING THE ETHNIC SURVIVAL CRISES

Early in the 1970s a sociologist and pollster in South Africa observed that, because of popular myths and perceptions, significant proportions of whites in South Africa are oriented towards survival rather than domination and that the latter is an inevitable consequence of the former. He added that any analysis had to contend with what he called "gut-level fears and anxieties."[19] The most prominent theme in Afrikaners' political thinking during the apartheid era was an obsession with the way in which the Afrikaners as a small nation could contend with different survival crises. Afrikaner nationalists commonly believed that survival in a hostile environment could only be secured if they kept the power that they had won in 1948. As an Afrikaner opponent of the NP leaders observed in 1959: "They regard it [political power] as an essential safeguard for their survival as a nation." Any threat to it "instantly calls for resistance which may be stirred to fanatic vehemence by the urge for national self-preservation."[20]

At the most basic level there were Afrikaner fears about physical survival, which must be seen against a backdrop of a settler history, dating back to 1652, when a small Afrikaner population lived among great numbers of indigenous peoples in a vast territory. These fears and anxieties were not idiosyncratic. Explaining the unwillingness of Afrikaners to cede or share power, the histo-

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rian Lewis Gann wrote in 1959 that in societies in Africa, Eastern Europe, and Russia there is no underlying harmony on which a democracy could be built—only minorities with conflicting ideals, interests, fears, and grave anxieties. For dominant minorities matters like national identity and political self-determination are not mere abstractions, but a matter of life and death: they know that they can expect rough treatment once they become subject to a nationally distinct majority. As Gann observes: "This will especially be true if the minorities appear to be possessed of more than their fair share of economic wealth; then they are likely to be liquidated altogether."[21] A thought very much along these lines was once expressed by the most respected Afrikaner poet and essayist, N. P. van Wyk Louw. He wrote that if the Afrikaners lost power and become a mere expatriate minority they would be "as helpless as the Jews in Germany."[22]

The Mau Mau uprising in Kenya, the mass evacuation of French settlers from Algeria, and the chaotic Belgian retreat from the Congo were all deeply unsettling to whites in South Africa. Afrikaans newspapers provided full and often lurid accounts of these traumatic events. Fear of an equally violent catastrophe lay close to the core of Afrikaner thought, giving rise to a series of draconian security laws. Liberals like Paton or Helen Suzman rightly criticized these laws but made little effort to come to grips with the descent into disorder and despotism in many other African countries and the realistic fear that these developments could be replicated at the tip of the continent. Despite the fact that not only the state but also private white citizens armed themselves, the fear did not subside. By 1987 four-fifths of Afrikaners stated in a national poll that under black majority rule the physical safety of whites would be threatened and white women would be molested.[23] In 1990, two months after negotiations started, 49 percent of whites agreed with the statement that there was reason to fear for their own safety and that of their family in the future; 43 percent felt otherwise.[24]

Although fears about physical survival were not always openly expressed, concerns over white material survival were always prominent in the public debate. As a result of their late urbanization Afrikaners struggled to make headway in the urban economy. When the NP came to power in 1948 about two-thirds of the

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Afrikaners were comprised of blue collar and other manual workers or struggling farmers who soon afterwards had to leave their land. Both classes needed state support to maintain themselves as part of the white dominant group. Apartheid was at heart an attempt to turn the white poor into a state-subsidized petty bourgeoisie, properly housed and clothed, protected from black competition, and socialized in white supremacist behavior. This was not achieved overnight, and white South Africa retained a predominantly working class character for quite some time. Blue collar and other manual workers formed 50 percent of the employed white population in 1971 and 44 percent in 1983.[25] The government could now proceed with more confidence in the field of industrial desegregation. In the meantime, however, increasing numbers of Afrikaners found employment in the state sector. By 1968, twice as many Afrikaners were in public-sector jobs than before 1948. Ten years later more than a third of Afrikaners were employed in this sector as compared to only a quarter of other whites. A great concentration of white middle-class workers in the state sector developed. By 1990, 46 percent of all white middle-class employment outside the primary sectors was in the state sector.

It is sometimes argued that South Africa's democratization in the 1990s was made possible by the success of both apartheid and capitalism in turning the white electorate into an independent middle class with a diminishing need for the state. This perspective must be questioned. White state employees would inevitably be threatened by any shift to black majority rule. Furthermore, the distribution of wealth within white society had become quite unequal, with the top quintile controlling four-fifths of the wealth at the end of the 1970s. While the incomes of the top three quintiles in the white group had stagnated between 1975 and 1991, those of the lowest two had declined by a staggering 40 percent in the same period. These figures hardly present us with a profile of the white community as independently wealthy and able to prosper in the face of a hostile or indifferent black regime.[26]

If political domination advanced white material interests, its longer-term effect on Afrikaner cultural survival was more ambiguous. To paraphrase Milan Kundera on the Czech struggle, the fact that the Afrikaner people as a distinctive ethnic group has survived during the past century has less to do with political

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cunning or armed force than with the huge intellectual effort that went into a small nation developing Afrikaans as a high-culture language, to use Ernest Gellner's term.[27] Afrikaans originated in the first of two centuries of settlement as a Dutch-based vernacular spoken by settlers, slaves, and indigenous peoples. Turning away from both Dutch and English to build up Afrikaans constituted a choice, a project, or, to use Pascal's term, a wager. Originally branded a "kitchen language," Afrikaans was deliberately turned into a "white man's" or "civilized" language. Furthermore—and this was ultimately of paramount importance—the white Afrikaner nation came to see its distinctive identity as expressed by that language. In 1925 Afrikaans became an official language, and the Afrikaner nationalist movement now concentrated much of its efforts on ensuring that Afrikaans assumed an equal role alongside English as the medium of public discourse. A surprisingly vibrant literature soon developed, and Afrikaans took its place in science, technology, and the marketplace. In nationalist thinking, the people's very existence was manifested in the "living language" of Afrikaans.

After the NP came to power in 1948, it enforced the principle of mother-tongue education at the school level, while five universities catered to Afrikaners on the tertiary level. The government constantly emphasized the constitutional provision that Afrikaans and English be treated on an equal footing, but it used this provision flexibly in the schools. The fear gradually developed that the future of Afrikaans was in jeopardy if the subordinate population spurned it. When the government embarked on a massive extension in the provision of education to blacks in the early 1970s, it also attempted to impose the equality principle in black schools in townships around Johannesburg and other towns in the Transvaal province. It stipulated that all black pupils in these areas had to take Afrikaans as a subject and be taught mathematics and social science with Afrikaans as the only language of instruction. This was the fateful precipitant that caused the so-called Soweto Riots of 1976, by far the most serious black uprising by that point against apartheid.

By now Afrikaans had widely become identified as the language of the oppressor—the medium used when policemen arrested blacks or when officials instructed blacks to show their "pass," which

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was the most effective check on black urbanization. Black resistance was expressed in a rejection of Afrikaans and Afrikaners. The more apartheid in its own terms "succeeded" by getting blacks to accept "self-government" in their own "homelands," the more Afrikaans as a language failed. One after another "homeland" governments chose English and an indigenous language as their official languages. The future of Afrikaans was threatened from two sides. Its close association with domination was sitting like an albatross on its shoulder. At the same time, however, there was every prospect that a black government would elevate English to the status of being the sole official language, spelling the end of Afrikaans and the Afrikaans culture—and with it the demise of the Afrikaner people.[28] The demographic picture was ominous. The best possible Afrikaner ally was the colored people, a predominantly Afrikaans-speaking group almost as large as the Afrikaners. Apartheid had alienated their elite, who were now turning to English. Whereas 18 percent of the South African people spoke Afrikaans as their mother tongue in 1970, only 15 percent was projected to do so in 2000.

There was lastly also a question about the ethical quality of survival. Prominent intellectuals pursued the chimera of a just solution, or less ambitiously counseled against a patently unjust one, to the country's racial problem. The most eloquent and lasting contribution was a 1952 essay by van Wyk Louw, which analyzed the different survival crises that conceivably confronted a small people like the Afrikaners. These included military defeat, mass immigration, and absorption by an Anglo-Saxon or Bantu-speaking (African) nation. For intellectuals, however, the greatest of these crises would occur "when a large number of our people comes to believe that we need not live together *in justice* [his emphasis] with other ethnic groups; when they come to believe that mere survival is the chief issue, not a just existence." Succumbing to this "final temptation" could have grave consequences since it could lead to a critical number of intellectuals withdrawing their allegiance (something Louw never did). Louw posed the question: "Is it possible for a small people to survive for long if it becomes hateful or something evil for the best in—or outside—its ranks?" He believed that it was possible for his people one day to

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emerge from the "dark night of the soul" and say, "I would rather go down than survive in injustice."[29]

A sociopolitical order and a justificatory framework were needed that dealt with the threats and challenges on all the different levels—political, physical, material, cultural, and ethical. Afrikaner nationalists believed they had found the answer in apartheid. This was not only an ideology but also an ethnic survival system that fostered and concealed Afrikaner domination. It was comprised of two parts: an ethnonationalism as the base and apartheid as a body of operating principles. The nationalist part of the system was an assembly of loosely formulated beliefs, values, and fears. On one level there was a special claim to the land based on the spurious assumption that the greatest part of the land was empty when the settlement was founded in the mid-seventeenth century. On another level the claim was made that Afrikaner political power and cultural identity rested on a covenant or contract with an all-knowing God.[30] This was soon extended to an argument stressing the centrality of nations in God's creation and their God-given separate destinies.

A nationalist ideology, however, rarely has clear and coherent ideas about a proper political and social order. Apartheid developed as an action-related system of ideas taking the Afrikaner historical experience as its point of departure and projecting that onto other peoples in the country. Just as the Afrikaners had thrown off British cultural hegemony, so the black people, according to the ideology, had to realize their own separate ethnic identity and build up their own ethnic power base. Apartheid, however, was not the rationale or the end of the system of rule. Already in the late 1960s John Vorster, who had become prime minister in 1966, said that apartheid was merely the means by which an Afrikaner identity could be retained, maintained, and be kept "immortal" within a white sovereign state. He added: "If there were better means to achieve the same end they had to be found."[31] This was an approach to which all his successors subscribed.

Until the final decade of its rule the NP leadership continued to believe that conceptually apartheid was an ethically justifiable system that enabled all the "nations" in South Africa to survive. However, it became increasingly difficult to reconcile the contra-

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diction between the ideal and the harsh reality, consisting as it did of black "homelands" that economically were not viable, the annual arrest of hundreds of thousands of pass-law offenders seeking work in the cities, the prosecution of those who transgressed the racial sex laws, and so on. Whereas the apartheid system in the 1950s and 1960s almost unthinkingly exploited an uneducated, poorly trained labor force, of whom a large complement were migrants, the realization dawned in the early 1970s that this super-exploitation was bad not only for economic growth but for future white security. In 1971 a cabinet minister warned about the huge racial wage gap, declaring that "such gigantic differences in living standards. . .would lead to murder and violence." After a wave of industrial strikes by extremely poorly paid black workers in 1973, Prime Minister John Vorster exhorted employers to treat blacks not "as labor units, but as human beings with souls." The government took the lead by narrowing the racial wage gap in the public sector, but vast inequities remained. The Soweto uprising imparted a greater urgency, particularly after P. W. Botha came to power in 1978. He told party followers: "We are moving into a changing world. We must adapt, otherwise we shall die." He also urged them to learn the lessons of their own history: "the moment you start oppressing people. . .they fight back. We must acknowledge people's rights and. . .make ourselves free by giving to others in a spirit of justice what we demand for ourselves."[32]

At the same time the leadership gave the assurance that white security remained of paramount importance. The government claimed that the country was confronted with a "total onslaught," which assailed the entire sociopolitical order. According to government spokesmen, the overriding consideration was "survival." But there was no real moral basis for the Afrikaner and the larger white minority to appeal for support in their struggle. The harsh reality was that the world backed minorities only when they expressed moral and political principles that the outside world felt should not be suppressed. To the world the white minority embodied, above all, crass materialism. While smarting under this world, and particularly Western, condemnation, the NP had no intention of giving up power as they entered the 1980s. However, fatal sys-

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temic weaknesses persuaded a new leadership to find a different solution to the crisis.[33]

THE UNDERMINING OF A SYSTEM

While obnoxious to the world, the system of Afrikaner domination was quite stable at the beginning of the 1980s, resting as it did on three pillars: vastly superior state power, white unity, and black political fragmentation. Over the next decade this system disintegrated until it finally was abolished in the mid-1990s. The system was undermined on the one hand by long-term demographic and economic trends and on the other hand by swelling black resistance. This produced such ideological and political disarray in the Afrikaner leadership ranks that they decided to risk the unbanning of the liberation movements, followed by negotiations for a power-sharing system. A lack of any strategic vision on the leadership's part, coupled with tough bargaining by the African National Congress negotiators, produced the outcome very few had expected and many feared: largely untrammeled majority rule in a unitary state.

The changing demographic equation, and more specifically the rapidly shrinking white minority, distinguishes the South African conflict most strikingly from all other ethnic conflicts. Seen against the broad sweep of South Africa's history, one of a handful of really important facts is that until the mid-twentieth century the proportion of whites relative to the total population was always sufficient to occupy all the strategic positions in the political, economic, and administrative systems in the country. Unlike, say, the colonizers in the northeastern parts of colonial Brazil, whites in South Africa never needed to establish a free, semi-skilled mulatto class to occupy the intermediate positions in the system of domination. By the middle of the twentieth century, however, a vital change had begun to make itself felt. Between 1910 and 1960 whites constituted 20 percent of the total population, but by 1960 the white demographic base began to shrink. By 1985 the white segment had fallen to 15 percent, and it is projected to fall to 11 percent by 2010. An acute shortage of white manpower began to develop in both the public and private sectors. This shortage increasingly forced employers in the private sector to breach the

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industrial color bar to meet the need for skilled and semi-skilled manpower. The state had overreached itself in both spending and administrative capacities in trying to control blacks. The mammoth Department of Bantu Administration and Development found itself incapable of stemming the flow of blacks to the cities. "Voting with their feet," urbanizing blacks brought about a "silent revolution." While blacks accounted for only half of all the city dwellers in the mid-1980s, they were projected to outnumber all other groups three to one by 2000. Blacks became homeowners and entrepreneurs and started to dominate vital segments of consumer spending.[34]

South Africa's economy began to stagnate in the mid-1970s after fifty years of impressively growing at about 5 percent per year. Between 1975 and 1991 the annual rate of growth fell to only 1.6 percent, well below the 3 percent annual population increase.[35] Real per capita income in the period slumped by about 25 percent. Some of the decline in the growth rate was due to factors over which the state had little control, such as the rise in energy prices after 1973 and the weaker market for South African commodities. Behind the country's economic woes, however, there also lay a long story of economic mismanagement. Ironically, the economic malaise sprang mostly from the determination to make white South Africa economically self-sufficient and capable of repulsing any threat to its political autonomy. South Africa could afford to do so since its economy was largely built around gold, which was assured of a market, albeit at a fixed price until the early 1970s. There was, however, a serious downside. First, gold is a finite and declining resource. As the mining industry was forced to increase wages in the early 1970s, its share of the Western world's gold production began to decline steadily. Secondly, the white demand for security, coupled with the luxury of having gold as a major export earner, produced a quite uncompetitive manufacturing sector. The drive towards import-substitution dates back to the 1920s, when the government started to build high tariff walls and established the Iron and Steel Corporation. Little effort went into becoming efficient enough to export. By the early 1990s manufacturing exports per capita were lower than any upper-middle-income country except Brazil.

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The state also introduced other policies designed to make the ruling group invulnerable. After World War II massive plants to extract oil from coal were built as part of a plan to bring the country's oil production up to one half of its domestic requirements. State aid to agriculture by 1970 provided on average one-fifth of a white farmer's income. To prevent the black migration to the cities, the state put numerous obstacles in the way of black employment, with the result that production became increasingly capital intensive and labor saving—this in a country with abundant sources of labor. To placate white workers, the training of blacks for more skilled work was a low priority. Labor productivity stopped growing in 1980 and capital productivity declined by over 30 percent between 1970 and 1991. Employment in the private sector dropped by forty-seven thousand jobs during the 1980s. By 1990 fewer than ten out of one hundred new entrants could find work in the job market of the formal sector of the economy. Between a quarter and a third of the economically active black labor force could not find regular employment. This greatly aggravated the incidence of both political violence and crime.

The economy had already started to shed black labor in the early 1970s. Realizing the security threat this posed, the government made two fateful decisions in order to promote economic growth. The first was to expand greatly the provision of black education and, with that, the productivity of black labor. In 1960 there were only 717 blacks in the most advanced classes in school. By the mid-1980s there were just over fifty thousand black and fifty thousand white university matriculants, but by 2000 it is predicted that seven out of ten matriculants will be black. By the end of the 1980s the urban black population was far better educated and trained—and much more radicalized than before. Surveys consistently showed that the higher the level of education of blacks the more acute their political discontent and the more pressing their demands. It was schoolchildren and students with little hope of finding acceptable jobs who spearheaded the successful ANC-led efforts of the 1980s to disrupt the black educational system and make the black townships ungovernable.

The other fateful decision was in 1979 when the government scrapped statutory job reservation and all other impediments to the advancement and training of black workers. It also allowed

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black trade unions to participate in the statutory industrial relations system. Blacks now enjoyed effective industrial civil rights without any meaningful political rights. The government's expectation that the black trade union movement would not become politicized quickly proved to be quite misguided. In fact, it became the best organized part of the liberation movement, arranging strikes and "rolling mass action" at critical points to back up black demands and weaken the will of NP negotiators. In an effort by employers to buy off militant black workers, wage increases were granted, but they were unaccompanied by any commensurate improvement in productivity. The labor market became ever more rigid, worsening the unemployment crisis. Confronted with such a hostile environment, investors took fright. Gross fixed investment plummeted from 26 percent of the GDP in 1983 to 16 percent in 1991—a level at which it was impossible for the economy to grow, since a 14 percent level was needed simply to replace the capital equipment that was wearing out. At the same time government consumer spending rose sharply from 15 to 21 percent. This was partly the result of an effort to mollify white civil servants but also in order to provide services to the rapidly growing black population and to narrow racial pay differentials. To fund this increased spending the government heavily taxed the middle and upper income sectors and borrowed so much that its debt rose from 5 to 19 percent of the budget between 1975 and 1992.

The NP government realized that the country needed a more legitimate political framework in order to attract new investments. Taking the first step in the aftermath of the Soweto uprising, it started a process leading in 1984 to the incorporation of the colored and Indian groups, forming 8 and 3 percent of the population respectively, into a Tricameral Parliament. Although the "other two" chambers had little power, the new Parliament irrevocably undermined the symbolism of white supremacy. Unexpectedly it also materially contributed to the destruction of two of the three pillars of the Afrikaners' power: their own unity and black political fragmentation.

Afrikaner political unity was finally shattered when the Conservative Party (CP) was founded in 1982 after eighteen parliamentary representatives of the NP had broken away over the issue of "power-sharing" with Coloreds and Indians. It managed to win

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over 40 to 50 percent of the Afrikaners in the next ten years. Although there were class dimensions to the split, with the CP based more strongly on lower income Afrikaners than the NP, the real line of division concerned the different ways of securing Afrikaner political survival. The split ended the life of the NP as a purely ethnic party. Government policy was no longer the tortuous outcome of several battles fought on different sites in the nationalist movement. The party had become a catchall (white) party, with the votes of English-speakers constituting more than 42 percent of its support in the 1987 election. The political leadership increasingly assumed a vanguard role. There was a major reduction of accountability as the NP parliamentary caucus was marginalized with leaders strengthening technocratic forms of decision-making. No longer constrained in the same way by the checks on power a nationalist movement traditionally imposes on its leadership, the NP leaders began to resemble free-floating political entrepreneurs, guided less by loyalty to the ethnic cause than by calculations about their place in the future centers of power. F. W. de Klerk and his future chief negotiator, Roelf Meyer, who as ethnic politicians strongly opposed reforms of the apartheid order (de Klerk did so until 1987), would as negotiators be more willing to retreat in the face of ANC demands than their NP colleagues, who earlier had been considered much more liberal.

The state had turned into a multiracial state that relied on racially mixed security forces to impose order and on black homeland leaders like Chief Gatsha Buthelezi to counter the ANC-led movement to isolate South Africa economically and internationally. The NP now rested on a broader base, but it had lost almost all ideological cohesion. In two polls, one undertaken in 1977 and the other in 1992, Afrikaners were asked to give a rating of what they considered to be the most important policy of their party. The responses were largely identical; at 27 percent in both polls white security was the highest priority, while language and culture rated seventh in 1977 at 1 percent. Fifteen years later it was eighth at 3 percent. One could argue that language and culture were so well protected that there was little reason to be worried, but the result still is a remarkable testimony to the waning of specifically Afrikaans cultural concerns during the apartheid era.[36] The dream of an exclusive white land had vanished as streams of impoverished

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blacks flowed to the outskirts of the cities and trickled into the white suburbs, raising fears about a collapse of "First World" standards. White voters were persuaded that the old order of black exclusion from power finally had come to an end. They were prepared to accept blacks in government provided a new political order guaranteed security, predictable politicians, competent bureaucrats, a strong economy, and secure property rights. Afrikaners and the larger white community still strongly insisted on what Walker Connor calls the freedom from domination by nonmembers, which in practical terms meant separate white political representation and a white veto. In Africa, however, that constituted white privilege and that was what the ANC's struggle was about.

Such had been the outrage of blacks over their exclusion from the Tricameral Parliament that another pillar of white power, namely the lack of black unity, had disappeared. All government efforts to attract moderate black leaders with demonstrable support into talks about drafting a new constitution failed. For the first time in a century sufficient black unity existed in the greatest part of the country to prevent the government from using black moderates as a shield in a form of indirect rule. The uprising of 1984–1986 all but eliminated the credibility of black councilors elected in the 1980s to run the black townships, none of which had a proper revenue base. Reluctant to devolve any power to the Natal region for fear of losing control, the government by the mid-1980s had alienated Chief Buthelezi, the only internal leader with a mass base. Except in rural Natal, where Buthelezi held sway, the ANC or its proxies were able to prevent any black movement not under its control from becoming a significant force. The state had established a large degree of control by the end of 1986, but it had become clear that the popular resistance could not be crushed altogether. At the end of the 1980s the security forces had begun to give up on winning the hearts-and-minds battle. Mike Louw, who was a senior officer in the National Intelligence Service (he became its head in 1992), remembers the situation in the late 1980s as follows: "Nowhere was the situation out of hand, but it was clear that politically and morally we were losing. Everywhere in the black townships we encountered intimidation and a strong political consciousness. The political system had become obsolete

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and a long, bloody struggle lay ahead. It had become clear that the sooner we negotiated a new system the better."[37]

In a perceptive article on South Africa, published in 1981, Samuel Huntington made the point that revolutionary violence does not have to be successful to be effective. It simply has to create sufficient trouble in the dominant group about ways to deal with it. Once the leadership is no longer able to apply its instruments of coercion ruthlessly, a crucial pillar of the system of domination disintegrates.[38] This was what started to happen by the second half of the 1980s. The government's inability to find a moderate black leadership with whom to negotiate had produced a deadlock in government. An account of the meeting of a special cabinet committee held in March 1986 shows how fundamental the differences in the power elite were. President Botha remarked that he did not favor one man, one vote in a unitary or federal state, adding: "I thought. . .we had clarity, but I do not think we have it anymore, because you want me to say we stand for a unitary South Africa. You allow me to say it, you write it in my speeches and I accept it, but what do we mean by that?" F. W. de Klerk commented that he could live with a rotating presidency, but "somewhere there must be somebody who had enough power in his hands, somewhere in a good government there must be a P. W. Botha who had the power and authority to ensure that things went right in the country."[39] As will be seen, de Klerk's hope that there would be white representation in a mixed cabinet, underpinned by some formal form of power, became his main negotiating goal in the early 1990s.

The Afrikaner elite recognized that remaining at an impasse was also dangerous. In mid-1986 the Afrikaner Broederbond, the secret communication channel between the government and the elite, issued a circular to that effect entitled "Political Values for the Survival of the Afrikaner." It declared that "the greatest risk that we are taking today is not taking any risks." The abolition of statutory discrimination had become a "prerequisite for survival" while black exclusion from politics "had become a threat to survival." It concluded that the state president did not have to be white and that ultimately the future of the Afrikaners depended on their will to survive and their faith and energy.[40] Also in 1986, the Dutch Reformed Church, by far the largest of the Afrikaner churches,

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finally abandoned its support for apartheid as a system that it had long justified theologically. It decided to follow the New rather than the Old Testament, pointing out that the idea of race plays no part whatsoever in the New Testament while the idea of the diversity of peoples is always presented within the context of unity. The church also abandoned some other cherished ideas: that it was as one with the Afrikaner people, that it was the moral conscience of the *Volk* and state, and that the Scriptures presented any specific model for race relations. For the first time it specifically stated that racism was a sin. Implicitly this meant that the vaunting of any group was racism and hence a sin. Afrikaners could no longer think of themselves as a chosen people; the idea of the covenant was dead.[41]

TOWARDS DEMOCRATIC UNCERTAINTY

While ethnic groups only relinquish power in exceptional circumstances, they almost always seek allies. This is particularly true of the Afrikaners, a small and basically insecure group. The apartheid system, which appropriated a monopoly of power, was something of an anomaly in Afrikaner history: The more than three centuries of settlement are studded with totally unexpected Afrikaner alliances or proposed alliances with unlikely partners ranging from African chiefs to imperialists to socialists. When the government confronted the deep impasse in the white-black power struggle at the end of the 1980s, it knew its constituency would welcome any major black partner that could assist it in dealing with the intractable problems of massive black poverty, unemployment, and crime. The dominant political question now had become not whether to take a black party into government—to that all except the right wing agreed—but whether the ANC constituted such a partner.

A more important question, however, was whether this black-white cooperation should occur in a democratic context. Some analysts argued in the mid-1980s that the introduction of universal franchise had become possible because little cultural distance characterized white-black relations. They largely shared the Christian religion and had become economically interdependent.[42] Roelf Meyer, the chief NP negotiator in the latter half of the negotiations, endorsed this view when visiting Belfast in mid-1996 with

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his ANC counterpart, Cyril Ramaphosa. Meyer indicated that he believed it to be wrong to compare the South African experience to that of Northern Ireland because "we [in South Africa] basically had no fundamental differences to resolve." He continued, "It was almost as simple as a matter of color or race that separated us. We had to remove the problem to reach out to each other, and to discover each other as human beings."[43]

Meyer's reference to the "simple matter" of race and color that separated whites and blacks can be seen as a collapse of both the ideology of apartheid and of Afrikaner ethnonationalism and the historic and political claims and status associations attached to that. This statement can be read as a testimony to the unqualified ideological victory of the anti-apartheid movement worldwide and of modernization theory, which postulates the eradication of ethnic and racial differences within a common society. There was one problem: it was not shared by the constituency that Meyer and his party represented. In successive polls in the final years of the 1980s, only a third of whites agreed that whites and Africans had enough common values to create a future democratic government. After the ANC's unbanning the figure increased and reached 59 percent in mid-1992, but after a series of attacks on whites it dropped again to a third by the end of 1992. Once questions became more specific dramatic differences were revealed. In a 1992 poll the following statement was made: "South Africa is an African country where others have to take second place." Of blacks 56 percent agreed with this statement against only 5 percent of whites. In a 1986 poll only 3 percent of Afrikaners (and 8 percent of English-speakers) were prepared to accept a unitary state with one parliament and one vote for every person.[44]

In such a context the government was increasingly attracted to the paradigm of consociationalism or power-sharing as an alternative to the Westminster form of majority rule. It had billed the Tricameral Parliament (incorrectly) as power-sharing, and its constituency considered that nonthreatening. Why not try it with blacks? In discussions between 1971 and 1990 with NP politicians, Arend Lijphart, the internationally renowned proponent of consociationalism, argued that they were making a big mistake if they thought that their choice was between a broad sharing of power and exclusive white (and Afrikaner) power. He told them

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their only real choice was between sharing power and losing power.[45] In the end they accepted this argument, strongly believing that negotiations did not entail bargaining over only the transfer of power.

There were several factors that facilitated the pursuit of a *power-sharing settlement* with the ANC. First there was Nelson Mandela, then still in jail and having informal, secret talks with government officials. Almost without exception NP leaders considered him a "godsend," a man whose stature and integrity they immediately recognized. He was no moderate in NP terms but consistently argued that majority rule, which he considered non-negotiable, had to be balanced by guarantees that ensured that white domination would not be replaced by black domination. Second, de Klerk was a democrat and civilian politician. He viewed with distaste the sidelining of the cabinet under the state of emergency, which saw the State Security Council, comprised of politicians and security officials, making the most important decisions. When de Klerk assumed control in 1989 he was assured of conservative backing in the party caucus, but the reformists were suspicious of him. Polls showed that the NP's support among white voters was being seriously eroded on both the Left and the Right while it remained paralyzed about its future direction. De Klerk had no wish for security officials to be further involved in political decisions. That meant he had only one option for shoring up his base: he had to seek a political solution, which meant that he had to move to the Left. Since the party fought for the election in 1989 on the premise that the polling constituted the last one from which blacks were excluded, he had no more than five years to find that solution.

Third, whites had enjoyed the franchise in South Africa for nearly 150 years, and there was little prospect of them supporting a solution in which they had to sacrifice their democratic rights. An important comparative article recently argued that the consolidation of a democracy in Africa occurred in settler societies because there had been a tradition of electoral competition, unlike patrimonial regimes where competition previously had been outlawed.[46] Of course the settlers long blocked the extension of democracy or used a partial extension to thwart popular democracy. When the NP in the early 1980s incorporated the colored people and Indians in the democratic process, its chief propagandist pri-

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vately presented it as "[broadening] our own power base and thus avoid turning them [Coloreds] over to a black power situation."[47] It was only when the leadership in the late 1980s was confronted with a stark choice between extending democracy to blacks and a costly battle of attrition that the democratic tradition of whites became an important variable. Having made the choice for democracy, the leadership could claim that black enfranchisement was not a break or denial of history but actually in line with the political tradition of whites and their interests. Gerrit Viljoen, initially the government's chief negotiator, defended a negotiated democracy as indispensable for the survival of whites as a shrinking minority. He said in early 1990: "[We] who want change want it exactly because we realize that our survival depends on orderly change.... The whole approach of government is to shift the emphasis from race to the quality of government and the broadening of democracy in spite of the risks."[48]

The fall of the Berlin Wall two months after de Klerk became State President presented the NP with a large window of opportunity. De Klerk could now tell his constituency that without Soviet backing the ANC was no longer a threat. With the entire world moving away from the socialist experiment the ANC would be forced to respect private property and follow other investment-friendly policies. De Klerk began to use to great effect the argument that time would not be on the side of whites, and Afrikaners in particular. He argued that the settlement Ian Smith and the white Rhodesians were forced to accept constituted a classic case of negotiations that had been delayed too long. Two months after his February 2, 1990 speech, he declared to a meeting held in the offices of *Die Burger*: "We have not waited until the position of power dominance turned against us before we decided to negotiate a peaceful settlement. The initiative is in our hands. We have the means to ensure that the process develops peacefully and in an orderly way."[49] In the period that followed, de Klerk and his senior ministers consistently spelled out the message that whites had a stark choice between being driven back into a corner in the next ten years or staging an outflanking movement that could yield to them and their representatives a strategic position in a new, legitimate political system.

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The NP entered the negotiations in 1990 from a position of strength and with a reasonably confident assumption that it could engineer a constitution that would severely restrict the power of the majority and thus diminish democratic uncertainty. Its negotiating proposals made a provision for a rotating presidency as the kingpin of an intricate scheme that would carefully limit the power of the majority and that of the minority (or minorities). The NP ended the negotiations in 1996, having failed to secure any of its major political and cultural objectives. Instead of nonelected negotiating parties drawing up the constitution over a prolonged period of time (as the NP proposed), an elected constituent assembly did so (as was the ANC's position). Instead of a power-sharing cabinet and rotating presidency within a federal system (NP) there would be a largely unitary state and majority decision-making in both the executive and legislative branches. These branches would effectively be fused and dominated by the largest party in the typical Westminster style (ANC). Drawing more than 80 percent of the black vote in the 1994 election, the ANC is assured to remain the dominant party for quite some time. Economically the NP got its way when the ANC accepted the market system and property rights, but in cultural affairs it has little reason for satisfaction. The recognition of eleven languages looks like a barely concealed formula for English to become the sole official language, and the ANC refused to grant either mother-tongue education or single-medium schools as rights. The cultural autonomy of Afrikaans schools and universities is heavily qualified by the insistence that English streams be introduced in these institutions to provide greater access to blacks.

We are left with two main questions: Why did the NP concede so much in the negotiations, ending up not with power-sharing but with majority rule? Why did its white constituency accept majority rule, which more than 90 percent firmly rejected in polls taken in the late 1980s?

The following explanations seem plausible. First, apartheid had used or debased all the available capital that normally goes with the demands ethnonational minorities make to ensure their survival. In the negotiations the NP was unable to argue convincingly that the Afrikaners or the larger white group as a whole constituted a minority rather than a replaced dominant group. It was

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impossible to demand that the NP as a white party be given a veto and at the same time pretend that it had made a decisive break with apartheid, which, by its own admission, had failed. The NP could make no territorial or federal claims since Afrikaners lived dispersed all over the country and since neither they nor the larger white group commanded a majority in any region. The formal acceptance of "Western standards" across racial lines made it impossible for the NP to argue that there were unique cultural values that had to be specially protected.

As a result of all this the NP decided to pursue a nonracial position and make the party the articulator of values and interests. Apart from its traditional middle-class white base, the NP also attracted lower-income colored people, middle-class Indians, and a small section of conservative blacks across the class spectrum. It also claimed to be the representative of the specific interests of business, civil servants, and the security forces. All this strengthened the ANC's argument that the country's politics was about interests and not race, making an "ordinary" (Mandela's word) liberal democracy feasible. To counter this the NP had to make the obvious point that the comparative evidence showed that in deeply divided societies there is normally no significant floating vote, which gives liberal democracies their vitality. Instead, race and ethnic affinities decisively determine voters' preferences. Hence, power-sharing was necessary to avoid the alienation of minorities and to provide a safe basis for investment. But the NP was unable to stand up to the ANC position that race and ethnicity had been tainted by apartheid and that no formal recognition should be given to these identities.

Secondly, the ANC retreat from nationalization as a main plank of its platform made it more difficult for the NP to claim that its presence in government was indispensable for the protection of free enterprise. The NP had come to the free market position very late in the day, and the very state of the economy testified to its violation of some cardinal principles of neo-liberal economic management. There was a huge debt, the civil service was bloated, the tariff walls were high, and corruption and white collar crime were rife. Apart from de Klerk and one or two others, the top echelons of the NP were far from impressive as politicians outside their traditional Afrikaner context. It was difficult to make the argu-

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ment that the NP added much value to the governing process or that its administrative talents were indispensable.

Thirdly, the end of the Cold War weakened the NP position. There was now no reason for the West to back a conservative government. Mandela's stature and the ANC's long struggle for black liberation made it seem the natural successor to the NP. The US government started leaning towards the view that as long as the ANC subscribed to a market system its political demands could be considered reasonable. At a critical point in the negotiations the US Under Secretary of State for African Affairs declared that all sides had to recognize "the right of the majority to govern." No side could insist on "overly complex arrangements intended to guarantee a share of power to particular groups which will frustrate effective government. Minorities have the right to safeguards; they cannot expect a veto."[50] The ANC itself could not have formulated it better.

Finally—and there is no other word for it—de Klerk lacked the necessary toughness to face down the ANC on critical points to ensure that his bottom-line demands were met. His great strength as a debater was also his weakness: He believed that he could persuade everyone of the reasonableness of his case or that some legalistic formula could always be found to paper over irreconcilable differences. When the ANC broke off negotiations in mid-1992 to embark on two months of rolling mass action, he was unable to sit this out. He believed that any security clampdown would destroy the chances of the remaining sanctions being lifted soon. He also thought that there was a risk of an economic meltdown if there was a refusal to resume negotiations on the part of the ANC leadership, who had endured long periods in jail or had lived on low salaries in exile and might be prepared to continue to do so to clinch victory. Only by sitting out the difficult period between July and September 1992 could de Klerk test the ANC leadership's resolve. However, as a man who in white politics was known as essentially a peacemaker and a centrist, he lacked the will to do so. In the end de Klerk set no conditions for a resumption of the negotiations and met almost all the ANC demands. The ANC had seized the upper hand. With increasing confidence Mandela rejected de Klerk's demands for formal power-sharing in the cabinet, treating it as an attempt to cling to the

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vestiges of white power. All de Klerk could get was Mandela's verbal assurance that he needed him and that he had a role to play. That, however, was subordinate to Mandela's insistence on having the power to make the final decisions. The final deal was so far from the NP's original demands that when the cabinet met to ratify it an outraged minister shouted at de Klerk: "What have you done?! You have given South Africa away!!"[51]

The NP was now squarely confronted with majority rule, precisely what it had promised its constituency it would prevent. De Klerk still hoped to retain more than a marginal influence by a good NP performance in the election. When the NP received 20 percent of the vote instead of the 30 to 35 percent de Klerk had expected, the hope of influence based on electoral strength was dashed. The other hope was that the NP would exert influence by acting as the gatekeeper to three powerful sectors: the business community, civil servants, and the security forces. But all three had given up on the NP as it began to backtrack in the negotiations and as the ANC moved swiftly to give assurances. Civil servants were promised their jobs or satisfactory retirement packages; the security forces were promised amnesty instead of a repeat of the Nuremberg trials; and the business community was assured that the new government considered private-sector investment as a top priority. Business quickly decided that a dominant party that comes to power through an election, tolerates an opposition, and respects civil rights constituted a sound platform for stability.

The puzzle remains: why did whites not revolt against a deal or overthrow de Klerk, given their resistance to majority rule? De Klerk as the scion of a political family and former conservative enjoyed an extraordinary measure of trust. No member of the caucus could ever believe that he would betray that trust or his people. Every time resistance surfaced in caucus he argued that, short of security action, no alternatives existed. He could assure all the members of his caucus, of whom a great majority were professional politicians, that there was an excellent chance that they would continue their political careers in the new structures. He dealt with the white electorate by holding an all-white referendum asking only for an endorsement of the negotiations well before serious negotiations started. As details of the unthinkable emerged, whites were gripped by a mood of resignation. The dismantling of

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the apartheid system had started in the early 1970s, and every time the electorate quickly adjusted to the new situation. This time, it was true, the matter was far more serious, but after almost seventy years of depending on an interventionist state, no white class—whether it be business, workers, or civil servants—had retained the capacity to organize separately to challenge the political leadership.

The military formed a possible source of resistance. However, it was small (fewer than seventy thousand full-time soldiers, of whom half were nonwhite) and had a long tradition of subservience to the political leadership. Moreover, de Klerk, probably sensing trouble, refused ANC demands for a multiparty aggregation of the security forces and carried out a small purge of officers suspected of backing or instigating third force activities. General Constand Viljoen, a widely respected former head of the Defense Force, at one stage threatened to mobilize right-wing forces of resistance and seize sufficient land to carve out a future Afrikaner *Volkstaat.* The undisciplined conduct of right-wing paramilitary organizations made effective action impossible. Viljoen and his movement were drawn into the election by a promise that the new government would consider a *Volkstaat* and would appoint a *Volkstaat* council comprised of right-wingers to research and deliberate on such a plan.

Election day was peaceful. Afrikaners were split almost down the middle between the right-wing parties and the NP. Ironically, the NP's electoral support base was much more nonracial than the ANC's. It drew half its votes from people who were not white, while only 6 percent of the ANC's support was not black. But the most important fact was that power had passed to blacks. Afrikaners with cultural concerns now had to fend for themselves under a new dominant party that did not have much patience for subnational identities or anything but an increasingly English-based, individualistic culture.

CONCLUSION

It would be tempting, though wrong, to consider what happened to the Afrikaners as evidence for the assumption that the emotional power of ethnicity is exaggerated and that material interests

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are decisive when the chips are down.[52] The situation was exceptional in South Africa in that the small, shrinking Afrikaner minority was facing severe economic and political problems and was hopelessly overextended in the political and administrative system. It had to make tough decisions about their future political survival as a group. De Klerk made his decisions in the spirit of Edmund Burke's dictum that leaders have to take their followers not where they want but ought to be. He knew that a shrinking white minority clinging to a monopoly of power offered no guarantee for the survival of his people. He was also confident that he could convince the ANC than an effective ANC-NP coalition was the best platform for realizing the economic potential of South Africa. De Klerk was able to persuade his party, his constituency, and the security forces to give up exclusive power and accept a new vision.

Where de Klerk failed was in his management of the negotiating process and in his strategy towards realizing his goal of power-sharing or of achieving an effective coalition government. He never signaled to the ANC in any serious way that this was his bottom line, nor did he try to understand the ANC's real agenda behind the bland assurances the movement's negotiators offered him that the ANC would continue to consult and work with de Klerk and his party. The ANC succeeded in getting what its spokespeople called an ordinary system of majority rule by flatly refusing to have the principle of power-sharing written into the constitution. It did approve, however, of a vaguely worded provision for a Government of National Unity in the interim constitution to assuage white voters' fears. Once the ANC had settled in the cushions of power, it was confident that the NP had no real power to constrain it. It rejected the inclusion of any sort of government of national unity in the final constitution, which came into force on February 4, 1997. Three weeks earlier de Klerk stated:

> The decision to surrender the right to national sovereignty is certainly one of the most painful that any leader can ever be asked to take. Most nations are prepared to risk total war and catastrophe rather than to surrender this right. Yet this was the decision that we had to take. We had to accept the necessity of giving up the ideal on which we have been nurtured and the dream for which so many generations of our forefathers had struggled and for which so many of our people had died.[53]

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The Afrikaner leadership handed over power because it had miscalculated that it was indispensable to the ANC.

Whites did not mount much resistance once the prospect of majority rule began to take shape. Part of the reason was that the process remained shrouded in ambiguity for quite some time. But there were also deep-seated reasons. There was little that a people in a modern state could do to roll back the process, and this is particularly true if they are as outnumbered as whites in South Africa were. Moreover, whites had become convinced of the failure of apartheid in the 1980s and saw no easy alternative. The electoral link between the NP and the white constituency had effectively been removed in 1989, well before the start of the negotiations. Constitutionally there was no course of action available to resist de Klerk. All that those who were prepared to take arms could do was to embark on random terrorism; alternatively, they could contemplate establishing by force an ethnic state in one of the regions. But for most whites that held little attraction.

Had someone other than de Klerk been elected as leader in 1989 a prolonged stalemate could have ensued, or South Africa may have witnessed a different leader pursuing a different strategy with a different outcome. If the particular events that did unfold demonstrate anything, it is that leaders do make a difference, particularly if they have the ability to take the party and their people with them into uncharted territory. What makes de Klerk different from a Gorbachev is that he is still the leader of his party and has managed to retain a following and a considerable degree of respect despite failing in his high-risk gamble. It says much for de Klerk, but even more about the Afrikaner people—their pragmatism, their fatalism, and perhaps also their resilience.

ENDNOTES

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Edward A. Tiryakian

The Wild Cards of Modernity

INTRODUCTION

THE END—OR THE BEGINNING—OF A CENTURY, to say nothing of a millennium, is an opportune occasion to take stock of what is problematic in a field, to acknowledge lessons we have learned, as inherited wisdom from paradigms that have guided the field, as well as what we have missed because of the filters of these paradigms. In the waning years of the 1990s, the sense and direction modernity is taking, at home and on a global basis, is a particularly challenging problem for the human sciences. Yesterday's competing paradigms are seemingly unable to generate much certainty or enthusiasm for their ability to diagnose our contemporary situation. Perhaps the combination of the unexpected implosion of the Soviet empire at the beginning of the decade and the unraveling of the "new world order," together with unexpected "good surprises" such as the abrupt but peaceful ending of white rule in South Africa, has taught most experts a modicum of humility in prognostication.[1] Regardless of discipline, there is a general sense of being in a period of transition, even if the crystal ball is cloudy as to what lies ahead and how far—or how long—the transition is to last. This may be typical of such periods.[2]

Several things have conspired to make the crystal ball cloudier than might be desired at a time when scientific and technological advances have continued at breakneck speed, when the global

Edward A. Tiryakian is Professor of Sociology at Duke University.

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economy has provided ever-widening links between different regions, providing structural conditions thought to be favorable to democratization. Among the murky spots of our modernity that have aroused particular interest and concern, race, ethnicity, religion, and nationalism must certainly figure. The latter in particular puts into question certain "traditional" paradigms of modernity that held sway in the social sciences until very recently. Although these paradigms have a distinguished genealogy extending back to the Enlightenment, they need to be updated with a more amorphous and dynamic perspective, one that makes room for the "wild cards of modernity."

* * *

W. E. B. Du Bois had it right—or almost right—when he announced, in the same year (1905) that Einstein advanced his theory of relativity, that "color" would be the social problem of the twentieth century. Irving Zola's teacher had it wrong when he told the budding graduate student in 1956, "Ethnicity is dead as a variable in social analysis."[3] Harvey Cox's social gospel of the 1960s seems today a naive panegyric to secularization that overshot its mark when he declared, "Secularization. . .has relativized religious worldviews and thus rendered them innocuous. Religion has been privatized."[4] Eric Hobsbawm's highly informative *Nations and Nationalism since 1780* had barely appeared in 1989 when the events of that autumn led to his book becoming a prescient best-seller despite his having proclaimed that the age of nationalism had ended. The mellowed but unrepentant Marxist, in his second edition, grudgingly noted the presence of nationalism (and fundamentalism) on the world scene but thought the latter not historically interesting for the future; in his words, "[We] will see 'nation-states' and 'nations' or ethnic/linguistic groups primarily as retreating before, resisting, adapting to, being absorbed or dislocated by the new supranational restructuring of the globe. Nations and nationalism will be present in this history, but in subordinate, and often rather minor roles."[5] Zbigniew Brzezinski saw it differently when, in the winter of 1989–1990, he drove a nail into the coffin of the Communist Manifesto, declaring "The specter that

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haunts the Russians in the Kremlin is that of nationalism—both within the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe."[6]

The several elements alluded to—race, ethnicity, religion, and nationalism—together with gender form a "cultural bundle" of attributes. In the world of the past quarter-century they have shown themselves to be potent factors in establishing group identity and allowing collective action, for relating large numbers of persons but also for making them feel distinct and separate from others. An earlier paradigm, which treated them as "ascribed statuses," essentially weak and "reactive" or, to introduce a metaphor from chemistry, as inert elements, in contrast to "achieved statuses" produced by education and occupation, is no longer much believed in. Although the terms "ascribed" and "achieved" are not much in current usage, the paradigm behind these terms needs to be overhauled, recognizing that personal *and* collective identities are, especially in our world of the 1990s, subject to continuing construction, deconstruction, and reconstruction. What had been taken as givens or "natural" have been reinterpreted as social constructs that impinge on and are impinged upon by many other factors in the social milieu. Moreover, formerly designated "ascribed statuses" have been seen as stimuli for social movements that have challenged and reformulated the meaning of these categories. They are no longer seen as "natural" but as socially constructed, imputed by dominant groups.

A central argument of this essay is that it is critical to treat this "bundle" as a dynamic set of factors creating modernity, rather than as constants or residuals in the general process of modernization. At different periods, these elements may have different values in providing motivation for change in the mobilization of social actors. Moreover, and particularly in the case of nationalism and religion, they may *interact* with other factors operating in the dynamics of modernity.

Before making this case, I will examine the contributions and limitations of a group of intellectuals who have greatly contributed to public discussions of nationalism and religion in relation to modernity. This is warranted, since intellectuals as protagonists and antagonists in the past two centuries have been major interpreters and producers of these phenomena. There is a need to reconsider nationalism and religion as factors *of* modernity rather

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than as reactions *to* modernity. In the last section, after considering certain academic legacies, I will take up anew the central question of *trust* as a general problem in this period of transition from one phase of modernity to another, relating that to the discussion of what I have termed "wild cards" and in particular to the question of national identity. It is only fair to state at the outset that I offer no "solutions" to our contemporary dilemmas; I hope that the stating of the problem may itself be a modest advance in our awareness of the issues at hand.

NATIONALISM AND INTELLECTUALS

Liberal democracies have a tendency to face the future wearing rose-colored glasses that hide jaundiced eyes. In a special issue of the *New York Times Magazine* devoted to looking at the coming century, John Tierney brought out the recurrent note of doomsaying by nostalgists and technophobes in the past century in the face of steady progress. Looking ahead, he anticipated that future angst will continue, as "academics and bureaucrats will seek funds by discovering new problems to study. Journalists will win awards and attract audiences by finding new scourges, real or imagined."[7]

During the present decade, nationalism and, to a secondary extent, fundamentalism have fulfilled Tierney's anticipation. They have played the same role in being viewed as forces capable of destabilizing from within the liberal social order as the proletariat, descendants of Hébert's *sans-culottes* in the French Revolution, did in the nineteenth century. Both nationalism and fundamentalism tend to be taken in the mass media as grave threats to the international order, fomenting interstate conflict that may result from secessions and irredentas. To complete a triumvirate of the perceived malevolent forces of the 1990s, we need look no further than ethnicity. Though etymologically ancient (from the Greek *ethnos* or *ethnikos* for nation), its usage is grounded in recent post–World War II social science, replacing for politically correct reasons earlier terms like "race" and "tribe." Approximately twenty years ago, "ethnicity" in the context of the American pluralistic experience was discovered as a positive alternative to race and as contributing to the American way of life in terms of cultural and economic diversity;[8] in this vein, Alex Haley's odyssey to his roots

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in Africa was justly hailed as reflecting the pride and dignity of ethnic consciousness.[9] But this benevolent image of ethnicity turned sour in the present decade: linked by association with nationalism, it was soon treated as a powerful force for intergroup conflict, capable of unleashing chaos in all regions of the world, as echoed in the title of Moynihan's later study of ethnicity's dark side.[10]

Yet, as Donald Horowitz has made abundantly clear,[11] if we treat secessionism to mean the endeavor of an ethnic group to break away from an existing state to set up its own, and irredentism as one state seeking to take away from another state an ethnic territorial part of the latter to add to its own, then the record of recent decades shows that irredentist movements have scarcely happened and that secessionist movements, while more numerous, have scarcely succeeded. This is particularly true if the secession movement takes place within Western democracies, whether they opt for bullets (as in the case of Corsica and the Basque country) or, as more likely, for ballots (as in the case of Quebec, Scotland, and Wales).[12] Even in former colonies where ethnic groups were separated from traditional homelands by artificial boundaries, Eritrea ought to be seen as an exception; the rule is that separatist movements (which have had greater recourse to available bullets than unavailable ballots) have not generally fared well in establishing their independence. In the main, then, in Europe and North America, ethnic tensions—whether involving the Russian-speaking minorities of Estonia, Latvia, and Moldova; or the Hungarian minorities in Slovakia and Romania; or Flemish and Walloons in Belgium; or Catalans and Basques in Spain; or even the complex ethnic *macédoine* in the Balkans, and perhaps most so in Macedonia[13]—have not erupted (so far) in feared domestic wars leading to interstate conflict. And for the "old modern" nations of Western Europe, survey data and public-opinion studies show that for various indicators, such as a feeling of national pride, a degree of confidence in one's national army, and a willingness to fight for one's country, there has seemingly been an erosion of a traditional nationalism, which has been replaced with the value of individualism.[14]

In mentioning this, I do not intend to go to the extreme of reducing the forces of nationalism and fundamentalism to present-day chimeras. A century that has witnessed the catastrophes of the Armenian Genocide and the Holocaust as well as other violent

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forms of state repression and attempted elimination of populations can never dismiss the possible utilization of nationalism and religious extremism for malefic ends.[15] But it would be simplistic to reduce these forces to atavistic or recessive traits of modern societies that will be eliminated with proper "cultural gene therapy," such as formal education, or that will shrivel in the broader process of globalization.

Intellectuals have contributed greatly, if unevenly, to both our knowledge about and our images of nationalism. It is no exaggeration to say that the many facets of nationalism and its ties to other sectors of modernity (e.g., democracy, economic development, even sexuality[16]) have in recent years become an academic growth industry, one that has witnessed the use of empirical, analytical, comparative, and interpretive approaches by various disciplines in the social sciences and the humanities to provide new vistas in a field that was formerly the monopoly of historians.[17]

The nexus of nationalism and historians as constructors of the ideas regarding the nation and national identity is worth noting.[18] Prominent historians in the nineteenth century, such as Michelet in France, Bancroft in the United States, Macaulay in Great Britain, and Treitschke in Germany, wrote what they saw as a new scholarship in historiography, yet their histories extolled the reality of the emergence of their respective nations on the world scene. Implicitly if not explicitly, the coming into being of the modern nation-state with its claims of legitimation was the glorious apotheosis of a long historical process.

The cultural historian Ernest Renan delivered a lecture at the Sorbonne in 1882 that, while slender in comparison to the voluminous national studies of his contemporaries, is perhaps the most seminal essay in nationalist studies.[19] His fundamental question, "What is a Nation?" reflects the fact that at the beginning of the Third Republic the national identity of France did not have a general consensus, especially between factions of the Left and the Right; the "project of the French Revolution" remained unachieved and still divisive. Renan's approach was, in effect, that of a responsible intellectual seeking to provide the grounds for such a consensus. As Charles Taylor has recently noted, Renan lucidly outlined what sets the modern nation apart from all other types of historical communities and, in particular, the fusion and homogenization

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of heterogeneous populations sharing culture and history in common, sharing not only a common past with its glory (and hardships) but also a common anticipated future.[18] After bringing out objective as well subjective components (including sentiments), Renan articulated a key voluntaristic principle in proposing that, ultimately, the modern nation rests on being "a daily plebiscite" that vindicates the collective will to be together and to do things together.[20]

"Daily plebiscite" may sound strange to our ears, but Renan may well have been ahead of his time, for the unity and fixity of the nation-state that is so familiar cannot be taken for granted, neither in 1882 nor in 1997. They are subject to everyday affirmations (or rejections) of the identity of the democratic national state, to everyday inconspicuous "banal nationalism," utilizing not the "florid language of blood-myths" but "prosaic, routine words, which take nations for granted, and which in so doing, enhabit them."[21] Still, formal plebiscites *have* been held as referenda regarding demands for greater autonomy in Quebec, Wales, and Scotland in the past twenty years; that these did not result in an affirmative vote does not mean that the underlying dissatisfaction regarding the present state arrangement is therefore shelved once and for all. Devolution of the unitary state continues to be an issue in Scotland, as much in 1997 as it was in 1979, and the defeat of the nationalist referendum in Quebec in 1980 was nearly reversed in the referendum of 1995, after the return of the Parti Québécois to provincial power.

If in general the historians of the last century were advocates of nationalism, that is, of the triumph of the modern nation-state coming out as a monarch butterfly from the cocoon of history, those of our own century have tended to take another stance. This has been explored at length by an eminent authority on nationalism, British sociologist A. D. Smith, who notes that "the history of nationalism is as much a history of its interlocutors as the ideology and movement itself."[22] A perspective common to many historians (and various other social scientists) is, first, a "skepticism and even hostility" that "emphasizes the inherently absurd and destructive tendencies of nationalism."[23] In stressing the destabilizing aspect of nationalism, historians have underplayed constructive processes of nation-formation and the unification of groups into larger com-

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munities, as much by cultural means as by force. A second underlying attitude of such historians (and like-minded scholars), argues Smith, is to view nations as "artificial communities with largely fabricated ties." It is relevant to focus on this point a little longer.

The theme of the "invention of tradition" was proposed some years ago in an influential volume edited by Hobsbawm and Ranger.[24] Many national/ethnic customs and practices that are portrayed today as having their genesis in the hallowed "tradition" of ancient times (thereby gaining authority) may in fact be creations of the recent past; the function of this historical reconstruction (which may be viewed from an iconoclastic perspective as myth-making) is that it may be particularly crucial in legitimating rule. Coincidentally, during the same year of publication as *The Invention of Tradition,* two works on nationalism appeared that have become staples of nationalist studies in the past two decades: Gellner's *Nations and Nationalism* and Anderson's *Imagined Communities.*[25] The two approaches are complementary and related to the general theme of the invention of the nation.

Gellner argued from what may be considered a liberal functionalist perspective: the demands of socioeconomic modernization in the last century under the aegis of the state made for a functional requirement of a more homogenized population with the skills, including literacy, necessary to provide labor force efficiency and cultural talent to the unfolding industrial urban order. Socioeconomic development as the ultimate moving force of modernity is served by nationalism, which brings forth cultural nationhood; it is a sort of Platonic myth necessary for the integration of the republic. The instrumental role of nationalism in modernity makes it a useful bit player.

The events of the late 1980s and early 1990s led Gellner to modify his views without drastically altering his thesis of the modernity of nationalism. Visiting the Soviet Union in 1990—in retrospect, its dying days—Gellner noted the vitality and diversity of renascent nationalism and wondered whether "the genie of nationalism" now unleashed by *perestroika* could breathe new life into the civil society destroyed by Stalin and his heirs.[26] Five years later, he penned one of his last reflections on nationalism, one informed by troublesome developments regarding foreign immigrants in both Western and Eastern Europe; while holding to his

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earlier tenet of the modernity of nationalism resulting from a loosening of social structure and a call for a new educationally transmitted and standardized culture, Gellner came to see it in a more cautious, if not apprehensive, vein. In our period of transition, whether in the wake of the collapse of totalitarian systems in the East, or with the "large immigrant foreign labor communities in which the melting pot situation does not work" of the West, nationalism through the appeal both of ethnic feeling and of providing a "path back to order" may entice "otherwise moderate and restrained persons."[27] Entice them to what? To xenophobia, "normally a controllable foible," inasmuch as dislike of the "other" is a ubiquitous phenomenon.[28]

Essentially, I would suggest that Gellner saw nationalism as a "wild card" of modernity, since in some circumstances—such as transition and changes in social structure—nationalism can become interactive with another general social factor and produce a much greater, even if destructive, impact than in a more "normal" or stable state of society. However, and I will return to this in my conclusion, Gellner failed to consider that the "wild card" might also become interactive with other factors that, when combined, may lead to very productive and enhancing, rather than destructive, outcomes.

Instead of taking a Western European, post–French Revolution, nineteenth-century locale as its matrix (an instance of "Eurocentrism" that today might not be fashionable), Benedict Anderson boldly pushed the seedbed of modern nationalism further back in time and space. His "minor thesis," so to speak, is that nationalism originated not in the metropole but in the colonies, especially in the West Indies and essentially in the form of Creole resistance to Western hegemony. However, Anderson's major contribution is viewed as getting to the heart of the matter of modern nationalism or, if not the heart, at least the original ground. Related to the "invention of tradition" theme, *Imagined Communities* provides an account of nationalism that rests upon print capitalism, which permitted readers to "imagine" themselves as part of a community larger than the small, everyday, face-to-face community. Implicit in Anderson's analysis, then, is the idea that the nation is the cognitive creation of literary and other cultural elites cum resistance leaders. One can readily extend forward the frame of

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Anderson's appealing interpretation, since in our century the "imagined community" has been facilitated even more by a new mass media supplementing the pamphlets of the eighteenth century, for example, by the "fireside chats" of radio ("My fellow Americans. . . ," which made the listener identify with a national community of millions), by television, or through the emergent global communities of the Internet.

Viewing "nation" and "ethnicity" as artificial constructs, as invented social myths that function in the creation and maintenance of power or in the attempted seizure of power, particularly in capitalist societies, has long been part of the Marxist intellectual perspective and its emphasis on social class as the real determinant of social structure. On the contemporary scene, in a vein similar to Hobsbawm and Anderson, Wallerstein and Balibar presented, the year before the implosion of the Soviet empire, a perspective representative of Western Marxist intellectuals.[29] Looking at constructs of "peoplehood," Wallerstein rejects any primordial basis for race, nation, or ethnicity while acknowledging their reality in "people-based activity." "We can never do away with peoplehood in this system [of the capitalist world-economy] nor relegate it to a minor role. On the other hand, we must not be bemused by the virtues ascribed to it, or we shall be betrayed by the ways in which it legitimates the existing system."[30]

Similarly, Balibar rejects arguments (such as those advanced by A. D. Smith[31]) that modern nations have a long historical past in an ethnic core. Viewing the existence of any national community as imaginary, in the sense of being "the projection of individual existence into the weft of a collective narrative," Balibar denies the capability of a modern nation to do away with class conflicts, "however egalitarian it may be." From the Marxist perspective, the nation-state's appeal to its national community rests on "fictive ethnicity," a social myth he views as indispensable to the idealization of nationhood that would otherwise "appear precisely only as an idea or an arbitrary abstraction."[32]

The sweep of nationalist movements in Eastern Europe during the year following the analysis of Wallerstein and Balibar appears to have made Marxist intellectuals think twice about regarding nationalism as a force to be reckoned with for altering the course of history, especially the history of the future. But the basic accep-

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tance of the inevitability of socialism, of "true socialism," is still today the prism through which these intellectuals view nationalism. In a recent article discussing emergent global environmental degradation ("ecocide"), Marxist historian W. Warren Wagar acknowledges the error of socialism in this century in failing to come to grips with nationalism, in making compromises with the capitalist system buttressed by nationalism, or, worse, in making accommodations with nationalism.[33] The accommodations for Wagar include those of wartime patriotism (betraying the true interest of the working class), national socialism, fascism, colonialism, and Soviet socialism (which erred in anchoring a classless society in one country, and in a largely Permian society at that). Agreeing with Hobsbawm that "Marxists as such are not nationalists" (an understatement, if anything) and that the robust appearance of nationalism today is deceiving, whether it is of the nation-state or of alternative nationalism (e.g., ethnic nationalism), Wagar's major prescription for understanding nationalism seems to be for socialism to reject all alliances with nationalism and the national state system. In looking ahead to the coming century, he states that "the key to effecting a transition from capitalism to socialism is a thorough understanding and a complete transcendence of nationalism."[34]

Marxist intellectuals, it seems, are hard put to understand and probably do not care to understand why and how nationalism has a greater appeal to non-intellectuals, including the working class, than the utopian model of a classless (and nationless) world. It is a riddle that socialists in this century have had to confront,[35] not only in 1989 (and in Poland ten years earlier) when the working class turned its back on Soviet socialism, but even earlier, when workers in France and Germany in 1914 turned their back on the pledges that the Second International advanced: that in case of war between capitalist powers, the proletariat in the warring states would not join the war effort. Instead, in the case of France, President Poincaré's call for a "*union sacrée*" of national unity, coming right after the funerals of assassinated socialist leader Jean Jaurès, was immediately met with enthusiasm from the Left, the Center, and the Right, including French socialists.[36] What this seems to suggest, then, is that the ties to a national community take priority in a crisis situation over the ties of economic interest.

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Perhaps what intellectuals of all stripes should accept as a starting point is the reality of nationhood as a basis of identity that cross-cuts not only educational and occupational level but also age, gender, race, and, in most cases, ethnicity. How these interrelated ties become activated in some but not all circumstances is an important research theme that has received too little attention.

Although we will consider in a later section what religion brings to bear on nationalism, it is only fair to note here in passing that there are instances of nationalism "trumping" religion. Returning again to World War I, German and French Catholics in that setting fought each other as savagely as did German and French industrial workers, and when an anguished Pope Benedict XV in 1917 offered his services to halt the bloodshed, a French clergyman rebuked him, saying: "Holy Father, we do not need your peace."[37]

* * *

If intellectuals, and particularly historians, have generally contributed significantly to the negative public image of nationalism, note should also be taken of other intellectuals who have provided us in recent years with a more balanced and even favorable depiction of nationalism and modernity. Broadly speaking, in contrast to those intellectuals who fear nationalism as an ideology that can wreak havoc on democracy, there is a contrasting orientation that sees nationalism as a discourse upholding a democratic order.

Within the latter group are intellectuals who take up the cudgels of the nation, where the nation is in the "periphery" as a specific territory with a distinctive culture engulfed in a nation-state not of its choosing. These intellectuals do not use a political rhetoric that appeals to the emotions but rather express the case for the periphery's claim to autonomy and national independence from what is perceived as a stifling, nondemocratic state. Representative of such voices are John Osmond and Gwynfor Evans in Wales, Ander Gurrutxaga in the Basque Country, and Fernand Dumont in Quebec.[38] In contrast to the view of Conor Cruise O'Brien that nationalism, once released by democratic movements, turns against the multinational polity so that "in each nationality that is struggling to emerge, aroused nationalism is intolerant of dissent, especially

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the dissent of local ethnic minorities,"[39] what one hears in the voices from the periphery is the assertion that a democratic society, responsible for the cultural and economic welfare of its people, can only come about with the liberation of the nation from the bureaucratic, impersonal state. And in the process, these proponents of the nation—of the nation that may be said to be *in* the nation-state but not *of* the nation-state—reject the treatment of nation as an "invention." Thus, Catalan sociologist Josep Lobera underscores the "materiality" of culture as the basis of Catalan national identity.[40] By that he means that a "subordinated nation," encapsulated within the victorious nation-state, maintains its cultural national identity via numerous forms and levels of resistance: at the family level, where the native language and traditional songs, games, and sayings are passed on in the socialization of new generations; at the community level, where civil society is maintained under the umbrella of literary organizations, choral societies, and church groups; and lastly, in political forms of underground activity, including illicit parties. In following the trail of Renan and Anderson that the nation is a historical narrative, and that historical memory—what is remembered and what is forgotten—plays a crucial role in the building of national identity, Lobera introduces an important caveat that applies across the board to authoritarian and liberal societies:

> The Renan-Anderson equation seems to forget that there may be more than one memory in action; that multinational states that engage in historical reconstruction, with a view to homogenizing a given population with a dominant national culture and language, may have to compete with alternative ethno-national visions—even if the latter may tend to project a weaker light.[41]

There are also intellectuals whose analysis underscores the contributions to the *nation*-state as a "center" of the democratic tradition of modernity. Edward Shils turned his sociological gaze to the bearing of nationhood on civil society in one of his last essays. His concise theoretical discussion of the nation and its grounds in voluntary associations and sacred territoriality merits an entire section, but for the sake of brevity, I want to highlight two different points that he makes.

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First, while noting that the most prominent cause of nationalism today is the presence of "subordinated" nations within a national state dominated by a major nation, Shils sees a functional need for the latter because nationhood is what sustains civil society; in his words, "Civil society is one of the institutional manifestations of the nation."[42] In democracies resting on a contractual order, the national self-consciousness of most members of a civil society is a prerequisite for that order, and destroying the idea of the dominant nation is "tantamount to the destruction of civil society."[43] That, in turn, Shils argues, would be damaging to the lesser nations within the nation-state who are protected by civil society from warring with each other. Nationhood, or national self-consciousness, is not to be derided, since this is the hub of citizenship. But Shils is aware of the fragility of national self-consciousness and of civil society. The idea of the dominant nation and the national spirit can decline and even be destroyed in a number of ways: by the nationalisms of the nations of subordinate status within the nation-state, by groups that have never been nations, and by "multiculturalism" as it is now unfolding in the American educational system. The last, whatever its intention, is an effective way of destroying the national spirit and the nation as a unity.

Second, Shils touches on one of the deepest emotional sources of nationalist mobilization: the defense of the nation's territory. How do we account for the way that what is instrumental in routine daily activity has become sacred—worthy of the most extreme sacrifices of property and lives? That, Shils suggests, is a riddle of nationalism whose explanation lies beyond rational utilitarian explanations.

Let me interpose here that rational-choice theory—a form of utilitarianism stressing that social actors act in order to seek the maximization of utility—has become a very widely used perspective in the social sciences in the past ten to fifteen years, with many variations on this basic theme; it has followers among those who have dealt with (ethno)nationalism.[44] Shils's critique is shared by various other observers of nationalism who find that, in the movements they study, rational-choice theory, or similar perspectives giving primacy to material interests, while plausible in the abstract, does not hold up in key instances. The deep emotional bond that attaches people to their national community—whether that of

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the dominant nation or that of a "submerged" nation—frequently overrides economic considerations of self-interest. Stern illustrates with numerous instances the example of individuals adopting the identity of a conquering power or dominant nation, of minority groups and industrial workers giving unquestioning support to the war effort.[45]

Neither Shils nor other critics of rational-choice theory are opting for an irrationalist perspective on nationalism or any other of the social phenomena that bring into play collective identities. Indeed, a promising trend in studies of nationalism in recent years has been the interpretation and analysis of the multiple facets of nationalism as a rational feature—or as a set of features—of modernity. In some instances, economic rationality may be a major factor in the appeal of nationalism; in other instances, there are psychological, political, cultural, and historical factors that have equal or greater weight. No single equation can be formulated to predict how these factors will figure in a given situation—there is a sort of "uncertainty principle" that operates not only when actors are faced with the choice of nationalism as a call for action, entailing uncertainty about rewards and benefits, but also when actors may be faced with a choice between competing nationalisms, such as the nationalistic appeal of the nation-state and that of a minority nation, or the nationalism of the secular state and fundamentalism, expressing the nationalism of the religious nation.

To conclude this discussion of intellectuals as cardinal interlocutors of nation and nationalism, two contemporary French scholars provide additional perspectives worth noting. Dominique Schnapper has provided within the frame of the nation-state perhaps the most extensive recent sociological attention to the idea of the nation.[46] Her analysis is essentially a liberal vindication of the nation-state at a time of crisis for its legitimacy, arising from, on the one hand, the Left's condemnations of the capitalist state and, on the other, protest from the Right over the issue of foreign immigration threatening employment of the indigenous population and the cultural identity of the nation. Structurally, I would add, this is a situation familiar to most other Western countries.

Standing on the shoulders of Durkheim, Weber, Mauss, and Elias, Schnapper sees the idea of the nation as a "specific form of

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political organization" originating in Europe, one that through the actions of the state concretized the abstract notion of nation into a real "community of citizens."[47] The democratic nation, she asserts, belongs to a political rational order that depends on the voluntary consent of its citizens, an order having many elements from the religious sphere.[48] Rejecting a dichotomization of nations as being grounded either in ties of ethnicity and having restricted bases of citizenship (*jus sanguinis*) or grounded in political-territorial ties and having universal bases of citizenship (*jus soli*), Schnapper sees the modern nation as having a fundamental cultural and political dualism: it is both an ethnic entity, brought about by the state and its national institutions, and also a civic entity, a community of free and equal citizens. The melding of the two, she indicates, is what Talcott Parsons intended by the notion of a "societal community" of citizens who are politically organized, who share a common cultural tradition, transmitted from generation to generation in the process of socialization.[49]

Schnapper is well aware that all is not well with the nation-state today: cultural and economic sovereignty are becoming curtailed with regionalization (e.g., the European Union and its push for a single currency by 2002) and globalization; internally, civic ties of solidarity are becoming weaker and more utilitarian, and (regional) ethnic particularism is making greater claims on individuals. Caught in this vise, the future of the nation—that underanalyzed component of the nation-state—is no longer assured. In a perspective very similar to that of Shils, Schnapper sees present trends as calling into question the survival of the democratic nation, which functions as an instrument of social cohesion and the basis of civil society.

In passing, it is worthwhile to note that her concern to recover the sense of the nation-state as a *civic nation,* and with it a renewed sense of the obligations and responsibilities of citizenship, is shared on this side of the Atlantic by others in the liberal tradition (witness recent writings by Hollinger and Bellah).[50] Among these French and American intellectuals, I would suggest, the feeling of a fin-de-siècle *malaise* is less about the danger of a far-right nationalism than about the collapse of the national center—not the administrative center, but that of the nation qua societal community, which is the sine qua non of feelings of unity.

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This foreboding frames Schnapper's criticism of social science for neglecting to make "nation" or "national solidarity" central to collective identity, bypassing it in favor of "class" or "economic" interests or, more recently, subnational ethnicity. I share her sentiment that we will not advance our understanding of nationalism unless we include national identification in our models of the socialization process of the self. What is crucial, and what has been neglected by the social sciences, is the internalization of national feeling ("*les modes d'intériorisation du sentiment national*").[51] How is it that in the socialization process of the family and other primary groups (such as the school, the neighborhood, and the peer group), the person develops the same sentiments of belonging to and participating in something larger on which the nation depends? From this inquiry we are able to ponder more troublesome questions: does the socialization process in democratic societies today fail to provide for, or may indeed be antithetical to, the self developing a national identity? Can it be that in its desire to make room for everyone, for every particularism, the postwelfare national state has set aside the idea of the nation? For some, that may not seem to be a matter of much concern, but if following Schnapper (and Shils) we take the idea of nation as an integral and not peripheral aspect of national development, as a primary basis of a political and adoptive kinship tie, it is incumbent on the social sciences to redirect attention to the nation as a locus of modernity.

A complementary French perspective, much in agreement with Schnapper, is provided by Julia Kristeva. Her analysis of nation and nationalism is enriched by her training in semiology and psychoanalysis as well as her firsthand familiarity with the dilemma of a nation-state confronted by the cultural heterogeneity of new immigrants—a situation facing all industrial, economically developed countries. She rejects the claims of the Left, which run down the idea of the nation by asserting that "nationalism" inevitably leads to an imposition of racist values; she also objects to the Right and the Far Right, who view foreigners simply as economic cogs, an economic hindrance, devoid of values that are likely to augment the national culture. Kristeva sees "nation" as a positive dynamic entity, a legal and political pact between free and equal individuals in the tradition of Montesquieu's *esprit général.* In her

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view, "nation" is not a finished product but a political project anticipated by the French Enlightenment, whose arrangement still has to be worked out, that needs to provide for the right of foreigners to participate in this contractual, transitional, and cultural nation.[52]

Adducing a psychoanalytical perspective, she sees national pride as comparable to the "good narcissistic image" the child initially internalizes from the mother, which is then elaborated into an ego ideal. Starting from that premise, Kristeva proposes a mutual enhancement of the national culture: immigrants should be grateful to the welcoming host, and the host should welcome the contributions of each immigrant community. To upgrade Renan's observation that historical memory is selective, the national memory should be reassessed to bring to consciousness the (repressed) historical components that have been buried or forgotten, in reality or in imagination; the nation called for by today's *esprit général* is one where one stratum does not dominate another.[53] The paramount function of the nation in Kristeva's analysis is to inspire pride in individuals and groups, to serve as a sort of halfway house in the historically unfolding process toward a broader international economic and political setting. This conception of the democratic nation—enlarging its citizenry and its cultural base, even as history is moving on to another phase of modernity—is for Kristeva a justifiable nationalism, a meaningful alternative to "the wounded, therefore aggressive nationalism of Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean."[54]

It may be noted in passing that Kristeva's perspective is congruent with Michael Lind's recent espousal of "liberal nationalism" for the United States, which argues for a new phase of the republican idea of the national community germinated in the Enlightenment. Going beyond the "melting pot" and also beyond the racial and gender quota attempts at integration, Lind proposes a new "liberal nationalism" as a policy for a "Trans-American" people that will be politically and culturally of the same national community.[55] In recognition of the growing cultural and demographic hybridization of the American population, Lind argues that there is a newly emergent transracial nation, which should be best thought of as "a predominantly theist nation with a secular government and a nonsectarian ethic of civic familism."[56] This "civic familism"

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is Lind's proposal for a communal morality that, like the population, is a hybrid—not the libertarian ethic so influential today nor the conservative ethic that praises the traditional nuclear family—but one suited to a strengthened middle class that is increasingly culturally heterogeneous. The contents of that morality and the vehicles for its propagation are nebulous, but the search for such an ethic echoes a sociological concern that stretches back to Durkheim, at the beginning of the century, and to Levine more recently.[57]

NATIONALISM AND RELIGION: ANOTHER LOOK

The increased scholarly attention given to nationalism and fundamentalism reflects their powerful and rather unexpected attraction as levers of political change in the post–Cold War era. The themes are not always characterized by dispassionate, disinterested analysis; they reflect a broad normative spectrum of perspectives, touching on certain of the enigmas of twentieth-century modernity: Why have these phenomena returned on the scene, in both "backward" and "advanced" societies? How long is their return likely to last? What gives them their potency to mobilize populations, even when this entails social action where short-term costs may far outweigh benefits?

Whatever solution we attempt for these and related questions, and several such abound in the scholarly literature, it seems to me more opportune to raise questions about the nature of the central paradigm of modernity that has held sway in the social sciences. Let me refer to it as "the paradigm of progress," where progress is seen as the improvement of the human condition through economic, technological, political, and intellectual development; these advances transform society irreversibly from a "traditional" base of custom and hierarchy, marked by inequality, to a more humane, rational, and egalitarian social (if not world) order. This characterization applies to both liberal and socialist versions. Various icons of the social sciences have contributed to this paradigm, which has been for a very long time the matrix of more specific theoretical, empirical, and normative models.

It would be beside the point to go over these. However, it is germane to point out lacunae in the paradigm or, to use a market

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analogy, to note that it is "overweighted" in certain sectors (such as rationalization, differentiation, and economic development) and "underweighted" in others (affect, integration, and nationhood development). This shows up in studies of "development," in "national development" and "nation-building," where the development (and therefore the problematic element) of the nation as a dynamic societal community is either omitted or barely touched on.[58]

What are the origins of this paradigm of modernity? We may trace its genealogy to the nineteenth century—at the end of the century, when the institutionalization of the social sciences occurred in France, Germany, and the United States at the zenith of the Victorian industrial order, or at the beginning of the century, when the great formulators of social science (Ricardo, Saint-Simon, Marx, Comte) provided early channels of reflexivity regarding the parameters of the emergent modern social order. By the end of the century, so goes this image of modernity, the rationalization of the world, the unification of the nation-state, and the expectation of the transformation of the world (through evolution for the liberal spirit, through revolution for the radical) into a cornucopia of abundance had been put into place as major fixtures. In retrospect, it was over the course of the long Victorian age, spanning two full generations, that emotions and feelings seemed to be banished from the public sphere and "secularization" became the attendant of the new industrial-knowledge society.[59]

Contemporary interlocutors of modernity do not, however, fixate on the nineteenth century, nor even on Baudelaire's coinage at mid-century of "the modern" to indicate the age's new quality of evanescence, with its acceptance by the general educated public. The eighteenth century is generally taken as the privileged (or, for some postmodern critics, the wretched) locale of modernity, with two interrelated foci: the Enlightenment and the French Revolution. The former is stressed as the seedbed of the emancipatory introduction of rationality and scientific inquiry, with the inherited or revealed wisdom of the past being rejected; the latter is seen as the cradle of nationalism, with the coming into being of the nation-state, born in the symbolic tearing down of the *ancien régime* at the Bastille, the military triumph of a people's army at Valmy, defending the homeland against the forces of the old

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European order, and the symbolic renaming of the Place du Trône as the Place de la Nation.

While on the whole this eighteenth-century emphasis is accepted—even Anderson's privileging of Creole nationalism takes the eighteenth century as the crucial "takeoff" period of modern nationalism—not all scholars find the origins of modernity and nationalism in that period. Stephen Toulmin, for example, emphasizes the importance of the seventeenth century, with Cartesian rational calculation being seen as a paramount quality of the human species, with a corresponding downgrading of the life of the emotions for the newly-educated elites. A new spirit of internationalism was the dream of both Leibniz and Newton, hoping for the reconstruction of Europe after the Thirty Years' War.[60] Liah Greenfeld has moved the genesis of modern nationalism back to the sixteenth century, recognizing in the social transformations of Tudor England a new meaning for the concept of "nation" replacing the medieval designation of "nation" applied to the place of origin of foreign students at the Sorbonne. "Nation" entered into discourse, Greenfeld argues, by a new elite—a new postfeudal, heterogeneous, mobile aristocracy in search of legitimation and greater voice in the political process.[61] Nation, in providing this legitimation, gave rise to the idea of the entire English population participating on an equal footing in the well-being of a commonwealth, a sentiment that was to crystallize ultimately in the democratic egalitarian idea of modernity.[62]

These accounts, while not inconsistent with one another, are incomplete, particularly in not providing for an image of modernity that makes room for the interplay between religion and nationalism on the one hand with the emotions on the other. A crucial confluence of the continental rational universalistic orientation and the British egalitarian emphasis on the nation as an entire people of equal standing found expression in l'Abbé Sieyès, a "red priest" of the Revolution about whom the literary critic Sainte-Beuve said, "He was the first clearly to conceive and invent. . .the new order that was to replace the old one."[63] One of his more tangible legacies is the administrative modernization of France into departments, providing for the uniform enactment of legislation, but of greater significance, perhaps, is his publication *What is the Third Estate?,* the first great tract of modern political

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thought, written on the eve of the Revolution. Renan's "What is a Nation?," written a century later, is an echo of Sieyès, a sort of halfway house between those of us trying to make sense of nationalism in the nineteenth century and the clergyman who rejected his place in the First Estate, scorned the members of the Second, and threw his lot in with the Third. Though the Third may have lacked property and status in the old order, it was privileged above the others because it represented the most numerous segment of France's population. The Third Estate qua nation was a historically emergent reality—that of a new political union of self-determining individuals, a civic and economic union; it was the basis of constituent power, a totality of private works and public functions.[64]

What is intriguing above all in *What is the Third Estate?* is that the modern idea of nation is "the political appropriation of a theological concept," as Heinrich Schneider has pointed out.[65] The revolutionary clerical ascribed traditional attributes of God to the "nation"—being from the beginning, the quality of the *causa prima,* omnipotence, all goodness—and behind the secularized Catholic was the secularized Calvinist Rousseau, whose famous "volonté générale" was an adaptation of what in religious parlance was referred to as "the will of God." Perhaps a summary statement might be that Sieyès "reinvented" or modernized an old expression of popular sovereignty that had been dormant for centuries: *vox populi, vox Dei.*

A few years into the Revolution, the revolutionaries on both sides of the Atlantic, sharing a common anchor in the Enlightenment and its Masonic heritage, supplemented the deification of the nation and its feminized guardian angels (such as Liberty) with various national cults and festivals designed to arouse popular sentiment, generating enthusiasm for the new national order.[66] And the sentiments mobilized could either be actualized as ritual reenactments of the Revolution or as a new *levée en masse* against an oppressive regime, with the revolutionary faith manifesting itself throughout the nineteenth and much of the early twentieth century, aided by modernized rituals and symbols.[67]

In contrast to the prevailing belief that emotions and sentiments, like religion, withdrew from the public sphere into the private sphere, that both became thoroughly "domesticated" (or deliberately "feminized" in the sense of their being "womanly" affairs),

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another reading of the course of modernity is possible. Nationalism needs to be seen as providing new meaning to the concept of *communitas*, creating ties that not only provide great satisfaction to individuals but also exert obligations. This bonding in the nineteenth century and a good part of the twentieth was established through a complex of institutions: rituals, collective projects, and events ranging from renovated educational structures, universal military conscription, national holidays, anthems and marches, popular culture, and wars—civil wars, wars of imperial conquest, and wars of national liberation. The manifestation of sentiment and feeling in these undertakings, in their collective successes and failures, in their demonstrations of exuberance and sorrow, is an integral part of the story of modernity.

In the "old order," pre-1789 or pre-1776, the basic socioemotional ties were either those relating social actors to local communities (the family, the parish, the craft) or to the sovereign. A crucial transformation of modernity, then, was the formation of new solidarities and new institutional arrangements, the very complex commingling of "nation" and "state" in a new national culture, which was also a new political culture whose premise was the *kratos* of the *demos*, however imperfectly "people power" may have been actualized. One ought not to gloss over the fact that in this momentous transformation toward the democratization of sovereignty (a process that was aborted in several places in the West and elsewhere, and is still underway in some places) religion lost some of its traditional mooring as the First Estate (in the metaphorical sense as the institutionalized sector of legitimation of authority). But, by the same token, this permitted the basic religious impulse for salvation to become "deregulated," free to attach itself in the public sphere to social causes, whether the "national" cause or other democratic causes such as socialism, Zionism, antislavery, temperance, and suffrage reform. Just as it had been a priest, l'Abbé Sieyès, who had provided French nationalism with its first major advocate, so also one finds in various other historical and cultural settings clerics emerging as advocates and icons of national autonomy and independence, apostles of liberation of the nation from what later was termed the "colonial situation."

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Religion and nationalism have been interactive in myriad ways and settings,[68] not as delayed *reactions* to modernity, but as part of the complex processes of modernity, of which economic development, rationalization, and differentiation are important but not sole determinants of the dynamics of change. And nationalism in the present century has continued to be a major "wild card," interacting with religion as well as race and ethnicity, even in the economic sphere. In the case of East Asian societies, economic development and nationalism have been interactive and complementary: the unexpected catapulting of East Asian societies into the world economy as major players is an instance where nationalism has effectively been used in the mobilization of the population to achieve global competitiveness on a par with the former "developed world," where economic prowess has provided a new channel for expressing national pride and a determination to refuse to kowtow to the Western claim of possessing a universal model of development. This "new nationalism" is replacing or supplementing earlier forms of Asian nationalism, including, at least in the case of Japan, right-wing romantic and military nationalisms.[69]

It is not just in Asian societies that nationalism interacts with the economy. In the United States today "nationalism" tends to be somewhat muted in discourse; it creeps into public discussion through calls to "buy American," in political opposition to NAFTA, in tough trade negotiations where the American trade representative bangs on the doors of the European Union or Asia, telling them to open up to American goods or else face drastic retaliation.

Quite different is the mixing of nationalism with race and religion to provide the basis for a still unfolding racial consciousness of unity in people of African descent, a movement that goes back to Marcus Garvey, that has recently had a very dramatic mobilization in the "Million Man March" of Louis Farrakhan and a different cultural mobilization in the invention of "Kwanzaa" as an alternative to Christmas. As for ethnicity, Quebec's highly visible ethnic nationalism is not altogether absent in the United States. Although this domestic ethnic nationalism may not be at the same stage of development as that common to Canada, it is in evidence in Puerto Rico and Hawaii as well as in the Native American population.

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IN GUISE OF A CONCLUSION

At the century's end, the structural and cognitive transition to a new stage of modernity calls for a rethinking of some of the basic features of our world ordering processes. A hundred years ago, at the spectacular Paris World's Fair of 1900—perhaps, in retrospect, the zenith of a civilization committed to the idea of progress—the world's premier mathematician, David Hilbert, performed a great service to the field of mathematics in laying out a set of problems that summarized what was known and what was not known. In doing so, he gave modern mathematics a sense of unity and purpose in working out solutions to these remaining problems. Quite recently, Neil Smelser engaged in a somewhat similar stocktaking, seeking to identify a range of social problems that the world is likely to confront in the next century. His purpose was to clarify how social-science knowledge can contribute to the vast array of social problems that the next phase of modernity holds in store.

With proper caution, Smelser indicated that while we cannot predict with precision the social problems of the next century—though something may be said about their general character—social-scientific knowledge is relevant to these conditions if we acknowledge that "what is required is a serious revamping of our mode of understanding social problems and social policies that are responsive to them."[70] Among the emergent problems for the next century, Smelser anticipates an increasing incidence of social movements along *cultural* (especially racial-ethnic) lines, mobilized by a "neo-primordialism" that will challenge secular, liberal democratic governments. As to the conceptual revamping that will be necessary, Smelser argues that social problems must be rethought not as "simple empirical entities" but as a complex social process whose dynamics must be examined comparatively amidst changes in social structure, in cultural expectations, and in the intersection of these in their formulation as social problems by "moral entrepreneurs" who may emerge as political leaders.

Nationalism, fundamentalism, race, and ethnicity have in the post–Cold War era tended to be seen as intrastate problems; they are also global. Part of complex processes of change (economic, demographic, and technological) in which the "global" and the "local" intersect in a variety of encounters—encounters that well-

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intentioned liberals operating in the Enlightenment paradigm of progress believe will benefit all of mankind in the long run but that in the short run have significant cultural as well as economic costs—they must be seen as provoking certain "moral entrepreneurs," including leaders of new cultural movements, to redefine the situation as hostile to the welfare of their specific community. What is desperately needed is a comparative inventory that considers who listens to which moral entrepreneurs in a given national setting and what the various discourses are that are used at different times in different settings. The need for a sort of "genome project" to study nationalism, not only in the varieties of its manifestations (including those not publicly designated as such), but also in the variety of complex interactions between nationalism and other cultural factors able to mobilize collective identity such as religion, race, and ethnicity, is a proposal not often contemplated.

The new era of modernity is one in which every region and country is faced with redefining its collective identity in light of a host of internal and external factors. In some instances, the identity of the nation-state was based on an "imagined" homogeneity of the population that virtually ignored culturally different populations in the periphery or the inflows of external immigrants. In several of these societies, the problem of national identity is today compounded by a much greater rate of demographic increase in the "other" population than in the population that sees itself as the main builders of the nation-state. In other instances, a consequence of the Cold War's abrupt ending has been the establishment of autonomous nation-states where yesterday's ruling elites, like the colonizers of empires, find themselves to be ethnic minorities; but, unlike the colonials of the French or British empires, the metropole today is not in an economic condition to bring them home.[71]

The problem that stems from the unsettling of national and regional identity relates to a ubiquitous problem of *social trust* or, rather, the *mistrust* or *distrust* that populations feel toward their national institutions, authority in general, and ultimately toward "others" who are not close kin, albeit inhabitants of the same territory and nation-state. Not so long ago, it seems, mistrust or distrust was more prevalent between nations; today, it seems to be

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a more acute internal problem, even in countries that have a professed universalistic and democratic ethos.

Piotr Sztompka, a noted Polish sociologist, has analyzed this "culture of distrust" to be an unfortunate condition of East European society, inherited from the Soviet regime, and his analysis of Poland is congruent with Andorka's discussion of Hungary.[72] Although Poland and Hungary have had relative success in the economic transition to a market economy, and although both have a much greater degree of ethnic homogeneity than other Eastern European countries, a severe "syndrome of distrust" prevails as a legacy of the previous regime. In the communist regime, there was not only a high distrust of official pronouncements but also, at the everyday level, a distrust of others at work and of neighbors in apartment buildings, since "the other" might be an informer. As indicators of distrust today, Sztompka points to a high percentage of Polish citizens who would seriously consider emigrating, a rising number of abstentions in elections, generalized distrust in the future that spills over in economic terms into an unwillingness to save in one's own currency, distrust in public institutions (such as education, public safety, and medicine), and distrust of elected officials; about half of the population distrusts media such as television and newspapers. In analyzing what lies behind this extensive distrust, Sztompka argues that in the wake of the authoritarian and distrusted Soviet system, there is new economic uncertainty and anxiety over rising prices and growing unemployment. Also, brutal and untamed business conduct, increased danger of violent crimes against individuals, political scandals and corruption of local and high-placed officials, and, more generally, unfulfilled expectations and hopes for the new social order have all contributed to a general "culture of distrust." What Sztompka and Andorka report about Poland and Hungary is reflected also in violent protests in Serbia, Albania, and elsewhere. My own observations, though impressionistic, suggest that such distrust is today common in the Baltic and the Balkans. In Germany last May, I interviewed a group of thirty-three East German schoolteachers in the city of Neuruppin (Brandenburg). Only seven expressed trust in their local officials and believed that they were conscientiously seeking to improve conditions; only one (incidentally, born in West Germany) trusted the elected officials of the federal govern-

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ment. Many East German academics and professionals I met felt marginalized, like second-class citizens in their own land. While that condition may be unique to Germany, as a consequence of unification, the distrust of intellectuals towards the central government is an unfortunate feature of all of Eastern Europe.

Distrust is equally present in other regions in transition: Israelis and Palestinians in the "new Middle East," Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland. These are all too visible populations inhabiting the same territory, kept apart by a wall of mistrust. But the question of a lack of confidence and trust in "the other" is more general; it also applies to the Western democracies, though data from these countries indicate a strong positive correlation between "economic development and a psychological disposition to trust other people."[73] When a cross-national sample of individuals in European Union countries was asked whether they felt that they trusted various national and European institutions, including their national parliament and government, the European Parliament, and the European Commission, more respondents answered in the affirmative for each, but none received a majority. For their national governments, the percentage trusting (45 percent) was scarcely larger than the percentage who felt no such confidence (43 percent); for the national parliaments, 48 percent reported trust, while more than a third did not (38 percent).[74]

The decline of trust, accompanied by low levels of confidence in institutions, has become a conspicuous feature of the American scene since the 1960s. The student protest movement of those years introduced a distrust of authority that has continued to this day. Francis Fukuyama is only one of many alarmed by what they see as the erosion of trust, the diminished social capital that follows from this.[75] Banal evidence of this tendency may be found in the 1996 electoral campaign, not least when one candidate thought it proper to ask whether the public would trust the other candidate with its children. A more serious manifestation of distrust is to be found at the level of race relations, in the sharp cleavage between whites and blacks, manifested in reactions to the first O. J. Simpson trial and to the 1995 Million Man March.

A 1994 national survey, asking what confidence individuals felt in specific institutions, produced the following results:

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Level of Confidence in Various Institutions[76]

	Government (Executive Branch)	The Press	Congress	Major Companies
great deal of confidence	11%	10%	8%	25%
some confidence	51	49	50	61
hardly any confidence	35	39	39	10

While the private sector in the United States enjoys a greater level of confidence than the public sector, the overall level of trust in the leadership of the key institutions of the American democracy—the polity, the economy, and the media—is disturbingly low.

How are we to interpret such data? If trust is the basic foundation of interpersonal relations and institutional commitment in democratic societies, its absence or erosion is a grave matter, affecting the very fabric of civil society. How to (re)build or restore trust—in the "other," but also in the institutions of civil society in a period of transition when old national identities have lost their appeal to many segments of the population at the century's end—is a problem worthy of close attention by social scientists and policymakers in Eastern and Western Europe, in North America, Latin America, Asia, and Africa.

To some, nationalism (and/or fundamentalism) *is* the problem, or at least a major part of the problem of this time of transition. It is seen as the dark side of modernity, fomenting xenophobia and racism, limiting social cohesion to small pockets of mankind. But sentiments of nationhood and religion may also be part of the solution. Expressed in new forms, the "wild cards" may just possibly provide new bases of legitimation, new bases of societal integration and institutional arrangements in the public sphere appropriate to the coming century. The paradigm of modernity that omitted religion and nationalism from the equation is not up to the task of creating what Bill Moyers has perceptively seen as the need for a "new national vision" for America, one "that has the authority and power of a religious vision but that is inclusive, not sectarian." "We Americans," Moyers has said, "must debate what it means to be a nation."[77] The question is no less relevant for those who denominate themselves British, French, German,

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Japanese, Korean, Russian, Latvian, Swedish, or Mexican (and *ad infinitum*).

The social sciences, to the extent that they are able to offer new insights and new empirical findings into social cohesion in an effort to reestablish and restore trust at the interpersonal and institutional level, will be making a signal contribution to the study of the many faces of modernity. Such study must take account of the "wild cards" of nationhood and religion, recognizing their importance as bases and reservoirs for "inventing" new dimensions for societal inclusion and organization. If such a complex task is undertaken, the social sciences may yet have a chance to gain new relevance, seeking to make sense of the next leg of modernity.

ENDNOTES

[1]See the symposium on surprises in the *American Journal of Sociology* 100 (6) (1995).

[2]After all, had he been asked in 1497, how long would Erasmus have said his period of transition, which has been recognized by later historians as "the long sixteenth century," would last?

[3]Irving Kenneth Zola, "Shifting Boundaries: Doing Social Science in the 1990s—A Personal Odyssey," *Sociological Forum* 10 (1) (1995): 9.

[4]Harvey Cox, *The Secular City: Secularization and Urbanization in Theological Perspective* (New York: Macmillan, 1965), 2.

[5]E. J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*, 2d ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 191.

[6]Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Post-Communist Nationalism," *Foreign Affairs* 68 (5) (1989/1990): 25. I said "mainly right" because at the time, fearful that "the fading of communism" might lead to "the surfacing of belligerent nationalisms," Brzezinski was still hopeful that with Western encouragement the Soviet Union (then including the Baltic and Ukraine, among other countries) might be transformed into a "genuinely voluntary confederation or commonwealth." Ibid., 20.

[7]John Tierney, "The Optimists Are Right, So Why Do So Many People Think Things Are Going to Hell?" in "The Next Hundred Years, Looking Forward, Looking Back: A Centennial Issue," *New York Times Magazine*, 29 September 1996, 95.

[8]Nathan Glazer and Daniel Patrick Moynihan, eds., *Ethnicity: Theory and Experience* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975). For a lucid distinction of ethnicity, nationality, and race—which are frequently used with much overlap—see Neil J. Smelser, *Sociology* (Cambridge, Mass.: UNESCO/ Blackwell, 1994), 280–298.

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[9]Alex Haley, *Roots* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1976). One may note the more recent ethnic categorization of "African American" or "African-American" displacing in current usage the more racial categorization of "black."

[10]Daniel Patrick Moynihan, *Pandaemonium: Ethnicity in International Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).

[11]Donald L. Horowitz, "Irredentas and Secessions: Adjacent Phenomena, Neglected Connections," in Naomi Chazan, ed., *Irredentism and International Politics* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1991), 9–22.

[12]About the only relatively successful secessionist movement in the West has been that of the Jura breaking away from Bernese rule. See Jürg Steiner, *Amicable Agreement versus Majority Rule: Conflict Resolution in Switzerland* (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1974).

[13]Loring M. Danforth, *The Macedonian Conflict: Ethnic Nationalism in a Transnational World* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995).

[14]Mattei Dogan, "The Decline of Nationalisms within Western Europe," *Comparative Politics* (April 1994): 281–305. As I will discuss in another section, this decline is in the allegiance to the nation-state.

[15]At the same time, the imprint of recent genocides provides receptivity for the more intransigent Armenian and Israeli nationalisms in safeguarding Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh or settlers on the West Bank.

[16]Regarding the latter, see George L. Mosse, *Nationalism and Sexuality* (Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985) and Andrew Parker et al., eds., *Nationalisms and Sexualities* (New York and London: Routledge, 1992).

[17]For a lucid overview of major trends and approaches in the field of nationalist studies, see Craig Calhoun, "Nationalism and Ethnicity," *Annual Review of Sociology* 19 (1993): 211–239; John Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State,* 2d ed. (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 404–424.

[18]Maurice Pearton, "Notions in Nationalism," *Nations and Nationalism* 2 (1) (March 1996): 1–15.

[19]"Qu'est-ce qu'une Nation? What is a Nation?," introduction by Charles Taylor, trans. Wanda Romer Taylor (Toronto: Tapir Press, 1996; first published in French in 1887). That this new bilingual edition of a work stressing national unity is published in Canada and introduced by a philosopher at McGill University is indicative of its obvious relevance for a country having a major ethnic cleavage. But then, is it not as highly relevant south of the Canadian border?

[20]"Une nation. . .se résume. . .par un fait tangible: le consentement, le désir clairement exprimé de continuer la vie commune. L'existence d'une nation est. . .un plébiscite de tous les jours, comme l'existence de l'individu est une affirmation perpétuelle de vie." Ibid., 48.

[21]Michael Billig, *Banal Nationalism* (London: Sage, 1995), 93.

[22]Anthony D. Smith, "Nationalism and the Historians," *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 33 (1–2) (1992): 58–80.

[23]Ibid., 72.

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[24]Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

[25]Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983); Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso and New Left Books, 1983).

[26]Ernest Gellner, "Ethnicity and Faith in Eastern Europe," *Dædalus* 119 (1) (Winter 1990): 294.

[27]Ernest Gellner, "Nationalism and Xenophobia," in Bernd Baumgartl and Adrian Favell, eds., *New Xenophobia in Europe* (London: Kluwer Law International, 1995).

[28]Ibid., 9.

[29]Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein, *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities* (London and New York: Verso, 1991).

[30]Ibid., 84.

[31]A. D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1987).

[32]Balibar, "The Nation Form: History and Ideology," in Balibar and Wallerstein, *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities,* 96.

[33]W. Warren Wagar, "Socialism, Nationalism, and Ecocide," *Review* 19 (3) (1996): 319–333.

[34]Ibid., 322.

[35]An answer to the riddle may lie in a possibility that leftist intellectuals have overlooked, namely, that "the working class" *may be as much an imagined community as "the nation."* Socialism as the nineteenth century's organizing movement of industrial and trade union workers in various countries used meetings, congresses, songs, festivals, tracts, and pamphlets to generate a sense of a collective consciousness in much the same way as did nationalist movements. The use of print capitalism to generate an "imagined community," Anderson's basic thesis, applies equally to the use of the radical press in developing class consciousness in the English working class, as noted in E. P. Thompson's classic study, *The Making of the English Working Class* (New York: Pantheon/Random, 1964), 717–720.

[36]Raymond Poincaré, *L'Union Sacrée 1914,* vol. 4 of *Au Service de la France* (Paris: Plon, 1927). Poincaré noted that the simultaneous German invasion of Belgium and the funeral of the highly respected Jaurès produced strong emotions bringing together political leaders of the Far Right and the Far Left. Ibid., 543 ff.

[37]Victor Conzemius, "Universal Christian Faith and Nationalism," in John Coleman and Miklós Tomka, eds., *Religion and Nationalism* (London: SCM Press; Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis, 1995), 14–21.

[38]John Osmond, *Creative Conflict, The Politics of Welsh Devolution* (London and Boston, Mass.: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977); Gwynfor Evans, *A National Future for Wales* (Swansea: Plaid Cymru, 1975); Ander Gurrutxaga, *La Refundacion del Nacionalismo Vasco* (Erandio, Basque Country: Servicio Editorial de la Universidad del Pais Vasco, n.d.); Fernand Dumont, *The Vigil of*

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Quebec (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974) and Dumont, *Raisons Communes* (Montreal: Boréal, 1995).

[39]Conor Cruise O'Brien, "Nationalists and Democrats," *New York Review of Books,* 15 August 1991, 30.

[40]Josep R. Lobera, *The Role of Historical Memory in (Ethno)Nation-Building* (London: Goldsmiths Sociology Papers, University of London, 1996), 1.

[41]Ibid., 5.

[42]Edward A. Shils, "Nation, Nationality, Nationalism and Civil Society," *Nations and Nationalism* 1 (1) (1995): 111.

[43]Ibid., 118.

[44]The most ambitious sociological statement of rational-choice theory is James S. Coleman, *Foundations of Social Theory* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990); for a rational-choice account of ethnonationalism, see Margaret Levi and Michael Hechter, "A Rational Choice Approach to the Rise and Decline of Ethnoregional Political Parties," in Edward A. Tiryakian and Ronald Rogowski, eds., *New Nationalisms of the Developed West* (Boston, Mass.: Allen & Unwin, 1985), 128–146.

[45]For an extensive discussion, see Paul C. Stern, "Why Do People Sacrifice for Their Nations?" in John L. Comaroff and Paul C. Stern, eds., *Perspectives on Nationalism and War* (Australia: Gordon and Breach Publishers, 1995), 99–121.

[46]Dominique Schnapper, *La France de l'Intégration, Sociologie de la Nation en 1990* (Paris: Gallimard, 1991); Dominique Schnapper, *La Communauté des Citoyens. Sur l'idée moderne de la nation* (Paris: Gallimard, 1994).

[47]Schnapper, *La Communauté des citoyens,* 24.

[48]Ibid., 135.

[49]Ibid., 172.

[50]David A. Hollinger, *Postethnic America: Beyond Multiculturalism* (New York: Basic Books, 1995); Robert N. Bellah, "Community Properly Understood: A Defense of Democratic Communitarianism," *The Responsive Community* 6 (1) (Winter 1995/1996): 49–54.

[51]Schnapper, *La France de l'Intégration,* 26.

[52]Julia Kristeva, *Nations Without Nationalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 44.

[53]Ibid., 56–59.

[54]Ibid., 47.

[55]Michael Lind, *The Next American Nation* (New York: Free Press, 1995).

[56]Ibid., 285.

[57]Donald N. Levine, *Visions of the Sociological Tradition* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1995).

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[58]See, for example, Alejandro Portes, "On the Sociology of National Development: Theories and Issues," *American Journal of Sociology* 82 (1) (1976): 55–85; "A World to Make: Development in Perspective," *Dædalus* 118 (1) (Winter 1989).

[59]Owen Chadwick, *The Secularization of the European Mind* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1975).

[60]Stephen Toulmin, *Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity* (New York: Free Press, 1990).

[61]Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992), 47–49.

[62]Ibid., 50.

[63]Cited in Murray Forsyth, *Reason and Revolution: The Political Thought of the Abbé Sieyès* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1987), 3.

[64]For a full description of Sieyès on the nation, see ibid., 69–87.

[65]Heinrich Schneider, "Patriotism, Nationalism and the Duties of Citizens," in John Coleman and Miklós Tomka, *Religion and Nationalism* (London: SCM Press; Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis, 1995), 39.

[66]For Liberty in relation to the nascent French nation-state, see the classic study of Maurice Agulhon, *Marianne into Battle* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Paris: Editions de la Maison des Sciences de l'Homme, 1981).

[67]See the illuminating study of James H. Billington, *Fire in the Minds of Men: Origins of the Revolutionary Faith* (New York: Basic Books, 1980); also, though more limited to Germany, George L. Mosse, *The Nationalization of the Masses* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991). For a brief discussion of the nexus between the religious cults of the 1790s and Durkheim's own stress on a civil religion as necessary for the integration of secular society, see Edward A. Tiryakian, "Durkheim, Mathiez and the French Revolution," *European Journal of Sociology* 29 (1988): 373–396.

[68]Sabrina Ramet has formulated an interesting typology of the intersection of religious fervor and nationalist fervor, producing six types, two of which, "messianic" and "defiant," are most problematic in terms of ethnic conflict. See Sabrina P. Ramet, "The Serbian Church and the Serbian Nation," in S. P. Ramet and D. W. Treadgold, eds., *Render unto Caesar: The Religious Sphere in World Politics* (Washington, D.C.: The American University Press, 1995), 301. For a more general discussion, see John Kent, "Religion and Nationalism," in Sean Gill, Gavin D'Costa, and Ursula King, eds., *Religion in Europe, Contemporary Perspectives* (Kampen, Netherlands: Pharos, 1994), 170–187; Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, "Remaking the State: The Limits of the Fundamentalist Imagination," in Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, eds., *Fundamentalisms and the State* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 620–643.

[69]Shintaro Ishihara, *The Japan That Can Say No* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991); Harumi Befu, ed., *Cultural Nationalism in East Asia: Representation and Identity* (Berkeley, Calif.: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1993); "The New Nationalists," *The Economist,* 14 January 1995, 19–21.

[70]Neil J. Smelser, "Social Sciences and Social Problems: The Next Century," *International Sociology* 11 (3) (September 1996): 285.

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[71]Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

[72]Piotr Sztompka, "Trust and Emerging Democracy," *International Sociology* 11 (1) (March 1996): 37–62; Rudolf Andorka, "The Socialist System and its Collapse in Hungary: An Interpretation in Terms of Modernization Theory," *International Sociology* 8 (3) (September 1993): 317–337.

[73]Alex Inkeles, *National Character: A Psycho-Social Perspective* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1997), 319.

[74]*Eurobarometer* (Brussels) 44 (Spring 1996): 5.3.

[75]Francis Fukuyama, *Trust: The Social Virtues & the Creation of Prosperity* (New York: Free Press, 1995).

[76]Data calculated from James A. Davis and Tom W. Smith, *General Social Surveys, 1972–1994: Cumulative Codebook* (Chicago, Ill.: NORC-Roper, 1994), 162–165. "Do not know" and "no answer" responses are not shown.

[77]Bill Moyers, "America's Religious Mosaic," *USA Weekend,* 11–13 October 1996.

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A particularly striking irony in the political development of the postcommunist countries is that they began their passage towards democracy by hitching their wagons to an idealized vision of the West European star at the very time when that star was beginning to appear increasingly tarnished to the West Europeans. The East European definition of democracy was, in that sense, dependent on external models rather than being derived from their own political experience, even where that experience was hardly suited to the development of democratic principles. What the postcommunists launched was a successful delegitimation of communism by reference to an ideal vision of democracy; they then sought to transform their polities according to this visionary model. This was bound to fail, but it was neither an unworthy attempt nor was it unexpected, given the intellectual traditions and utopianism of the region. The West played a role in this, by its inability and lack of will to help the Central and East Europeans in their quest for a new democratic paradigm. That too was explicable by the slow crisis that Western Europe was itself experiencing as a result of the collapse of communism.

Europe was once again far more interdependent than it had been during the communist period. Not only were Central and Eastern Europe dependent on what the West would or would not do, but the West could hardly remain immune to developments further east. While ethnic cleansing, for example, was restricted to the former Yugoslavia, the proposition that unwelcome minorities should be eliminated wholesale was certain to find imitators in the West. While ironies abounded, the future of Europe as a whole was affected by an enormous sea change. The era beginning in 1989 had to be qualitatively different from the one that began in 1914.

George Schöpflin

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Charles Lindholm and John A. Hall

Is the United States Falling Apart?

A HOST OF BEST-SELLERS HAVE APPEARED in recent years complaining that the social fabric of the United States is unraveling.[1] What is at issue is not solely the insistent demands emanating from previously unheard-of entities, such as the "Queer Nation" and the "Nation of Islam," as well as from more familiar ethnic and religious groups. Rather, the "new groupism" rests on sophisticated philosophical attacks against the very notion of a common American culture. One such criticism argues that the American dream *had* content but that this content was so biased and limited, Waspish and racist, that there is no reason to lend it any credence.[2] Another view sees Anglo-Saxon culture in general and American culture in particular as *lacking* in content, being so individualist and atomist as to deny the way in which collectivities create compelling moral identities for their members.[3] Noting the difference between these two views—one seeks to abolish any common frame and the other seeks to create one—should not obscure their shared belief that the promise of the seal of the United States (*E pluribus unum*) has now lost its relevance in an atmosphere of "culture war."[4]

The debate about the immorality or absence of a common American cultural value system has been posed in another way by theorists who lament the supposed development of a new American character type, so lacking in moral fiber and fearful of social opprobrium as to have no capacity to make ethical commitments.

Charles Lindholm is Associate Professor in the Anthropology Department and the University Professors Program at Boston University.

John A. Hall is Professor of Sociology at McGill University.

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This is the "other-directed" American made famous by David Riesman and his associates.[5] Following in Riesman's footsteps, *Habits of the Heart,* the hugely successful portrait of American life drawn by Robert Bellah and his colleagues, presents Americans as individualists without substance, unable to undertake principled communal action because they are terrified to differ from others in a competitive, fluid, and atomistic social world.[6] The claim of diminished social responsibility has also been made from a somewhat different perspective by Robert Putnam, in noting that Americans now "bowl alone"; he sees this development as representing a waning of the social capital hitherto created by the associations of civil society.[7]

A paradox is apparent amidst this plethora of discordant warnings: Americans are imagined simultaneously to be unable to resist the tyranny of groups *and* to be isolated individualists. This suggests the need for a reconsideration of the condition of the United States in order to reveal the underlying institutional patterns and shared cultural values of the society, and then deciding whether these institutional structures and cultural commonalities are enough to hold America together.[8] Any such reconsideration must begin with a discussion of history.[9]

WITH LIBERTY AND JUSTICE FOR ALL: THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

The most important point to note about the United States is that it never had an old regime. Americans were consequently able to create a society with a unique commitment to egalitarianism and social mobility. Such a future was not preordained. The identity of most of the early colonists was initially very firmly British, and its leaders took for granted the hierarchical class ethic of the colonizing power. At the same time, the colonists were also loyal to an ideological conception of the rights of free-born Englishmen rather than to a particular piece of territory. Ironically, the very Englishness of the colonists did much to encourage their rebellion: although the taxation proposed by Westminster in its attempt to put its first empire on a sound financial basis was moderate, the logistics of eighteenth-century power meant that consultation by means of representation did not take place, thereby infuriating the

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settlers, who believed they deserved to be treated as free-born citizens of the realm. Still, these first rebels were men of some means, whose conception of "the people" was limited to the propertied.

It was only the military exigencies of the struggle for independence that forced the American elite to turn to genuinely popular elements both in the cities and in the West, where strong egalitarian and individualistic values held sway. The ensuing mass military mobilization undermined the potential, which had certainly existed, for the emergence of a local old regime of hereditary gentry. That potential was further weakened when the property of almost all Loyalist large landholders was expropriated, obliging them to flee from the United States in numbers five times greater than Royalists from France during the Revolution—which is to say that America was born amidst a dose of political cleansing that removed a large proportion of its potentially aristocratic elements.[10] More lastingly, the revolutionary political elite who laid down constitutional principles for the new society could not ignore the popular contribution, making an emphasis on liberty, democracy, and the rights of small property inevitable. Of course, the elite's distrust of the people lay behind the decision to create a system of checks and balances, that is, a political system that would be hard for anyone to dominate. Regional fear that one part of the country might subordinate another further weakened the power of the central government by introducing a system of federalism and by rendering all the states equivalent in the Senate, regardless of their actual population.

Despite these safeguards, the American nation was very far from established in the early years of the Republic. Some states, most notably Vermont, were reluctant to join the Union. More importantly, local interests were so divergent that threats of secession were made in earnest. Although the earliest of these came from the Northern states appalled at the War of 1812, the most serious of course came from the South. If the South's secession had to do with its fear that it would eventually be overwhelmed by new states without slavery, the fact remains that Lincoln, convinced that the United States stood as a beacon on the hill for other nations, fought primarily for the continuance of the Union.[11] Military outcomes very often determine national histories, and this has

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most certainly proved true in the United States. No further serious challenge has been directed against the Union, though the notion of states' rights and a deep distrust of the federal government have continued to have a constant appeal to local electorates everywhere in America.

Of course, territorial continuity is not in itself a guarantee of social peace; on the contrary, vicious struggles can and do take place within accepted frontiers over the definition of a society's character. The classical experience of Europe saw religious and class struggles deeply divide even those countries that were not polarized by the problem of nationalities. Comparative historical sociology now most often explains class conflict in political terms, stressing the extent to which radicalism resulted from the despotic character of state power. Most obviously, the various trajectories of European labor movements are best understood as the result of authoritarian regimes' determination to exclude the people from participation.[12] For instance, anti-socialist or anti-union legislation in Imperial Russia and Imperial Germany made workers focus on and attack the state, since it was futile for them to attempt to organize at the industrial level. In relatively liberal Britain, where unionization was possible, conflict was diffused more evenly throughout society.[13] In addition, where the state was linked to an official church, conflict was likely to be made even more intense by the layering of two sources of dispute on top of one another.[14] The occasional intransigence of the Left in French history owes much to its also being the party of anti-clericalism; in contrast, the relative peace of England resulted in part, as the French historian Élie Halévy noted, from workers having their own religion, so that Methodism replaced the appeal of Marxism.[15]

These comments allow us to highlight some especially salient aspects of the institutions of the United States. The American Constitution, by refusing to accept a state religion and giving each individual the right of religious freedom, ensured that religious disputes would not, as in France, be stacked on top of any other source of conflict. The founding fathers thereby created a system whose dynamics could be well understood by both Adam Smith and Rousseau. Personal religiosity and sectarianism were to be encouraged by the lack of an established faith, while challenges to state authority would be limited both by the movement between

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sects and by the tendency for their interests to clash; the government could therefore encourage the quest for the salvation of one's soul but discourage the existence of any ecclesiastical claims to authority in this world. This model came to define the American experience of religion: the vast majority are believers, but no one religion predominates, and new religions are continually being born. The occasional appearance of millenarian awakenings and local charismatic cults, long characteristic of American religious life, is a small price to pay for the relative stability of this arrangement.

A very similar pattern explains the nature of American labor history. One of the most famous treatises about American life asked why there was no socialism and no great workers' movement in the United States.[16] The answer is simple. Since all white males were given the right to vote in the Jacksonian era, even the poorest of them were loath to oppose a state that they felt to be their own. Furthermore, the much publicized openness of American society and the spatial and social mobility of Americans permitted the vast majority to believe that by their own efforts they could raise their standards of living and perhaps become wealthy themselves, which subverted any desire to overthrow the monied elite. Why destroy those you hope to join? This attitude remains pervasive today despite downward rather than upward mobility being more the rule than the exception in modern America, not surprising given that differences between haves and have-nots are accelerating.[17] Nonetheless, recent survey data on all social groups in America, *including* the most disadvantaged, show that—despite some feeble socialistic rhetoric—there is almost no popular support for even minimal redistributive mechanisms.[18]

Aside from reflecting a touching faith in social mobility, American acceptance of vast differences in wealth is also a secularized transvaluation of the Protestant ethic, wherein earned (not inherited) wealth is associated with such highly valued characteristics as assertiveness, initiative, effort, and ability—rather than with membership in an ascribed caste or wealthy elite. It is also generally believed that the wealthy will lose their riches in the span of a few generations and that new hardworking entrepreneurs will take their place. As a result, Americans may feel envious of the rich, but they do not want to destroy them or flatten out the income curve;

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rather, they want a chance to reach the crest of that curve themselves.[19]

Political arguments about the justice of economic inequality in America do not challenge these basic assumptions. From the Right the argument is that the race is indeed fair: the poor have failed to take advantage of the opportunities offered to them and to everyone else and so deserve their poverty. The argument from the Left is the reverse: the playing field is not level, therefore those players who fail are not at fault and should be helped to achieve parity. Both sides accept without debate a cultural belief, inherited from Protestantism, that only those who are trying seriously to escape poverty, who want to succeed in the competition, should be given aid; there is no charity for those who are "lazy," as recent debates about welfare make clear.

Of course, these values exist in tandem with, and validate, the relentless quest for wealth that has long been a central preoccupation for Americans. As Tocqueville wrote in 1840, "It is odd to watch with what feverish ardor the Americans pursue prosperity and how they are ever tormented by the shadowy suspicion that they may not have chosen the shortest route to get it."[20] He explains this characteristic obsession in terms of the problems of gaining status in an egalitarian society: "When the prestige attached to what is old has vanished, men are no longer distinguished, or hardly distinguished, by birth, standing, or profession; there is thus hardly anything left but money which makes very clear distinctions between men or can raise some of them above the common level."[21] Intense competition for status through wealth stimulates the "hypocrisy of luxury. . .peculiar to democratic centuries" where the conspicuous consumption of expensive goods is the major route to prestige.[22]

Within this egalitarian yet aggressive society of assiduous consumers, the present-day suburban mall has evolved into a temple where the adherents of the American cult of shopping can worship. In its protected, artificial, and homogenizing environment Americans gather to view, comment upon, and purchase the status symbols that not only demonstrate their relative positions vis-à-vis one another but also indicate their shared participation in the American dream of economic success.[23] It is easy for academics, who tend to disdain the crass pleasures of materialism, to under-

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estimate the symbolic importance of consumption in bringing Americans together. Of course, there are class divisions here—some malls and the goods they offer are for the relatively wealthy, others are for the relatively poor—but in all of them the carefully controlled environment and the overwhelming display of items for sale is a concrete representation of a shared fantasy of achieving and displaying material wealth.

CONFLICT AND COHERENCE

Important qualifications must be added to this argument lest it seem unduly complacent. Racial conflict—the most troubling American problem of all—will be discussed later. For the moment, we wish to focus on issues related to the economy, religion, and ethnicity.

We have already noted that the quintessential American dream is one of gaining riches and thereby status. This dream is most plausible during the periods of productivity and wealth generated by American capitalism. But America has not always been an economic dynamo, and those who lived through the depression have a very different attitude toward consumption and display than their younger fellow citizens. Furthermore, lingering traces of Puritan asceticism undercut the hedonism of mall culture.

It is also important to recall that the United States had more deaths at the end of the nineteenth century due to labor violence—in absolute terms and in proportion to population size—than any other country except Czarist Russia.[24] But instances of industrial struggles for higher wages ought not to be taken as indicating a serious rift in American society. It is crucial to note that violence directed against strikers came from Pinkerton detectives rather than from the central state. Such action, of course, depended upon judicial consent, and the fact that capitalist property rights were enshrined in a written constitution so early on mattered here a great deal. Nonetheless, participation in the polity, the possibility of reform, and especially the felt opportunity for eventually gaining wealth were also available to workers, and these undercut class unity powerfully, despite a short-lived surge of leftist activity among radical unions such as the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW).

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Religious persecution also has a long and ugly history in the United States, from colonial times when Quaker missionaries were killed as heretics by New England Puritans, to the nineteenth century when Joseph Smith, the Mormon prophet, was murdered, and up to the present day with the immolation of David Koresh and his followers. Less apocalyptically, anti-Semitic, anti-Catholic, and now anti-Muslim hate literature continues to proliferate in the more paranoid segments of American popular culture. However, in general the state has only actively participated in religious persecution when the cult in question was held to be actively challenging government authority—as in the stockpiling of weapons by Koresh. Instead of facing persecution, religions of all sorts have been easily absorbed within the amorphous American framework, so that nowadays Jews, Catholics, Muslims, and Hindus are lumped together with the predominant Protestant sects as part of a multitude of denominations—all of whom are assumed to be worshipping, in some fashion or another, the same God. In fact, the main problem for religious groups in America is not persecution but rather maintaining some form of distinctiveness, since interfaith marriage is increasingly common and religion becomes more and more a matter of choice, not birth.[25]

So religious and class differences, although sometimes violent, have not in the final analysis significantly challenged the relative stability of the United States. Nor has ethnic conflict, which has torn other societies asunder, had much effect in America. This is not from lack of opportunity. As Michael Lind has pointed out, the United States was relatively homogenous ethnically until the huge mass immigrations from Europe that occurred at the end of the nineteenth century.[26] This immigration was a "second revolution" that challenged the authority of the Anglo-Saxon majority. Racial prejudice against these newcomers was rampant for a time, both among the elite and the masses, as learned doctors documented the cranial limitations of the Irish and the natural brutishness of the Poles while murderous race riots erupted in the urban ghettoes.

Yet, far from causing American society to disintegrate, this influx of "foreigners," most of whom were in fact white Europeans, actually strengthened the nation—in part because their loyalty was to the idea of America, not to any particular place, and in

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part because American society responded by creating the most inclusive public educational system within the advanced capitalist world, which helped immeasurably to incorporate the immigrants into their new society. A host of studies tell us that the overwhelming experience of immigrant families was that of a transformation into Americans. The majority of immigrants willingly accepted deculturation and the loss of their native languages in order to embrace wholeheartedly the opportunity for their children to succeed and to participate politically—an opportunity that had been denied to them in their homelands. In an amazingly short time frame European immigrants who had been considered, and who had considered themselves, to be absolutely distinctive and impenetrable races were redefined as hyphenated Americans, distinguishable from one another primarily by food preferences and ethnic holidays. Since World War II, intermarriage among these "ethnics," like intermarriage between religious groups, has become pervasive.[27] For contemporary American suburbanites, belonging to an ethnic community has now become primarily a matter of personal choice, albeit a choice that is validated by a biological ideology of "naturalness."[28]

We can say then that the historic achievement of the United States is remarkable, especially when seen in comparative perspective: a nearly complete assimilation of immigrants, combined with a remarkable absence of concerted class warfare or religious violence. The analytic point about this pattern is that the United States has long demonstrated a strong homogenizing nationalism that draws its citizens away from any particular ethnic, class, or religious identity. Alternative visions have been marginalized in favor of a standard notion of what America ought to be, namely, "the land of opportunity" where old settlers and new migrants, rich and poor, Protestant and Catholic all have an equal chance to gain economic success through hard work and individual enterprise, and where "the voice of the people" rules a democratic polity that is not tarnished by aristocratic pretensions.

THE HOMOGENIZING POWER OF AMERICAN CULTURE

Americans generally believe, as one of our students proudly put it, that "we Americans do not have a culture; we are all different."

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American intellectuals have tended to accept the premise that Americans indeed lack a culture; they assert that the United States coheres because of its institutions and the democratic and liberal ideals that underlie them. So long as Americans have faith in the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, they have no need of a shared cultural identity and can exist within a pluralistic "nation of nations."[29] But this view ignores two important facts. First, to have any lasting effect ideals cannot be institutionally imposed but must resonate with preexistent shared perceptions and ways of being in the world. Many societies, after all, have wonderfully democratic and liberal constitutions yet manage to be totalitarian and genocidal despite them. Second, grade-school civic lessons aside, very few native-born Americans have any clear idea of what the sacred documents of the nation actually contain. They are Americans all the same, instantly recognizable not by their differences but by their enormous similarities.

This commonness of the culture of the United States can be approached by a moment's reflection on the claim noted, namely, that Americans are different and so do not share a culture. No sentiment could be more quintessentially American, for the assertion itself rests on a culturally specific faith that all persons are independent actors, each separately responsible for his or her own fate and endowed with a God-given potential for free choice and agency. Ideally, all such persons are equal before God and the law, with equivalent rights and privileges, and all are worthy of respect regardless of wealth, prestige, or power. This pervasive belief—derived in part from the historical absence of an aristocracy in the United States, in part from the culturally dominant Protestant faith in the capacity of individuals to choose their own fates, and in part from the great social mobility of American society—has always been expressed in ordinary interaction through an absence of deference and by strong moral demands for the expression of equal esteem for all members of the community. The historian David Fischer notes that from colonial times "extreme inequalities of material condition were joined to an intense concern for equality of esteem" as rich and poor "wore similar clothing and addressed each other by first names. They worked, ate, laughed, played and fought together on a footing of equality."[30]

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Despite ever greater distinctions in rank and wealth, Americans remain extremely careful to cloak authority relations with the trappings of equality. On the job, subordinates are "team members" whose "consent" and "cooperation" are "requested" by their "supervisor." At home it is perfectly acceptable to have servants or to go to an elite school but *not* to put the servants in livery or to have a genteel accent; in short, it is politically correct to be rich and powerful just so long as one does not make claims to be different and better. The surest way to be ostracized by Americans is to have the reputation of being a snob; the surest way to be accepted is to be friendly and "nice" to everyone, regardless of status.[31]

Such effacement might seem to conflict with the well-publicized self-assertiveness of Americans—an assertiveness strikingly indicated by national surveys showing that 70 percent of Americans think they are above average in terms of leadership. But we should note as well that even more striking statistics apply to Americans' beliefs in their "ability to get along well with others": none think they are below average, 60 percent report themselves to be in the top 10 percentile, and 25 percent say they are in the top 1 percentile.[32] These seemingly contradictory findings can be reconciled once we note that Americans find status and respect primarily through being liked, and they want leaders whom they can like in turn. Therefore, for Americans the ordinary Joe *is* the better leader, and it makes sense that the majority of Americans, ordinary Joes (and Janes) who try hard to be nice and adapt to the needs of others, feel that they are, as a result, potential leaders.

Americans' "niceness" and distaste for elitism, so often commented on with various degrees of amusement or condescension by foreign visitors, correlates with a fluid social world where there are no clear status markers; this unstable and potentially threatening universe is made liveable by the expectation that one's own friendliness and helpfulness will usually be reciprocated.[33] Such an attitude can only exist in conjunction with a basic sense of trust in the public sphere, which is believed to be populated by men and women who, like oneself, are basically fair, decent, and kind. Social trust is a legacy of the original Protestant covenanted community, now transformed, as noted above, into the larger secularized social world where the primary values are being "well liked"

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and "getting along well with others." Training toward these ends is clearest in the American school system, where popular students are elected as student body leaders who "represent" their fellow students, where "school spirit" is heavily promoted, and where children are graded on the quality of their "citizenship." Students are also expected to participate in extracurricular activities that oblige them to cooperate together on a voluntary basis. Team sports especially are highly valued as an expression of school spirit and local pride, where individuals can show off their personal talents while helping their teammates to victory through disciplined self-sacrifice and cooperation. These institutions have nothing to do with formal education and everything to do with learning how to participate peacefully in a competitive society of coequal individuals.[34]

Alongside diffuse trust is another characteristic American stance, that of "moral minimalism," which prohibits overt interference with or judgment upon other people.[35] This ethical position of benign detachment, like the requirement to be nice to everyone, is a product of the underlying American value system of individualistic egalitarianism, which means that all persons have the freedom to make their own fates, without restraint from their neighbors, and, concomitantly, should not interfere with anyone else's actions. This American pattern fits well with the roomy and fluid world of the suburb, where there is no need for individuals to confront one another, where it is even possible for members of the same household to have separate rooms, separate schedules, separate meals, and almost no contact.[36] Americans thus tolerate diversity so long as they are not obliged to interact with others who are too different from themselves or with people who are intrusive and make demands on their time and autonomy.

The violent hatred that motivates ethnic cleansing and nationalistic pride is not to be found here. Rather, modern-day, middle-class Americans are weakly held together precisely by their bland acceptance of one another, an acceptance that is smoothed over by the ideal of friendly interaction and justified by a common belief that nothing in the public world—or even in the private world—is really worth getting too excited about. This may not be heroic, and it may not provide strong ties, but its very mildness has obvious benefits.[37]

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Beneath the generalized "niceness," social trust, and moral minimalism of America stands the basic premise that "individualism is natural, community problematical. *Society has to be built.*"[38] Generated again from Protestant principles in the context of American social openness, this perspective imagines society not as a preexistent entity but as a moral corporation knitted together by voluntary agreements between independent and coequal agents, each bearing personal responsibility for their acts. In a real sense, this notion of the political community replicates the image of the egalitarian American family—an institution, as the anthropologist David Schneider demonstrates, that is believed to be a locus of "diffuse, enduring solidarity," where authority is democratically exercised through consensus and affection and where all are treated equally without regard to status, power, or capacity because, ideally, all love and are loved equally.[39]

In the familial vision of the American community, political action takes on a sacred aura, and political power-holders are imagined as exemplary figures, who must always demonstrate that they are not egoists or supporters of special interests but are rather agents of consensus and selfless servants of all the people in a nation that ought to resemble a loving family. This high moral ideal gives Americans a strong sense that their polity is the ethical center of a society based on shared caring and common humanity, not just the locus of power seeking and deal making. American presidents, in particular, portray themselves and are portrayed in the cultural imagination as expansive and encompassing symbolic figures who reach beyond interest groups and despised "party politics" so as to work for the "good of the nation." The emotional expressiveness increasingly demanded of presidential figures is an indicator of this function, since the revelation and sharing of strong emotion demonstrates the president's common humanity—whereas policies and "politics" are divisive. Voters who can sympathize with a president's personal tragedies and family trials will feel a comforting communion with him: he is a good man who suffers just as I do; his nobility and compassion are like my own.

In sum, America is a unique society based upon shared values of egalitarian individualism and capitalist free enterprise. It has demonstrated an astonishing capacity to integrate new immigrants, to defuse religious, class, and ethnic hostilities, and to promote a

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homogenized national culture. This culture is animated by dreams of monetary success in the competitive marketplace but is softened by an ethic of generalized social trust and a pervasive interactive style that combines "niceness" with moral minimalism. Within this shared frame of reference, Americans imagine their social universe to be, in its ideal form, an extended family, based on the love and voluntary cooperation of coequals engaged in the joint task of building a community. From the point of view of its citizens, the United States is the best of all possible worlds—one that, by and large, delivers on its promises. Instead of ethnic nationalism, Americans have the nationalism of an ideal: they firmly believe that, if they could, everyone in the world would love to join them and become citizens of the United States.

AMERICAN CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS

The American experience is fraught, like any other, with inner tensions that provide the dynamic for its movement. What is perhaps unique is that Americans believe that this should not be so. Pervasive idealism about politics, for instance, means that the electorate is continually disappointed when its leaders prove to be fraudulent in their claims that they serve neither themselves nor any interest group, that instead they are dedicated to the higher communal end of representing "all the people." An increased scrutiny of public figures and the widely reported mass contempt for them reflects deep ambivalence toward the political realm, as sacred ideals of selfless community service are increasingly seen to clash with unacceptable realities of difference and interest, and as politicians are revealed to be heroes with feet of clay—something that could never happen if they were not thought of as heroes in the first place.

Another element in the widespread sense of malaise in America is the equally ambivalent relationship Americans have with groups. Tocqueville was perhaps the first to note that Americans are great joiners, finding refuge from a competitive universe by associating together in a vast array of civic and social organizations. Important recent research shows that this continues to be the case. There may be truth to Putnam's claim that membership of bowling leagues has fallen, but there is none to his more general notion of

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"declining social capital"—as can be seen in the huge growth of membership in therapy groups, children's football leagues, and health clubs.[40]

But what matters more than sheer numbers are the beliefs entertained about group life. Outside of the pragmatic sphere of business, associations are believed to be held together, as noted, less by interest than by shared love and mutual caring. Disagreement is kept to a minimum in favor of enjoying one another's company,[41] and there is usually a concerted effort to avoid the appearance of any form of hierarchy, for fear of being called a snob. Each such group feels itself to be unique, though for an outsider the actual differences between groups may appear negligible. For instance, self-identified members of ethnic groups often believe their group has many distinctive rituals, whereas in truth the rituals are shared by almost all Americans.[42] Similarly, middle-class black and white college students may vehemently claim that they belong to completely different "cultures," but for an observer the discernible differences between the two groups are negligible.[43] While we do not seek to downplay the subjective importance of multiple cultural identities in America, there remains everything to be said for Tocqueville's notion that the characteristic American elaboration of small differences is best understood as an effort to establish a personal identity and a place of comfort and community within the competitive world of the United States.[44]

A number of consequences follow from this effort. Members of American groups tend to feel themselves united by shared caring and kind intentions; they are good people and good citizens, acting as "everybody" should act. But they are suspicious of the motivations of members of other groups, who may only be pretending to be decent and caring persons in order to further their special interests against the interests of the whole. For example, college students typically describe their own group as a bunch of friends, while other groups are "cliques." Similarly, American social activists see themselves as trying to draw people into the community, while their opponents describe them as power-hungry and exclusionary.[45]

The tension between an idealized "us" and a demonized "them" manifests itself at every level of American culture. Survey research on the leading members of a variety of influence blocs—labor

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leaders, businessmen, feminists, bankers, farmers, media people, blacks, students, and so on—shows that in general their ideals are the same as the ideals of the public at large.[46] But they disagree about who *actually* does have influence, and they see "themselves as the victims not of a system deaf to all groups but of a system that 'plays favorites.'"[47] Only one's own group is pure, and only one's own group therefore actually holds the general will at heart. It follows that one's own group should dominate, since only one's own group actually expresses the true voice of the public. This circle of self-delusion and self-congratulation among groups validates public qualms about corruption and degeneration in the political realm, leading to further cynicism about—and withdrawal from—political action and thus a return to the realm of personal friends and family.[48] It should be emphasized, however, that the pervasive ambivalence of Americans about politicians and groups does not threaten the society with disruption. In fact, it makes it harder for any group or individual to present themselves as the savior of the American way, and so provides a base for the mundane continuance of a social order based on trust of other Americans as individuals but distrust of them in groups or as leaders.

Much more troubling is the continued prevalence of anti-black racism in America.[49] While white ethnics (and, to a lesser extent, Asians and Latinos) have been "melted" into American society, retaining only a symbolic cultural identity, those of African descent, who have been in America from its inception, are still excluded and discriminated against despite their best efforts to participate in the American dream.[50]

The most obvious reasons for this unhappy situation are to be found in America's cruel history of slavery. The humiliation of bondage, especially in a society where freedom and equality are so highly valued, is a stigma that is hard to erase, and African-Americans continue to be tainted with that dishonoring heritage, which is exacerbated by the fact that, to quote Tocqueville once again, "the insubstantial and ephemeral fact of servitude is most fatally combined with the physical and permanent fact of differences in race. Memories of slavery disgrace the race, and race perpetuates memories of slavery."[51] The problems of the historical memory of slavery are compounded by the poverty, powerlessness, and ghettoization of great numbers of African-Americans. Their

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low status reinforces negative attitudes of whites towards them while also solidifying their own sense of exclusion and indignity. The amplifying layering effect of group hostilities avoided in American religious matters thus resurfaces with a vengeance in American race relations.

Alongside these causes, there is a less well-known source for the continued gap between blacks and whites, one that can be best understood as a dreadful corollary of the blanket American faith in equality. To account for real inequality, or even for difference, Americans tend strongly to "naturalize" distinctions, making biology the source of differences that the ideology cannot explain. We can see this tendency manifested in the apparently perverse claims made by white "hyphenated" ethnics that they can recognize innate biological characteristics of their chosen ethnic group. Belonging then becomes "natural," not to be altered despite the real permeability of ethnic categories. If this is so for white ethnics, it is even more so for African-Americans, whose skin color renders their difference obvious, and whose poverty and high crime rate can then be attributed to that difference.[52] The same method has, of course, been used to deny equality to women as well. Biologizing inferiority allows faith in human equality in the face of blatant bigotry and oppression to be maintained through the simple expedient of denying some people full human status.[53]

Well-meaning attempts to redress this and other racial injustices have led to the development of the census categories for five types of ethnic Americans (including the catchall category of "Hispanics")[54] and to the much bludgeoned demon of multiculturalism. Does this mean that groupism is stronger, that America's power to homogenize is over? The preponderance of evidence suggests a negative answer. Despite all the publicity, ethnicity remains a relatively weak identity marker with very little content; it has the subjective value of providing a vaguely personalized community in a world of diffuse and atomistic relationships. Like class and religion, ethnicity seems to have minimal potential to develop into oppositional movements with any substantial alternative content. Rather, ethnic identity groups, like sexual identity organizations or religious sects or twelve-step groups, will multiply and subdivide as Americans choose the communal identity that "feels best" to them.

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At the same time, we will also see a continuance of the tendency for these groups to make claims to be "natural" in order to validate their existence and maintain their solidarity, so that gays have to "act gay," blacks have to "act black," and Hispanics have to "act Hispanic," whatever these terms may mean. But such claims—presently authorized at least for "races" in the census categories—will inevitably be contested, as the individualist, self-assertive side of American culture comes to the fore and as people refuse to be pigeonholed into prearranged categories, however "natural" they are claimed to be by those with an interest in maintaining them.

The real danger is that African-Americans may continue to find it especially difficult to make such self-assertions; they cannot choose who they want to be and instead have negative identities thrust upon them. The effort to turn a bad hand into a good one by repudiating the culture that dealt it is an understandable reaction,[55] but one that takes for granted exactly those cultural premises of the United States that we have already noted: that people have a God-given right to manufacture their own identities and to assert themselves within the social and political marketplace. Black Americans' belief that they can and should struggle against oppression and for justice and equity actually shows the depth of their Americanness.[56] That many white Americans can understand and sympathize with the plight of African-Americans shows that racial prejudice, although generated by the contradictions of American egalitarianism, is never wholly legitimated within it and that the struggle against racism is as much a part of the American grain as is racism itself. It also behooves us to note that those who feel themselves utterly excluded and alienated from American culture lack the structural resources to mount a challenge of any real seriousness against the stability of the society—a reflection that makes apparent the extent to which the notion of "stability" is value-laden.

CONCLUSION

In this essay, we have sought to refute the claim that America is falling apart. On the one hand, the institutional structure of the United States has the capacity to diffuse potentially divisive con-

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flicts between classes, religious sects, and ethnic communities throughout society—rather than concentrating them against the state. On the other hand, as long as the economy is healthy, putative new identities and groups do not offer any real challenge to the basic premises of American culture, nor is the highly flexible social fabric of America likely to be torn asunder by their demands. Whether black or white, gay or straight, female or male, the vast majority of Americans continue to believe in the possibilities of economic success and to act as if the world was made up of nice, nonjudgmental individuals, who build familial communities through mutual and voluntary cooperation. Despite the inevitable and wrenching tensions and paradoxes implicit in this idealized belief system, it shows no signs of losing its hold.

It may be useful to highlight our argument by reflecting upon the notion of civil society. In a characteristically brilliant contribution, Daniel Bell once claimed that the United States was *nothing but* a civil society.[57] There is a good deal of sense to this: the diffusion of conflict within society results precisely in a plurality of groups whose interests are not united against an overbearing state. But our argument goes beyond Bell's. Most obviously, we have stressed the presence of a common cultural frame, acceptance of which plays as significant a part in limiting conflict as does the sheer fact of pluralism.

But a more subtle point needs to be made, and this can follow from a fuller definition of civil society.[58] Civility in society—rather than, as the traditional definition has it, the mere presence of strong and autonomous groups within society—depends upon a particular social agreement to live together with difference. The greatest example of such an agreement in European history remains that symbolized by the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648: because neither side could win the religious wars, it suddenly became reasonable to consider religion a private rather than a public affair—and thereby to live with genuine difference.[59]

Given this definition, we can see that the United States is not really a civil society in the full sense suggested, though it is indeed a society where considerable personal civility is practiced. Clearly, despite the plethora of noisy interest groups, in the United States there is little recognition, whether resigned or enthusiastic, of genuinely alternative ways of life, despite the rhetoric about differ-

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ence. This point can be underscored by a standard European joke about American foreign policy that points out that the United States wishes people to be free to choose—just so long as they choose the American way. And this is scarcely surprising. The American experience has not been that of a clash of utterly different ways of life—except for the challenge from the South, whose opposition was so completely destroyed. Rather, the differences that exist in American civilization are relatively small, objectively; whilst ideologically "all are different," Americans in fact are remarkably "all the same." The homogenizing powers of this framework have been astonishing, and the dynamics of the culture suggest that this is scarcely likely to change: America will remain a land intolerant of real divergence but simultaneously capable of absorbing differences and turning outsiders into Americans in short order.

We can conclude normatively by suggesting that no very harsh judgment should be made about this powerful homogenizing force. For one thing, homogenization aims at a universal ideal that, however imperfectly realized, stands far removed from the ethnic particularisms that tear at the heart of many nations. For another, it is well to remember that the seventeenth-century European invention of the ideal of toleration was followed first by the ideological surge of the French revolutionary period and then by fascism and communism, the two great totalitarian ideological forces of the twentieth century.[60] In contrast, America's homogenizing capacities have ensured that its internal conflicts have *not* led to world war. Perhaps then, given the American experience, we should show some skepticism towards the unfettered praise of difference that dominates contemporary social theory. There may be something to be said for the decencies of a little dullness and the comforts of a measure of conformity.

ENDNOTES

[1]The two most eloquent complaints are Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., *The Disuniting of America: Reflections on a Multicultural Society* (Knoxville, Tenn.: Whittle Direct Books, 1992) and Robert Hughes, *The Culture of Complaint: The Fraying of America* (New York: Warner Books, 1993).

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[2]See, for instance, Arjun Appadurai, "Patriotism and Its Futures," *Public Culture* 5 (1993).

[3]The most important voice is that of Charles Taylor, notably in "The Politics of Recognition," in Amy Gutmann, ed., *Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994).

[4]The most apocalyptic use of this phrase is by James Davison Hunter in *Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America* (New York: Basic Books, 1991) and *Before the Shooting Begins: Searching for Democracy in America's Culture War* (New York: Free Press, 1994).

[5]David Riesman with Nathan Glazer and Reuel Denney, *The Lonely Crowd: A Study of the Changing American Character* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1961). It should be noted that Riesman thought that this type was more empathetic and kindly than the inner-directed traditional man, and he strongly rejected all notions that his work showed an absence of moral commitment in America.

[6]As Bellah and his colleagues write, "An absolutely autonomous self and a self determined completely by the social situation do not, then, turn out to be opposites." Robert Bellah, Richard Madsen, William Sullivan, Ann Swidler, and Steven Tipton, *Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1985), 80. See also Christopher Lasch, *The Culture of Narcissism* (New York: Norton, 1978), who stresses the inner rage of the conformist required to adapt to an alienating environment.

[7]Robert Putnam, "Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital," *Journal of Democracy* 6 (1995).

[8]For one recent argument in favor of American coherence, see David Hollinger, *Postethnic America: Beyond Multiculturalism* (New York: Basic Books, 1995).

[9]Unfortunately, we do not have the space to do anything more than sketch a few of the most salient aspects of the American past, and therefore we must ignore the long-term shifts in institutions and attitudes as well as generational differences in favor of a very broad overview.

[10]Robert Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution,* vol. 1 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1959), 188–202, cited in Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power: The Rise of Classes and Nation-States, 1760–1914,* vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 150. We draw extensively on Mann's interpretation of early American history.

[11]Of course, the abolition of slavery did not lead to the end of racial discrimination; to the contrary, attempts at wholesale reconstruction were defeated, and a type of second-class citizenship, based on the purported principle of "separate but equal," ensured that American democracy was not complete. We will discuss the consequences of this failing in a later section of the essay.

[12]In the European context, this applies as clearly to nationalities. For a general view, see J. A. Hall, *International Orders* (Oxford: Polity Press, 1996), chap. 3.

[13]There is now a substantial literature on this point; see, inter alia: Carlos Waisman, *Modernization and the Working Class* (Austin, Tex.: University of Texas Press,

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1982); Dick Geary, *European Labor Protest, 1848–1945* (London: Methuen, 1984); Timothy McDaniel, *Autocracy, Capitalism and Revolution in Russia* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1987); Ira Katznelson and Aristide Zolberg, eds., *Working Class Formation* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986); Ross McKibbin, *The Ideologies of Class* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990); and Mann, *The Sources of Social Power,* vol. 2.

[14]The most powerful appreciation of the radicalizing effect of the superimposition of conflicts remains Ralf Dahrendorf, *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Societies* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1959).

[15]Élie Halévy, *The Era of Tyrannies* (New York: Anchor Books, 1965).

[16]Werner Sombart, *Why Is There No Socialism in the United States?* (London: Macmillan, 1976).

[17]Studies of this phenomenon include Katherine Newman, *Falling from Grace: The Experience of Downward Mobility in the American Middle Class* (New York: Free Press, 1988); Jennifer Hochschild, *What's Fair? American Beliefs about Distributive Justice* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981); and John Laslett and Seymour Lipset, *Failure of a Dream?* (New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1974).

[18]Indeed, survey data show that Americans of every status, race, occupation, and ethnicity are remarkably uniform in their agreement on the proper disparity of wealth for occupational groups, with businessmen unquestioningly accepted as deserving top salaries and unskilled labor entitled to the lowest pay. See Sidney Verba and Gary Orren, *Equality in America: The View from the Top* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985). In fact, data in Jennifer Hochschild's book, *Facing Up to the American Dream: Race, Class, and the Soul of the Nation* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992), indicate that the poorest Americans believe more fervently in the American dream than do the middle classes. It is true that there was considerably more radical political activity in America in the early part of the century, especially in reaction to the depression. But even in those dark days, redistributive demands were minimal compared to Europe.

[19]There is, of course, some ambiguity about the inequalities that result from this laissez-faire attitude. For example, Hochschild found that many of her respondents, when questioned, said that "other people would not permit equality to work, even though they themselves might welcome it." Hochschild, *What's Fair?,* 171.

[20]Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1969), 536.

[21]Ibid., 615.

[22]Ibid., 467. For the classic analysis of this phenomenon see Thorstein Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class* (New York: Penguin, 1979).

[23]See Jerry Jacobs, *The Mall: An Attempted Escape From Everyday Life* (Prospect Heights, Ill.: Waveland Press, 1984), for an analysis of the symbolic role of the mall in American culture.

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[24]On this matter, see Mann, *The Sources of Social Power,* vol. 2, chap. 18. Violence in America has long been widespread, but it is usually between individuals, not groups. Within a certain range of virulence, such personal violence is to be expected within a society based on the values of individual autonomy and self-help, and is not necessarily an indicator of social malaise.

[25]See Mary Waters, *Ethnic Options: Choosing Identities in America* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1990), on Catholics, and Sidney Goldstein, "Profile of American Jewry: Insights from the 1990 National Jewish Population Study" (New York: Council of Jewish Federations, North American Jewish Data Bank Occasional Papers, May 1993), on Jews.

[26]Michael Lind, *The Next American Nation: The New Nationalism and the Fourth American Revolution* (New York: Free Press, 1995).

[27]Four out of five Italian-Americans since 1950 have married outside their religion while 75 percent of English, Irish, and Polish and 50 percent of Jews do today.

[28]Waters, *Ethnic Options.* The biological metaphor becomes even more crucial for black Americans, as we shall see.

[29]As Michael Walzer puts it, it is sufficient for hyphenated Americans to rest their political faith in the American side of the hyphen, leaving their cultural identity in the left. See his "What Does It Mean to be an American?" *Social Research* 57 (1990).

[30]David H. Fischer, *Albion's Seed: Four British Folkways in America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 754. Fischer is talking about frontier America, where egalitarian display was most marked, but assertions of equality were found all over colonial America, save in Virginia, where aristocratic values, exaggerated by the institution of slavery, prevailed. For a classic anthropological collection devoted to the American character, see James Spradley and Michael Rynkiewich, eds., *The Nacirema* (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1979). For a more recent effort see Hervé Varenne, ed., *Symbolizing America* (Lincoln, Nebr.: University of Nebraska Press, 1986).

[31]See David Potter, "Individuality and Conformity," in Michael McGiffert, ed., *The Character of Americans* (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1964), for these and more examples; for the American requirement to be friendly see Hervé Varenne, "Creating America," in *Symbolizing America* and Stephen Kalberg, "The Sociology of Friendliness" (unpublished manuscript). Michael Moffatt in *Coming of Age in New Jersey* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1992) describes the dire consequences of being accused of snobbery among undergraduates at Rutgers. Adam Seligman illustrates this supremely American characteristic through a dialogue he overheard between a well-to-do suburbanite and a tramp rummaging through a garbage can. The two exchanged polite greetings and the suburbanite informed the tramp that better-quality pickings were likely to be found down the street. Seligman remarks that this exchange would be impossible in Europe, but it is standard in America, where "individuals confront one another in their individual identities and not as members of broader solidarities or groups." Adam Seligman, *The Idea of Civil Society* (New York: The Free Press, 1992), 155.

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[32]For this survey, see D. Myers, *Social Psychology* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1987). These statistics are cited (but interpreted quite differently from our version) in Hazel Markus and Shinobu Kitayama, "Culture and the Self: Implications for Cognition, Emotion and Motivation," *Psychological Review* 98 (1991): 242.

[33]This point was first made by Tocqueville.

[34]See Page Smith, *A City Upon a Hill: The Town in American History* (New York: Knopf, 1966). It may seem a long leap from Calvinist Protestantism to high school sports, but that would be to forget that it was Protestant New Englanders who invented baseball, football, and basketball with specific concern for inculcating moral values in their youth. For more, see Fischer, *Albion's Seed.*

[35]See M. P. Baumgartner, *The Moral Order of a Suburb* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988). Of course, moral minimalism does not mean Americans have no values or that they will accept government oppression. Quite the contrary is the case. On this theme see Stephen Kalberg, "Cultural Foundations of Modern Citizenship," in Bryan S. Turner, ed., *Citizenship and Social Theory* (London: Sage Press, 1993).

[36]Lower-class relationships in America tend to be more volatile and confrontational—a consequence both of differing values and more constrictive social settings. For a recent ethnographic study of the complex relationship between class and concepts of self in America, see Adrie Kusserow, "The American Self Reconsidered: 'Soft' and 'Hard' Individualism in Manhattan and Queens," doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, Department of Anthropology, Cambridge, Mass., 1995.

[37]In the same vein, the high political apathy so often decried as indicating social breakdown may equally mean that people are quite reasonably unmotivated to argue about issues that might disrupt a carefully constructed and delicate social facade.

[38]Hervé Varenne, *Americans Together: Structured Diversity in a Midwestern Town* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1977), 70, emphasis in the original. See Bernard Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967) and J. R. Pole, *The Pursuit of Equality in American History* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1978) for an elaboration of this argument.

[39]See David Schneider, *American Kinship: A Cultural Account* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1968) for this model, abstracted from his intensive study of the structure and symbolism of American kinship. In this setting, the father is hardly a commanding patriarchal authority figure. Instead, like all other family members, he must use negotiation and example, rather than command, to get his way. The absence of paternal power in middle-class America fits with the very real independence of children, who share little collective property with the father, cooperate little save when pursuing pleasure, and have almost no long-term interests to bring them together except the fragile emotional bond of love. For classic statements about the American family see Christopher Lasch, *Haven in a Heartless World* (New York: Basic Books, 1977) and (in a very different mood) Erik Erikson, *Childhood and Society* (New York: Norton, 1950).

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On love as the central metaphor of American culture, see Varenne, *Americans Together.*

[40]For examples see the special issue entitled "Civic Participation in American Democracy" of *The Public Perspective* 7 (4) (1996), edited by Everett Carl Ladd. It is perhaps worth noting as well that those accused of the bombings in Oklahoma City did not "bowl alone" but were in fact active members of a bowling league.

[41]Varenne reports that "some of my informants could literally be brought to tears if someone they considered close to them appeared to seriously disagree with them." Varenne, *Americans Together,* 92.

[42]See Waters, *Ethnic Options.*

[43]See Moffatt, *Coming of Age in New Jersey,* who notes that the major objective difference between black and white students at Rutgers was their taste in music. Elsewhere in the same book a West Indian student comments that his classmates, whether black or white, seem to him to be indistinguishably American.

[44]"In democracies, where there is never much difference between one citizen and another and where in the nature of things they are so close that there is always a chance of their all getting merged in a common mass, a multitude of artificial and arbitrary classifications are established to protect each man from the danger of being swept along in spite of himself with the crowd." Tocqueville, *Democracy in America,* 605.

[45]See Elwin Hatch, *The Biography of a Small Town* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), for an example. Note too that Americans tend to portray everyone but themselves as nationalistic and self-interested—an attitude that infuriates Allied leaders.

[46]The major exception were feminists, who were far more radical in their ideology and leveling in their politics than any other group.

[47]Verba and Orren, *Equality in America,* 189. The exception are members of the media, who have a uniquely high opinion of their own powers of influence.

[48]It is within this context that we can understand the general American repudiation of the political demands made by special interest groups such as gays, blacks, and feminists. As Samuel Huntington has remarked, relatively disenfranchised groups obliged to make public protests to gain their ends paradoxically undermine their own claims, since most Americans feel that these protesters are demanding special privileges for themselves at the expense of the community at large. Meanwhile, elites who quietly negotiate real power do not suffer the same public opprobrium, since their arrangements are personal and private. See Samuel Huntington, *American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981).

[49]Tocqueville was prescient about this problem. For him, "the most formidable evil threatening the future of the United States is the presence of the blacks on their soil. From whatever angle one sets out to inquire into the present embarrassments or future dangers facing the United States, one is almost always brought up against this basic fact." Tocqueville, *Democracy in America,* 340. Nor was he sanguine about the possibilities for a solution to the race question. "In the United States the prejudice rejecting the Negroes seems to increase in proportion

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to their emancipation, and inequality cuts deep into mores as it is effaced from the laws.... Once one admits that whites and emancipated Negroes face each other like two foreign peoples on the same soil, it can easily be understood that there are only two possibilities for the future: the Negroes and the whites must either mingle completely or they must part." Ibid., 344, 356.

[50]The *fact* of discrimination is evident in any number of accounts—perhaps the best still being W. Lloyd Warner, ed., *Yankee City* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1963). See also John Ogbu, *Minority Education and Caste: The American System in Cross-Cultural Perspective* (New York: Academic Press, 1978), who describes American black-white relations as equivalent to a caste system. Interestingly, in her *Facing Up to the American Dream,* Hochschild shows that poor blacks are more confident in American culture and less suspicious of whites than their more successful middle-class black counterparts. Hochschild explains this paradox with great subtlety, but we would argue that a major factor is simply the fact that poor blacks have very little real interaction with whites, and so can retain their illusions about their potential acceptance into white society. This is not to say, of course, that change has not occurred; it has. Economically and socially, black people now participate much more freely in American culture than in previous generations, but the problem has not vanished. For a recent survey, see Andrew Hacker, *Two Nations: Black and White, Separate, Hostile and Unequal* (New York: Scribners, 1996).

[51]Tocqueville, *Democracy in America,* 341.

[52]See Louis Dumont, *Homo Hierarchicus* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1980), for a structural explanation based on his own experience of the hierarchical society of India. The biological argument has recently found new intellectual justifications in Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray, *The Bell Curve* (New York: The Free Press, 1994). For a debate on this volatile issue see Steven Fraser, ed., *The Bell Curve Wars* (New York: Basic Books, 1995).

[53]See Charles Lindholm, *The Islamic Middle East: An Historical Anthropology* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1996), for a discussion of the same mechanism in the Middle East.

[54]See Lind, *The Next American Nation,* and Hollinger, *Post-Ethnic America,* for accounts of the origins and character of these ethnic categories.

[55]See Erving Goffman, *Stigma* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), for what is still the best examination of the options available for the stigmatized.

[56]The most radical form of Afrocentricism, which demands a utopian communalism and a transformed personal consciousness, is indeed a real challenge to American individualism in one sense, but in another sense it is simply one more instance of the idealistic American attempt to create a covenanted community where the chosen will transcend the contradictions of individualism. Such communities have a long history in American life.

[57]Daniel Bell, "'American Exceptionalism' Revisited: The Role of Civil Society," *The Public Interest* 95 (1989).

[58]For this definition, see John A. Hall, "In Search of Civil Society," in John A. Hall, ed., *Civil Society: Theory, History, Comparison* (Oxford: Polity Press, 1995).

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[59]See Ernest Gellner, *Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and its Rivals* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1994), chap. 5.

[60]It should also be noted that the return to civil society in Europe has owed a very great deal to a geopolitical settlement that depended (and depends) on the United States.

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The American society puts private before public purposes. The politics of our country still begin with the individual, not the state. Our tests of ourselves, as a good or not so good society, relate to the human conditions of our citizens. Our political principles begin with the rights of man, and it was not manifest destiny or imperial ambition, or any accepted priority for the interest of the state, that brought us as far into the world as we have come. It was rather a combination of perceived danger and an exuberant nongovernmental expansion of particular interests. Both have had enormous impact on our behavior and on the level of our engagement; neither has changed the fundamental political priorities of our people. . . . Even on domestic issues what the voter has most on his or her mind, most of the time, is a private interest, or at most a group concern—what will these politicians do for me and my family, or for us: the farmers, or the working men, or business and commercial forces, that in our view "really make the country run." The surprisingly large groups that are still dominantly Democratic or Republican, in a nation where David Broder tells us that "The Party is Over," reflect no systematic political commitment of an ideological sort, but rather a persistent perception that Democrats, or Republicans, are good for "us."

McGeorge Bundy

From "The Americans and the World"
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Mark D.W. Edington

The Fog of the Familiar Paradigm: On the Dangers of Applied Theory

The captain of a Mississippi steamboat had made fast to the shore because of a thick fog lying upon the river. The fog lay low and dense upon the surface of the water, but overhead all was clear. An impatient passenger inquired the cause of the delay. "We can't see to steer," said the captain. "But all's clear overhead," suggested the passenger; "you can see the North Star." "Yes," replied the officer, "but we are not going that way."

—*Woodrow Wilson*
Leaders of Men[1]

THERE IS UNCANNY UNANIMITY among social science disciplines in comprehending the last decade of the twentieth century as a time significant only for what it follows. We live, it seems, in a "postworld": post–Cold War, postindustrial, post-modern, post-Christian, even in some views a "posthistorical" time, a time somehow unique in human experience because it unfolds after history's end.

Such an orientation necessarily presumes that the past achievements of virtually any field of inquiry will be only marginally relevant to the human future, which, on these terms, cannot but emerge as starkly unlike anything previously encountered. The irony is that, at the same moment, old paradigms once admired for

Mark D.W. Edington is completing his doctoral studies at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.

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their probative value—and now recognized, in the light of a new day, to be misleading at best—are not simply thrown over; instead, they take on the character of significant social objectives in themselves. Thomas Kuhn's warnings prove to be as true for society as they are for science; intellectual achievements once valued for their explanatory power instead become totemic artifacts, reverence of which impedes further speculation.[2]

The result can be costly indeed. It has already exacted a tragic price in the destruction of life and culture owing to the signal failure of most Western states to anticipate, comprehend, or respond to the forces emerging to shape a world that seems to be bursting forth upon us. Accordingly, the purpose of this essay is to examine the case of one such theory-become-obstacle; to briefly chart its path from theoretical model to institutional monolith; to explore some of the ways in which it has imposed a state of arrested development upon present American perceptions of, and actions toward, the issues and ideas addressed by other contributors to this issue that have moved from periphery to pivot at the turn of the age; and to suggest at least a few ways in which the intellectual constraints it imposes might be overcome in hopes of broadening the array of intellectual resources we bring to bear in seeking to understand how the widening range of actors—states, movements, institutions, corporations—interact on the world scene.

Any such inquiry is necessarily based on a number of assumptions about how the forces shaping human experience are examined by scholars with a view to generating descriptive generalizations and propositions about social groups and their interaction; and how social theory, in turn, is translated into prescriptive guidance and communicated as such to those holding the authority and responsibility to fashion policy on behalf of the state.[3] The scope of the present effort does not allow a detailed examination of how ideas and theoretical tools are communicated from the academy to the halls of government, nor of the impact of the trend within social science disciplines since midcentury toward greater analytical rigor and a more "scientific" method on the relationship between academic research and policy choices.[4] Scholarship and statecraft are two distinct undertakings, and much effort is expended by individuals on each side in seeking to understand the ideas of the other. I simply assert here that ideas have conse-

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quences, and that these consequences are often, if not predominantly, not so much the creature of the scholarly endeavor as the result of how policymakers interpret and apply the findings of scholarship.

What we must keep in mind through the course of what follows is that theoretical paradigms developed to explain social phenomena have salience to the work of those who craft policy—and never more urgently than when those phenomena are perceived to be central to the etiology of conflict between or within states or social groups. Scholars may, and do, despair over how their work is understood and applied by policymakers. But seen from the perspective of the latter, the task of the scholar does not end in the articulation of theoretical constructs that explain the sources of conflict along political, economic, cultural, or racial lines. Faced with the accelerating pace of change and the growing destructive potential of violence wrought by smaller and smaller actors on the world stage, the policymaker looks to the theorist for assistance when finally the question is confronted, "What then shall we do?" For the scholar, answering the question means enduring what will be seen as a misapprehended and clumsy application of clear and elegant theory, and on occasion it is a painful lesson in humility as well. As Wilson argued in the opening lines of the essay quoted above, written while he was still a professor at Princeton:

> The men who act stand nearer the mass of men than do the men who write; and it is at their hands that new thought gets its translation into the crude language of deeds. The very crudity of that language exasperates the sensibilities of the author; and his exasperation proves the world's point—proves that, though he may be back of the leaders, he is not the leader.[5]

FROM THEORY TO DECISION-MAKING CULTURE

Our task, then, is to demonstrate the trouble that can result when scholarly concepts grow into institutional paradigms for understanding a range of social phenomena far broader than that originally comprehended by the theory itself. The set of concepts I have in mind has, in the span of the past five decades, come to be the lens through which the United States—or, perhaps more accurately, its policy culture or (to employ a term of art) strategic

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culture—perceives and interprets much of the world.[6] I am speaking here of *deterrence*.

Of course, the idea of positing a deterrent threat in order to prohibit a specific behavior is at least as old as God's setting out the occupancy rules for the Garden of Eden.[7] As a means of describing international conduct and contact, however, deterrence has a fairly short history, not appearing in the writings of international-relations theorists until the first years after the dawning of the nuclear age.[8] Those who first sought to express the gravity of the security dilemma imposed by the unimaginable destructive power of atomic weapons could (and did) find some parallel to the concept they had in mind in writers as ancient as Thucydides or as strangely modern as Machiavelli; however, their efforts were self-consciously new, and their writings were almost calculated to shock readers—particularly those within the policy-making community—with the frightening reality of absolute terror. It was Bernard Brodie, a Chicago-trained political scientist, who early and famously set the terms of deterrence in the nuclear age for the whole of the instrument of force: "Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost no other useful purpose."[9]

Many of the early theorists of the nuclear dilemma brought the intellectual framework of training in the social sciences to their task, and as such it is understandable that much of their work reflects an effort to grasp the historical scale of the new circumstances they faced.[10] Quite soon, however, the focus of deterrence theory per se was narrowed to deal specifically with one overarching objective: preventing a nuclear exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union. History made interesting reading, but policymakers needed a theoretical model that provided some guidance for decision in the terra incognita of a world in which the United States was confronted with other nuclear-armed states. Intellectually, the issues at stake seemed most readily reduced by a highly systematic, rigidly logical approach; accordingly, paralleling (and to some degree, perhaps, anticipating) the postwar pattern throughout American social science toward an emphasis on scientific rigor, the study of deterrence shifted away from historical, descriptive efforts in favor of a rigidly analytical, quantitative

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approach.[11] Lawrence Freedman has wryly observed that among the "formal strategists," virtually all of whom were civilians (and most of whom came not from government but from within the academy), "the appearance of quantification was taken to indicate rigorous scholarship."[12]

Thus, the single most significant element of US global engagement became, in a real sense, a branch of such academic fields as decision theory and, within it, game theory, for "it provided a means of reducing strategic problems to a manageable form in which the dilemma and the paradoxes of the age could be bared and solutions explored."[13] Deterrence theory became what policymakers needed it to be: normative and prescriptive. Its practitioners could report with considerable precision a specific and necessary course of action to responsible officials.

Of course this short summary greatly simplifies the story of the many political, economic, and technological factors that combined to influence US perspectives toward what was then perceived as the most significant threat to the nation's security.[14] The point to be made here is that the explanatory power of a highly quantitative, rigidly analytical theoretical approach to a social-psychological phenomenon—the deterrent relationship—raised its assumptions and insights to the level of verities in the eyes of those to whom it fell to translate theory into practice. Acknowledging the dangers thus opened, one of the leading civilian formal strategists had warned against a too-broad imposition of abstract theory on complex reality: ". . .the mathematical structure of the payoff function should not be permitted to dominate the analysis. . .there is a danger in too much abstractness. . .some *essential* part of the study of mixed-motive games is necessarily empirical."[15] But for those confronted with the day-to-day realities of steady technological advancements and oscillating political tensions, these attempts at scholarly nuance unduly complicated the problem of arriving quickly and efficiently at a workable solution to the looming predicament of assuring stable deterrence. With remarkable speed, the ideas and intellectual framework posited by a body of abstract deterrence theory developed chiefly by scholars penetrated offices and agencies of the government, fundamentally shaping the sort of information sought about potential adversaries, the analytical tools used to explain the behavior of states across a wide spectrum of

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functional issues—even the evolution of the postwar US decision-making structure itself.

More than two decades ago, Alexander George and Richard Smoke identified the dangers for American thinking about not just conflict, but indeed American global engagement across the board, given the exclusive (if justified) focus on so highly polarized an approach to deterrence. In reviewing the evolution of deterrence thought in the three decades after the dawn of the nuclear age, George and Smoke noted that policymakers, struggling with the dilemma of security in a bipolar nuclear world, had separated the concept of deterrence from traditional diplomacy, and then had further parsed the problem of nuclear deterrence from the broader question of deterring an adversary. Here was the form and direction that would be taken by scholarly inquiry; addressed to the most worrying difficulties officials faced, it naturally enjoyed the greatest degree of official interest and research support. Little surprise, then, that it enjoyed the greatest advances both in theory and practice.[16] Such interest as did exist among practitioners in the question of nationalism or the significance of ethnicity was pursued as a peripheral concern, the logic of which was meaningful only in the context of a bipolar international structure.

Writing during the early 1970s US-Soviet détente, George and Smoke took it as their task to address what they perceived as the eroding geopolitics of bipolarity by restoring to the understanding of deterrence the sorts of considerations not so easily reduced to game-theory matrices. If it was true that the rarefied analytical tools of the formal strategists had succeeded in addressing the overarching problem of nuclear deterrence, they also had "the negative effect of reinforcing the policy-makers' tendency to rely too heavily on deterrence strategy and deterrent threats in lieu of the more flexible instruments of inter-nation influence associated with classical diplomacy."[17] In a work of exemplary scholarship, George and Smoke identified and examined seven simplifications inherent in the abstract (i.e., ultimate stakes) deterrence model that made suspect its normative application to threats of lesser magnitude, reviewed a range of empirical approaches to the study of deterrence, and offered eleven detailed case studies by way of building a suggested reformulation of deterrence theory intended to restore a sense of humility to the claims made by champions of

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the deductivist approach—an acknowledgment that American responses to the broad array of sources of human conflict had suffered from the failure to "define limits to the scope and relevance of deterrence strategy."[18] It is not clear that this admirable effort at scholarly precision and refinement had its intended effect on the thinking of policymakers, however; indeed, the trend toward inappropriate application continued and broadened. Having achieved unchallenged stature as the intellectual approach uniquely suited to guiding us safely through the nuclear conundrum, deterrence theory continued to be regarded as an appropriate framework of expectations, norms, and processes for approaching a far broader range of challenges in the world, whether or not they involved issues of security. After some five decades of conditioning, we tend to see all the complexity of the international arena—resource scarcity, trade relationships, environmental degradation, alliance-building, even intensifying ethnic identity and the phenomenon of religious nationalism—through a quite distorted lens of deterrence theory, which takes in the full spectrum of phenomena shaping the world outside our cognitive borders and transmits it to us as a stark, white light. Not surprisingly, our responses exhibit a distressing tendency to be reflexive and polarized as well.

How much more true today is the collapse of the bipolar geopolitical order that inspired George and Smoke to warn in 1974 that deterrence was too narrow a slit through which to see the world. Yet oddly, in almost Kuhnian fashion, the notion of deterrence has become in and of itself a unifying theme—not merely of the means of our policies, but of their objectives as well. Once we sought, by means of deterring nuclear conflict, the success of a range of international initiatives. Now, having expended enormous effort and vast resources in building extensive military forces, constructing government agencies—even molding the language of policy pronouncements and deliberations—so as to shore up the image (and self-image) of resolve, deterrence emerges instead as our goal, with other elements of our international conduct assayed in terms of their potential contribution to the credibility of our deterrent posture. Little surprise, in one critic's epithet, that US post–Cold War international discourse may be summarized as "the rush to posture." Trapped in our theory-become-sacred-object, we dare not contemplate the alternatives.

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One can find ample evidence of this tendency in the annual external policy pronouncements of the post–Cold War US administrations. These, distilled into the tellingly titled *National Security Strategy of the United States*, make clear that virtually every angle of the approach taken by our institutions to the world outside our borders is calibrated from a single point of origin—the ability to stop another international actor from following a course perceived to be inimical to our interests. Consider this extract:

> Our national security strategy is based on enlarging the community of market democracies while deterring and containing a range of threats to our nation, our allies and our interests. . . . *To that broad end*, the report explains the three central components of our strategy of engagement and enlargement: our efforts to enhance our security by maintaining a strong defense capability and promoting cooperative security measures; our work to open foreign markets and spur global economic growth; and our promotion of democracy abroad.[19]

Most such policy statements are uselessly anodyne, of course; but to the extent that basic assumptions can be identified, and the relationships between means and objectives traced, they reveal our intellectual effort to comprehend new and resurgent forces shaping relationships between intraglobal communities to be wanting.

FIRST STEPS TOWARD A NEW FRAMEWORK

How shall we break free from the misleading (and, arguably, potentially destructive) confines imposed on all our international discourse—whether or not that interaction involves state actors—by the culture of deterrence?

It was Raymond Aron who noted that what had once seemed a clear distinction between industrial and military societies had come to be regarded by contemporary philosophers of history as, in fact, no distinction at all; "Europe knows today," Aron wrote, "that industry, far from preventing war, gives it a limitless scope."[20] Pierre Hassner, recalling Aron, has carried this idea forward, reviewing the intellectual progression from theories of universal history to modern society and, ultimately, to the question of human nature. From this, Hassner suggests a disturbing prospect:

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> We have reached, then, the ultimate dimension of our subject, a dimension which goes beyond inter-state war. As long as there are several states, war between them will be possible; but. . .it has already lost its justification, or its meaning, and it may become less and less frequent and less and less central for political life. But could it be that the decline of war would have to be paid for with an increase of private, individual or civil violence?[21]

The question posed by Plato, and recalled, appropriately, by Hassner, confronts us, despite our "postworld" sensibilities: What may we say, indeed what must we say, of the relation between the structure of the soul, of the community, and of the world?

Set in these terms, the question recalls immediately the three levels of analysis suggested by Kenneth Waltz more than thirty years ago (significantly, before the ascendance of abstract deterrence theory made many of the questions he addressed seemingly irrelevant) as a means of categorizing explanations for the causes of human conflict—the individual (human nature), the state, and the structure of the international system.[22] In recent years, some careful expeditions of rediscovery have been undertaken by scholars in each of these areas, particularly in the first two.

Attempts to comprehend the forming of individual identity through the modalities of ethnic and religious nationalism have found earlier work on the question of nationalism (with which many intellectuals were seized in the interwar years) to hold, if not enduring answers, at least relevant questions, and more recent theoretical approaches (such as rational-choice theory) have been brought to bear on ethnic conflict.[23] Regarding the question of state structures and their implications for conflict, a small literature has flourished of late testing the long-held view that democratic states do not war with each other.[24] At the level of the international system, a few ambitious writers (for example, Edward Mansfield) have sought empirically to identify relationships between the structure of international power relationships (concentrated or diffuse?), the breadth and depth of trade relationships (extensive or narrow?), and the likelihood of conflict.[25]

Yet, in translating the findings of such work into new analytical tools for the use of policymakers contending with tensions arising from ethnicity, religion, or other communal sources, scholars will have more to overcome than the deeply ingrained perspectives,

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values, and even language inculcated by the deterrence world view. They will confront the unhappy and complicated experience of the United States in dealing with the phenomena of nationalism. It is not possible here even to survey this question, other than to point out that the guiding principles that have dominated the American approach to diplomacy—whether they called for subordinating the activities and behavior of states to international juridical regimes, or restraining them by the drawn sword of deterrence—have, at base, long been founded on what Secretary of State Madeleine Albright has in a different context lauded as "an explicit rejection of politics based on ethnic identification."[26]

Indeed, the paradox is that American efforts to attenuate the forces of nationalism have tended instead to reinforce them. The failings of "international legalism" along these lines were noted by Kennan, in a passage worth quoting at length:

> . . .while this concept is often associated with a revolt against nationalism, it is a curious thing that it actually tends to confer upon the concept of nationality and national sovereignty an absolute value it did not have before. The very principle of "one nation, one vote," regardless of physical or political differences between states, glorifies the concept of national sovereignty and makes it the exclusive form of participation in international life. It envisages a world composed exclusively of sovereign national states with a full equality of status. In doing this, it ignores the tremendous variations in the firmness and soundness of national divisions: the fact that the origins of state borders and national personalities were in many instances fortuitous or at least poorly related to realities. It also ignores the law of change. The national state pattern is not, should not be, and cannot be a fixed and static thing. By nature, it is an unstable phenomenon in a constant state of change and flux. History has shown that the will and the capacity of individual peoples to contribute to their world environment is constantly changing.[27]

It hardly seems necessary to point out that the ascendance of deterrence theory to supplant legalism as a guiding principle of postwar American external affairs—with its assumptions of unitary, value-maximizing, rational actors, pursuing connected and transitive preferences in logically consistent fashion—added little to the tools available to policymakers for understanding the nationalist urge. Yet the deterrence world view has set in place strong

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preferences for thinking and speaking about the world in specific ways; even in trying to describe the dynamism of the emergent forces of nationalism to broader audiences (chiefly including, we may surmise, policymakers), scholars have tended to lapse into the more familiar language of the days when deterrence held the answers. Thus, for example, one of the best-received recent studies of religious nationalism appeared under the title *The New Cold War?*[28]

We may already have before us the first few attempts by policymakers to articulate, drawing on the work of scholars, a broad set of principles that might aspire to supplant deterrence as a means of orienting the path of policy through an unfamiliar landscape of communal conflict and failing states. Unfortunately, these initial efforts do not seem likely to inspire confidence, much less to offer the sort of encompassing prescriptive utility that policymakers expect from social theory—and that scholars find worrisome.

One such attempt centers on the debate over the importance of state structure in reducing both inter- and intranational conflict. The scholars' question of whether democracies are or are not more inclined to be pacific neighbors has been answered by the strategists in the affirmative. This is a theme that has been taken up frequently, if unsystematically, by Clinton; it is the outlook that informs the Clinton administration's successive editions of the annual presidential policy statements on national security, which under Clinton have taken on a new title with curiously expansionistic overtones: *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement.*

The theme has been given more extended recent treatment by Clinton's deputy secretary of state, Strobe Talbott. While at least acknowledging that the question is still regarded as open among theorists, Talbott asserts that "[t]he larger and more close-knit the community of nations that choose democratic forms of government, the safer and more prosperous Americans will be, since democracies are demonstrably more likely to maintain their international commitments, less likely to engage in terrorism or wreak environmental damage, and less likely to make war on each other."[29] The principle for action thus suggested is not, however, unconditional: "Support for democracy is not an absolute imperative that

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automatically takes precedence over competing goals; rather, it is a strong thread to be woven into the complex tapestry of American foreign policy."[30] So far, so good; but neither Talbott nor any other official of similar or higher rank have yet offered any systematic examination of exactly what specific measures, or means of assessment, such a principle would suggest in designing the "complex tapestry" to be something more than a haphazard weaving. What would such a guiding principle suggest by way of dealing with, say, the Kurdish question? What of states in which the democratic experiment seems likely to fail, or unlikely even to be attempted? Moreover, what guidance does it offer in cases of conflict between democratic states and ethnic or religious minorities within their boundaries—or between two democratic states, as very nearly happened between Peru and Ecuador in January of 1995, and between Greece and Turkey a year later?

It is not immediately evident how the principle of support for democratization could be further developed into broader guidance addressing the expanding range of questions that characterize the post–Cold War global setting. This is less so the case, however, with respect to a second recent theme that takes up the question of the structure of the international system: an increased emphasis on multilateral institutions. With the bipolar international structure of overlapping alliance relationships now robbed of its *raison d'être*, US policymakers have sought increasingly to bolster multilateral and alliance mechanisms through which the task of addressing interstate and subnational conflict could be shared. This emphasis can be seen as the unifying theme behind such developments as Washington's insistence, despite a lively debate over the wisdom of such a step, on expanding the membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, while broadening its remit to encompass threats to security arising from violence within states on NATO's periphery (specifically, the NATO-organized Implementation Force and Supporting Force in the former Yugoslavia); the Clinton administration's hopes to achieve ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention, despite a Senate Foreign Relations Committee ill disposed to the idea; the US decision to oppose Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his attempt to seek a second term as secretary-general of the United Nations; the US role in crafting the World Trade Organization as the principal achievement of the Uruguay

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Round of the GATT; and renewed American interest in multilateral organizations in the Pacific, particularly the Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum.

Whether or not one agrees with the approach, it may at least be said that multilateralism offers a fairly ready answer to most functionally and regionally defined items on the American agenda. It is not so clear, however, that as a guiding principle it holds much promise in addressing communal violence arising from ethnic or religious sources. Indeed, such an approach seems to fall open to Kennan's critique of legalism, quoted above; if nationhood is the necessary condition of standing in such fora, then an emphasis on multilateralism will only serve to increase the stakes for those seeking recognition of a nationalist movement.

A third response has attempted to press forward the guidance offered by traditional (deductivist) deterrent theory in employing the instrument of military force. The problem itself is set in different terms, a reflection of the unsuitability of the classical deterrence model to present challenges: perhaps we cannot reliably deter an adversary from taking a certain inimical course of action, but might we instead compel that adversary to behave in certain ways? This line of approach has both theoretical and practical underpinnings. Most notably among the formal strategists, Schelling was interested in the problem of compellence and examined it at some length, describing compellent threats as an example of self-consciously risky behavior that sought to influence an adversary's behavior by quite intentionally leaving to chance a mutually painful outcome.[31] The context of this analysis was, of course, that of nuclear-armed adversaries; but the ideas presented there have become the subject of renewed interest among both theorists and practitioners in war colleges and military academies. The idea of compellence also has practical attractions to American policymakers because of the decisiveness it implies in utilizing force—a theme echoed in the "sufficiency criterion" central to the so-called Weinberger doctrine, a set of tests intended to determine the advisability of using the military instrument.[32]

Perhaps in some cases a more developed theory of compellence might provide guidance to officials faced with the potential of conflict erupting between communal interests, or threats directed against the nation by hostile subnational groups. But it must be

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said that determining how to compel another actor (even if an adversary) to behave or not behave in specific ways does not seem a propitious place to begin a more constructive pattern of engagement, and certainly one likely to foreclose any avenues leading thence. Certainly it does not offer much hope of achieving a more sophisticated understanding of the dynamics of identity that come to be expressed by means of nationalist violence.

Hence, the efforts thus far in evidence to move beyond the limitations of deterrence thinking seem finally unresponsive to the dramatic stresses that show up in high relief, and place under tremendous economic, cultural, even psychological pressure, the profound differences in value systems that lead communities to believe a goal is worth advocating, or in need of defending, by appeal to violence. How then might scholars direct their continuing efforts in order to offer policymakers a more resilient analytical framework with which to approach an increasingly fragmented and violent world?

OUT OF THE FOG

It is not for this writer to forward the theme or substance of a new conceptual approach that would challenge the deterrence paradigm. Indeed, it would be better to do without one altogether; policymakers would be best advised to disenthrall themselves of hopes for a new unified theory, which tends, as we have seen, to impose a wonted simplification on events. Yet notwithstanding this caveat, it seems reasonable to suggest a few lines of inquiry that not only might enhance our understanding of the questions posed within each of the three broad categories of analysis described above but moreover could help to knit together our developing thought within each to the others.

For all of the effort expended over the course of centuries, it is not clear that we have made substantial progress in our understanding of what motivates individuals and small communities to violence since Augustine first posited that original sin lay at the root of interhuman conflict. (Thus Professor Hammerton: "Consideration of whether human beings as a species have an innate tendency towards aggression among themselves has generated a massive literature and negligible evidence: the question remains

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completely open."[33]) The enduring contention surrounding the assertion that humankind is given over to aggression by nature is only sharpened by our *fin-de-siècle* attentiveness to the multifaceted question of human diversity.

It might be well, then, to pose two questions in generally opposed directions. First, what is the true scope of human diversity? Precisely, what can meaningfully be said to make for diversity within the human species? Certainly gender differentiation must be more fully appreciated as a source of essential diversity in the human experience; but what other distinctions might rise or fall in significance upon further assessment? The difficulty of defining with precision the idea of race is one salient example; what of such accepted, and often much studied, concepts as ethnicity, economic welfare (class), religion? As we learn more about the links between logic, language, and culture, might the role of linguistics as a point of departure between human communities merit broader study?

Second, if the impact of these questions is to broaden our understanding of what "diversity" might encompass, we might also narrow the scope of this inquiry by asking: What is the *significance* of these sources of diversity given their probative value in explaining intercommunity conflict? Already the significance of belief systems, particularly as expressed in the phenomenon of religious nationalism, points to one such source of human diversity that seems undeniably prolific, if difficult to quantify, as a source of violence both within and across national boundaries. All expressions of human diversity are worthy of scholarly attention, of course; but if our particular objective is more accurately to render those objective realities that somehow separate and estrange the experiences of one human or group from another and thus become a fulcrum of conflict, we will be justified in paring down our inquiry.

The question of the domestic political structure of nation-states, and the relationship between such structures and the persistence of violence we observe, may seem to have been made moot by the collapse of communism as an alternative idea for organizing polity. Yet, as noted, the idea of a coming *pax democratia* has received considerable scrutiny by historians and international-relations theorists. Kant's enlightenment ideal of perpetual peace built upon a foundation of republican governments in all states may be

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undone by exactly the sort of rigid empiricism he so much detested. But we may take the question further: how will that compound concept of "nation-state" evolve? Liah Greenfeld has asserted provocatively in the pages of *Dædalus* that the persistence of nationalism will not yield to the economic logic of globalization, nor be undermined by its expanding neural network of communications. We could take a step beyond this to ask, might the highest expression of nationalism at some point cease to be the state, and instead come to be regarded as something else?[34]

What is the enduring significance of "state sovereignty," at any rate? What if our response to Hedley Bull's complaint about "those who say that what we have to do is get 'beyond the nation state'" must be: we already have? What does it mean that one of the most successful "national" economies in the world, generating one of the highest standards of individual welfare, is found in a place—Taiwan—that is not even acknowledged to be a state by a majority of governments? Surely we are increasingly alive to the fact that actors other than states can command our attention on the world stage; indeed, with the notable exception of the Gulf War, practically all post-Soviet conflicts have not been between rival states but rather within failed states or between nonstate movements and state institutions. Can the system of nation-states endure such ambiguity? Is there some sense in which "national sovereignty," at least in the sense of commanding loyalty, can exist independently of state institutions—say, for Kurds, or Tibetan Buddhists, or Sikhs, or Algerian Islamists? How many ways can human loyalty be divided—or is the potential of complete disintegration simply too dangerous for us to pose the question?

Such questions take us toward a renewed inquiry into the nature of the international state system or, perhaps more accurately, the structure of global relationships. Already theorists of international relations have revisited the classical models of realism, rationalism, and idealism seeking how they might help to illumine our path toward postmillennial global polities and the relationships between them.[35] All of these approaches may hold explanatory potential, but equally all must be reexamined in order to account for both resurgent and unprecedented phenomena. How can realism account for the irrational fervor of religious nationalism or, more generally, the reality of transnational fundamentalism? Is it

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possible for a rationalist analysis of world politics to encompass such considerations as resource scarcity or the penetration of global communications to even the most remote cultures? How does a Wilsonian idealist contend with the destructive outcomes that have attended the principle of self-determination, originally conceived as a counterpoise to the perceived threat of nationalist movements becoming seduced by communist revolution? What challenges are posed to each of these schools by the global significance of weapons proliferation, environmental degradation, or the conflicts that arise between faith communities?

The issues suggested for examination at each of these three levels of analysis encompass a broad range of disciplines within the academy. While their presentation here is necessarily disjointed, it is possible to reduce the argument to a few broad points. Finding our way out of the fog of a fragmented world requires that we escape the constraints imposed by the pervasive influence of deterrence theory on our institutions for, our thinking about, and our conduct of external relations. Charting that course demands a more rigorous understanding of the sources of human diversity and their role in giving rise to conflict. It is a course that leads through a broadening of political theory to encompass the myriad value structures and loyalties that characterize modern communities and polities, and passes on through the continuing reassessment of the enduring theoretical-systemic approaches to explaining the structure and function of relationships between global communities. Yet recalling Wilson's riverboat captain, we will do well to remember that our "postworld" is not a starlit night but a fog-bound river—not a set of fixed constellations, but a flowing stream subject to the willful currents of ideas and movements. We should not expect that the simplicity and certainty that led us to become so enamored of deterrence theory will characterize either our journey or our destination.

ENDNOTES

[1]Woodrow Wilson, *Leaders of Men* (1890; reprinted, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1952), 46–47.

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[2]Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,* 2d ed.; published as *International Encyclopedia of Unified Science,* vol. 2, no. 2 (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1970). We should be quick to note that Kuhn frequently expressed dismay over the application of his ideas to such phenomena as political revolutions, much less to changes in the orientation of political institutions, which we take as our subject here. Even so, Kuhn's assertion that contending camps in a dispute over theoretical explanations of physical science, though using the same words, comprehend quite different things by them is not without salience in observing current disputes within the academy and the makers of policy over the meaning and implications of such ideas as "ethnic nationalism" or "religious nationalism."

[3]Ted Robert Gurr warned some years ago that "'Theory' is a term loosely used in the social sciences generally and in the study of political violence specifically." Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970), 16. Gurr's careful explanation of "The Nature of Social Theory" reflects the growing emphasis in political theory during the latter half of the twentieth century on analytic precision.

[4]On the trend toward a more "scientific" approach in the social sciences in the years since World War II, see "American Academic Culture in Transformation: Fifty Years, Four Disciplines," *Dædalus* 126 (1) (Winter 1997), especially pt. III.

[5]Wilson, *Leaders of Men,* 19.

[6]A "strategic culture" emerges when "individuals are socialized into a [distinctive] mode of strategic thinking. As a result of this socialization process, a set of general beliefs, attitudes, and behavior patterns. . .has achieved a state of semipermanence that places them on the level of 'culture' rather than mere 'policy.'" Jack L. Snyder, "The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations," Rand Corporation Project Air Force Report R-2154-AF (September 1977): v. Colin Gray examined the question of strategic culture in "National Style in Strategy," *International Security* 6 (2) (Winter 1981): 21–47. See also Ken Booth, *Strategy and Ethnocentrism* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1979). More recent examinations are Stephen Peter Rosen, "Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters"; Alastair Iain Johnston, "Thinking About Strategic Culture"; and Elizabeth Kier, "Culture and Military Doctrine: France between the Wars," all in *International Security* 19 (4) (Spring 1995).

[7]Genesis 2:16: "And the Lord God commanded the man, You may freely eat of every tree in the garden; but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil you shall not eat, for in the day that you eat of it you shall die."

[8]Thus Bernard Brodie: "Deterrence as an element in national strategy or diplomacy is nothing new. Since the development of nuclear weapons, however, the term has acquired not only a special emphasis but also a distinctive connotation." Bernard Brodie, *Strategy in the Missile Age* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1959), 271. Perhaps the best overview of the emergence of early deterrence concepts from earlier (interwar and wartime) ideas of strategic bombardment is Lawrence Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), sec. 1.

[9]Bernard Brodie, ed., *The Absolute Weapon* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1946), 46.

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[10]Brodie, for example, was a historian of naval strategy; his coauthors in *The Absolute Weapon*—which certainly deserves the distinction of being the first sustained consideration of the meaning of the nuclear age for policymakers' decisions—were political scientists (William T. R. Fox, also a Chicago product) and lawyers (Arnold Wolfers, Percy Corbett, and Frederick Dunn), all drawn from Yale's Institute of International Studies. See Fred Kaplan, *The Wizards of Armageddon* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), 19–32. Kaplan also gives an excellent sense of the tension between the outlooks and efforts of scholars from the humanities and scholars from the sciences that characterized the early years of deterrence theory.

[11]Such an approach found its greatest champion in Robert S. McNamara. "He exulted in modern techniques of problem-solving, anxious to extend his range of choice and his devices for choosing between alternatives, attempting quantification to permit rigorous comparisons and resolutely excluding irrelevant criteria." Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy,* 229.

[12]Ibid., 182. The leading "formal strategists" included Thomas Schelling, then a professor at Harvard University; Daniel Ellsberg of the Rand Corporation; and Glenn Snyder, a professor of political science at the State University of New York at Buffalo.

[13]Ibid.

[14]The best summaries are Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*; John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Reappraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982); and Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974).

[15]Thomas Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980), 162; emphasis in original.

[16]George and Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy,* 32–33.

[17]Ibid., 2.

[18]Ibid., 506.

[19]*A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, February 1995); emphasis mine.

[20]Raymond Aron, *The Century of Total War* (Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 1955), 56.

[21]Pierre Hassner, "Beyond the Three Traditions: The Philosophy of War and Peace in Historical Perspective," *International Affairs* 70 (4) (October 1994): 754.

[22]Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954).

[23]For example, Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983); Brian Jenkins and Spyros A. Sofos, eds., *Nation and Identity in Contemporary Europe* (New York: Routledge, 1996); Charles Tilly, ed., *Citizenship, Identity, and Social History* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Albert Breton, ed., *Nationalism and Rationality* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995); and Anthony D. Smith, *National Identity* (London: Penguin Books, 1991). Ashutosh

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Varshney has explored the probative value of rational-choice theory in understanding ethnic conflict; see his "Ethnic Conflict and Rational Choice: A Theoretical Engagement," Center for International Affairs Working Paper 95–11, Cambridge, Mass., October 1995.

[24]See especially Michael Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," *American Political Science Review* 80 (4) (December 1986): 1151–1169; Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993); David E. Spiro, "The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace," *International Security* 19 (2) (Fall 1994): 50–86; Christopher Layne, "Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace," *International Security* 19 (2) (Fall 1994): 5–49; and Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," *International Security* 20 (1) (Summer 1995): 5–38.

[25]Edward D. Mansfield, *Power, Trade, and War* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994).

[26]Madeleine K. Albright, statement before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 8 January 1997.

[27]George F. Kennan, *American Diplomacy* (expanded ed.; Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 97–98.

[28]Mark Juergensmeyer, *The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1993). The review of Juergensmeyer's book that appeared in the *New York Times* seems to confirm the idea that the study was intended for a policy-making audience: "Clearly, Western policy makers have to take account of the reborn religious dimension in geopolitics, and Mr. Juergensmeyer's book serves as a useful introduction; it is something President Clinton will find it worth his while to read." Paul Johnson, "Our God Can Lick Your God" (Review of Juergensmeyer, *The New Cold War?*), *New York Times Book Review,* 9 May 1993, 7.

[29]Strobe Talbott, "Democracy and the National Interest," *Foreign Affairs* 75 (6) (November/December 1996): 48–49.

[30]Ibid., 52.

[31]Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict,* 195–199.

[32]The "Weinberger Doctrine" is set forth in Caspar Weinberger, "U.S. Defense Policy," *Foreign Affairs* 64 (4) (Spring 1986): 675–697. Weinberger's intent was to establish a number of rigorous tests against which the decision to use force would be measured. The "sufficiency criterion" required that "[s]hould the United States decide. . .to commit its forces to combat, we must commit them in sufficient numbers and with sufficient support to win." Ibid., 686. This emphasis on sufficiency was Weinberger's response to the incrementalism that had grievously characterized US involvement in Vietnam. Weinberger's failure to follow his own advice was made plain by the disasters that befell US forces in Lebanon within half a year after his essay appeared.

[33]M. Hammerton, "Military Mind," entry in *The Oxford Companion to the Mind* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 486.

[34]Liah Greenfeld, "Transcending the Nation's Worth," *Dædalus* 122 (3) (Summer 1993): 47–62.

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[35]In addition to Hassner's essay cited above, recent efforts along these lines include John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," and William C. Wohlforth, "Realism and the End of the Cold War," all in *International Security* 19 (3) (Winter 1994–1995); Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory," Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "The Promise of Collective Security," John Gerard Ruggie, "The False Promise of Realism," and Alexander Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," all in *International Security* 20 (1) (Summer 1995). A recent survey is James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., *Contending Theories of International Relations,* 4th ed. (New York: Addison Wesley Longman, 1997).

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The remarks which follow are, of course, thoroughly subjective, and undoubtedly jaundiced. I am more struck by the dead ends than by the breakthroughs; by the particular, often brilliant, occasionally elegant, but generally nonadditive contributions to specific parts of the field, than by its overall development; by the contradictions that have rent its community of scholars, than by its harmony. . . . If I had to single out three significant "advances," I would list the concept of the international system, an attempt to do for international relations what the concept of a political regime does for "domestic" political science: it is a way of ordering data, a construct for describing both the way in which the parts relate, and the way in which patterns of interaction change. . . . Next, I would mention the way in which the literature on deterrence has analyzed and codified "rules of the game" which have been accepted as such by American statesmen, and which have served as the intellectual foundation of the search for tacit as well as explicit interstate restraints: MAD ("Mutual Assured Destruction") and arms control are the two controversial but influential offsprings of the doomsday science. Third, there is the current attempt to study the political roots, the originality, and the effects of economic interdependence, particularly in order to establish whether it shatters the "realist" paradigm, which sees international relations as marked by the predominance of conflict among state actors. And yet, if I were asked to assign three books from the discipline to a recluse on a desert island, I would have to confess a double embarrassment: for I would select one that is more than two thousand years old—Thucydides' *Peloponnesian War,* and as for the two contemporary ones, Kenneth Waltz's *Man, the State and War* is a work in the tradition of political philosophy, and Aron's *Peace and War* is a work in the grand tradition of historical sociology. . . . All three works avoid jargon; the two contemporary ones carry their erudition lightly: the sweat of toil is missing. How more unscientific can you get?

Stanley Hoffmann

From "An American Social Science:
International Relations"
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